nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2014‒01‒10
nine papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Formal planning and the reshaping of public sector professional work By Maria Lusiani
  2. From hybrid TV towards transmedia: Recent marketing advances of the New Media developments By Hsu, Wen-yi; Shih, Stone
  3. An Economic Evaluation of Peru's LNG Export Policy By Leonard Leung; Glenn Jenkins
  4. Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations By Jean-Etienne de Bettignies; Jan Zabojnik
  5. From …fixed to state-dependent duration in public-private contracts By Daniel Danau; Annalisa Vinella
  6. How to Define and Analyze Business Model Innovation in Service By Xavier Pavie; Eva Hsu; Hanns Justus Tillman Rödle; Raquel Orozco Tapia
  7. Clean-Development Investments: An Incentive-Compatible CGE Modelling Framework By Christoph Böhringer; Thomas F. Rutherford; Marco Springmann
  8. Working Paper 194 - The Impact of Community Development Works Programs (CWP) on Households’ Wellbeing in Albania By AfDB
  9. Финансовая инновация - миф или реальность? By Kogan, Anton

  1. By: Maria Lusiani (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice)
    Abstract: This paper deals with the ÔmanagerializationÕ of public sector professional work. Specifically, it will focus on the role of formal planning practices (as expressed in strategic planning, project management and budgeting practices) in changing public sector professional work. Planning and accounting are at the heart of public sector reforms, responding to a logic of having public service professionals transparent on what they do, on how they pursue their goals, and accountable on the use of resources and on results. Thus planning and accounting practices have been transferred from private sector management models to public, professional organizations. Yet public sector professional organizations can be conceived as a pluralistic setting characterized by diffuse power, fragmented objectives and knowledgebased and are deeply embedded in public administration regulatory logics: how can management models deriving from private, hierarchical firms be applied to the specificities and complexities of public, pluralistic settings? What is the specific meaning of formal planning practices in such complex contexts? Based on a qualitative, single case study design, this paper will show how the planning system (in its manifestation of strategic planning, project management and budgeting) applied in a public hospital apparently ÔfailsÕ when its deliberate role of serving as a tool for decisions is considered. Yet it is widely in use and widely accepted by professionals as well. Conclusions on the value of formal planning when other emergent roles are taken into account will be discussed.
    Keywords: Planning, public sector, professionals, managerialism.
    JEL: M10
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:69&r=ppm
  2. By: Hsu, Wen-yi; Shih, Stone
    Abstract: Large broadcasters and independent media companies are already aware of the global developments in transmedia storytelling and understand that this is the trend (Gambarato, Renira R., 2012). In Taiwan, the HwaCom New Media project started with a government funded HbbTV development project, and then turned into a transmedia trial. The Fun Travel infrastructure has been built since June, 2013. The HwaCom Systems, Inc. establishes alliances to gain access to other firms' valuable resources. This study focuses on single case and tries to provide an exploration of how strategic alliances help the HwaCom New Media project achieve resource combinations through the resource-based theory of strategic alliances. To facilitate this study, direct observations and a focus group interview were conducted to explore some insights of this trial case... --
    Keywords: complementary resources,Hybrid Broadcast Broadband Television (HBBTV),resource-based theory of strategic alliances,The HwaCom Systems,Inc.,transmedia storytelling (TS)
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse13:88502&r=ppm
  3. By: Leonard Leung (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Canada); Glenn Jenkins (Department of Economics, Queen's University, Canada, Eastern Mediterranean University, Mersin 10, Turkey)
    Abstract: Peru's Camisea gas fields hold nearly ninety percent of the country's natural gas reserves. In the 1990s, the government insisted on prioritizing Camisea gas for domestic consumption. The revocation of this policy in the 2000s allowed the private developers to export forty percent of Camisea's proven gas reserves, equivalent to Peru's one third of the total. This USD 3.9 billion LNG export project boasts the largest single foreign direct investment in Peru's history. A major component of the financing was granted by international financial institutions on economic grounds. While the project was expected to yield a substantial return to the private investors, it is clear that the exportation of one-third of Peru's total proven natural gas reserves is not aligned with its long term interests. In this paper, a cost-benefit analysis is undertaken under a series of scenarios starting with the situation during the projects formative stage in mid-2000s and again in 2012, two years after its commercial operation. In all cases, Peru does not have sufficient reserves to warrant export, and the economic costs far exceed the benefits. This project should not have been approved by the government, nor should have the loans been granted by the international financial institutions.
    Keywords: Peru, Camisea gas fields, LNG export, cost-benefit analysis, energy trade
    JEL: Q38 D61
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:dpaper:227&r=ppm
  4. By: Jean-Etienne de Bettignies (Queen); Jan Zabojnik (Queen)
    Abstract: We examine optimal information flows between a manager and a worker who is in charge of evaluating a parameter of interest, e.g. the value of a project. The manager may possesses information about the parameter, and, if informed, may divulge her information to the worker. We show that information sharing may weaken the worker's incentives and that, consequently, the manager may find it optimal to conceal her information from the worker. Moreover, the manager faces a time-inconsistency problem, which leads her to conceal her information more often than she would if she could commit to an information sharing policy. We build on these results to address issues related to authority in organizations.
    Keywords: Information non-disclosure, expert evaluation, agency costs, authority
    JEL: D21 D82 L23
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1321&r=ppm
  5. By: Daniel Danau (University of Caen Basse-Normandie, CREM CNRS UMR 6211, France); Annalisa Vinella (Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", Italy)
    Abstract: A government delegates a build-operate-transfer project to a private firm. At the contracting stage, the operating cost is unknown. The firm can increase the likelihood of facing a low cost (the good state) by exerting effort when building the infrastructure. Once this is in place, the firm learns the true cost and begins to operate. Under limited commitment, either the firm or the government may renege on the contract. Within this context, we explore how well a contract with a state-dependent duration performs, as compared to the more standard fixed-term contract. Under full commitment, the efficient allocation is decentralized, whether the contractual term is fixed or state-dependent. Under limited commitment, in situations where break-up of the partnership is little costly for the government, the efficient allocation can be decentralized only if it is stipulated that the duration of the contract will be longer in the good state than in the bad state. This result is at odds with the prescription of the literature on "flexible-term" contracts, which recommends a longer contractual length when the operating conditions are unfavourable.
    Keywords: Fixed-term contract, state-dependent duration, limited commitment, renegotiation, public-private partnerships
    JEL: D82 H57 H81
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201344&r=ppm
  6. By: Xavier Pavie (PhD Program - ESSEC Business School); Eva Hsu (The Chinese University of Hong Kong - The Chinese University of Hong Kong); Hanns Justus Tillman Rödle (School of Business, Economics and Law - University of Gothenburg - (SWEDEN)); Raquel Orozco Tapia (Universidad Argentina de la empresa of Buenos Aires - Universidad Argentina de la empresa of Buenos Aires)
    Abstract: This research deals with the process of business model innovation in services. Definitions and explanations of both general innovation terminologies as well as specific service related once will be given and discussed. Moreover, reasons and implementation strategies will be identified and discussed. Last but not least a case will be elaborated how innovative companies in products can become innovative in services.
    Keywords: Business Model ; Business Model Canvas ; Business Model Innovation ; Change Management ; Incremental Innovation, Innovation Management, Innovation Strategy ; Radical Innovation ; Service Innovation ; Service Management
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00921420&r=ppm
  7. By: Christoph Böhringer (University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy & ZenTra); Thomas F. Rutherford (University of Wisconsin-Madison - Agricultural & Applied Economics); Marco Springmann (University of Oldenburg - Economic Policy)
    Abstract: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) established under the Kyoto Protocol allows industrialized Annex I countries to offset part of their domestic emissions by investing in emissions-reduction projects in developing non-Annex I countries. We present a novel CDM modelling framework which can be used in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to quantify the sector-specific and macroeconomic impacts of CDM investments. Compared to conventional approaches that mimic the CDM as sectoral emissions trading, our framework adopts a microeconomically consistent representation of the CDM incentive structure and its investment characteristics. In our empirical application we show that incentive compatibility implies that the sectors implementing CDM projects do not suffer, and that overall cost savings from the CDM tend to be lower than suggested by conventional modelling approaches.
    Keywords: Clean Development Mechanism, Computable General Equilibrium Modelling
    JEL: C68 Q58
    Date: 2013–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zen:wpaper:23&r=ppm
  8. By: AfDB
    Date: 2014–01–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adb:adbwps:998&r=ppm
  9. By: Kogan, Anton
    Abstract: The article analyzes the ways of making investment decisions. The use of net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) are criticized. Describes the indicator « the indicator of the speed of specific increment in value» (IS). The numerical example, proposed in the form of a business game, it is shown that the economy, the subjects of which use IS instead of NPV and IRR, has accelerated the pace of development.
    Keywords: Estimation of efficiency of investments, economics of innovation.
    JEL: C71 D22 D24 G17 G31 O16
    Date: 2013–12–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:52739&r=ppm

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