nep-ppm New Economics Papers
on Project, Program and Portfolio Management
Issue of 2013‒05‒19
seven papers chosen by
Arvi Kuura
Parnu College - Tartu University

  1. Governance and success of university-industry collaborations on the basis of Ph.D. projects: an explorative study By Negin Salimi; Rudi Bekkers; Koen Frenken
  2. Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening By Andrei Barbos
  3. Providing negative cost public projects under a fair mechanism: An experimental analysis By Werner Güth; Anastasios Koukoumelis; M. Vittoria Levati; Matteo Ploner
  4. Evaluation of Development Programs: Using Regressions to assess the Impact of Complex Interventions By Chris Elbers; Jan Willem Gunning
  5. Strategic versus Financial Investors: The Role of Strategic Objectives in Financial Contracting By Stefan Arping; Sonia Falconieri
  6. Ability Dispersion and Team Performance: A Field Experiment By Sander Hoogendoorn; Simon C. Parker; Mirjam van Praag
  7. Ethnic Diversity and Team Performance: A Field Experiment By Sander Hoogendoorn; Mirjam van Praag

  1. By: Negin Salimi; Rudi Bekkers; Koen Frenken
    Abstract: Faced with ever-increasing pressure to innovate and perform, firms consider universities as a significant, external source of knowledge. There is a variety of ways through which such knowledge flow can take place, including academic publications, contract research, staff mobility and university patents and licenses, but also more collaborative modes such as joint research projects. This paper focuses on a specific – and promising – collaborative model, in which firms and universities are together involved in a Ph.D. project, carried out by a doctoral candidate. We model the relationship on the one hand on various aspects of governance, and the success of the collaboration on the other. Here, success is operationalized in a number of different ways, including the successful transfer, the application and the commercialization of knowledge. Our model was tested using a survey conducted at the Eindhoven University of Technology. We conclude that governance decisions have a significant impact on the ultimate success. Among other things, the choice of university supervisor plays a pivotal role. Moreover, success is more likely if there is joint decision-making by both university and partner on the content of the project, and communication between the Ph.D. candidate and their supervisor in the firm has a high frequency and quality. We believe our findings can help universities and firms to collaborate successfully.
    Keywords: Collaborative Ph.D. projects; governance of university-industry collaborations; collaboration success.
    Date: 2013–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:tuecis:wpaper:1305&r=ppm
  2. By: Andrei Barbos (Department of Economics, University of South Florida)
    Abstract: This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specifcation, an increase in the submis- sion fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.
    Keywords: Evaluation, Project Screening, Regulatory Burden
    JEL: D02 D82 L50
    Date: 2013–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usf:wpaper:0613&r=ppm
  3. By: Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group); Anastasios Koukoumelis (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group); M. Vittoria Levati (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, and Department of Economics, University of Verona); Matteo Ploner (DECO-CEEL, University of Trento)
    Abstract: This paper experimentally examines a procedurally fair provision mech- anism allowing members of a small community to determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experi- ments with positive cost projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism re- mains conducive to efficiency when negative cost, but less efficient, projects are made available. We find that this is not the case. On the other hand, we detect no significant difference in bid levels depending on whether mixed feelings are present or absent, and on whether the others' valuations are known or unknown.
    Keywords: Public projects, Bidding behavior, Procedural fairness, Experiment
    JEL: C72 C92 D63 H44
    Date: 2013–05–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-021&r=ppm
  4. By: Chris Elbers (VU University Amsterdam); Jan Willem Gunning (VU University Amsterdam)
    Abstract: There is a growing interest in extending project evaluation methods to the evaluation of programs: complex interventions involving multiple activities. In general a program evaluation cannot be based on separate evaluations of its components since interactions between the activities are likely to be important. We propose a measure of program impact, the total program effect (TPE), which is an extension of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Regression techniques can be applied to observational data from a representative sample to estimate the TPE for complex interventions in the presence of selection effects and treatment heterogeneity. As an example we present an estimate of the TPE for a rural water supply and sanitation program in Mozambique. Estimating the TPE from randomized controlled trials would appear to be an alternative; however, the scope for using RCTs in this context is limited.
    Keywords: program evaluation, randomized controlled trials, policy evaluation, treatment heterogeneity, budget support, sector-wide programs, aid effectiveness
    JEL: C21 C33 O22
    Date: 2012–07–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:2012081&r=ppm
  5. By: Stefan Arping (University of Amsterdam); Sonia Falconieri (Brunel University)
    Abstract: Strategic investors, such as corporate venture capitalists, engage in the financing of start-up firms to complement their core businesses and to facilitate the internalization of externalities. We argue that while strategic objectives make it more worthwhile for an investor to elicit high entrepreneurial effort, they can also undermine his commitment to penalize poorly performing entrepreneurs by terminating their projects. Based on this tradeoff we develop a theory of financing choice between strategic and financial investors. Our framework provides insights into the design of corporate venturing deals and the choice between corporate venturing and independent venture capital finance.
    Keywords: Corporate Venturing, Soft Budget Constraint
    JEL: G20 G24 G32
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:0000036&r=ppm
  6. By: Sander Hoogendoorn (University of Amsterdam); Simon C. Parker (University of Western Ontario, Richard Ivey School of Business); Mirjam van Praag (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: This paper studies the impact of diversity in cognitive ability among members of a team on their performance. We conduct a large field experiment in which teams start up and manage real companies under identical circumstances. Exogenous variation in - otherwise random - team composition is imposed by assigning individuals to teams based on their measured cognitive abilities. The setting is one of business management practices in the longer run where tasks are diverse and involve complex decision-making. We propose a model in which greater ability dispersion generates greater knowledge for a team, but also increases the costs of monitoring necessitated by moral hazard. Consistent with the predictions of our model, we find that team performance as measured in terms of sales, profits and profits per share first increases, and then decreases, with ability dispersion. Teams with a moderate degree of ability dispersion also experience fewer dismissals due to few er shirking members in those teams.
    Keywords: Ability dispersion, team performance, field experiment, entrepreneurship, knowledge pooling, moral hazard
    JEL: C93 D83 J24 L25 L26 M13 M54
    Date: 2012–11–29
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:2012130&r=ppm
  7. By: Sander Hoogendoorn (University of Amsterdam); Mirjam van Praag (University of Amsterdam)
    Abstract: One of the most salient and relevant dimensions of team heterogeneity is ethnicity. We measure the causal impact of ethnic diversity on the performance of business teams using a randomized field experiment. We follow 550 students who set up 45 real companies as part of their curriculum in an international business program in the Netherlands. We exploit the fact that companies are set up in realistic though similar circumstances and that we, as outside researchers, had the unique opportunity to exogenously vary the ethnic composition of otherwise randomly composed teams. The student population consists of 55% students with a non-Dutch ethnicity from 53 different countries of origin. We find that a moderate level of ethnic diversity has no effect on team performance in terms of business outcomes (sales, profits and profits per share). However, if at least the majority of team members is ethnically diverse then more ethnic diversity has a positive impact on the performance of teams. In line with theoretical predictions, our data suggest that this positive effect could be related to the more diverse pool of relevant knowledge facilitating (mutual) learning within ethnically diverse teams.
    Keywords: Ethnic diversity, team performance, field experiment, entrepreneurship, (mutual) learning
    JEL: J15 L25 C93 L26 M13 D83
    Date: 2012–07–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:2012068&r=ppm

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