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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Dezhina , Irina; Simachev, Yuri |
| Abstract: | The paper presents the results of 2-year survey conducted in 2011-2012 among Russian universities and companies who jointly implement R&D projects aimed at development of high-tech manufacturing. The joint projects represent a new government instrument to stimulate the development of linkages between universities and companies by giving matching grants for R&D to companies with obligation to order R&D to a university-partner. The objectives of the survey included analysis of motivation for cooperation both from side of universities and companies; primary effects and side-effects of such initiative; changes that may be introduced to the government regulations concerning matching grants. Total 38 teams were surveyed. Our findings show that major motivations from side of universities were access to new practical research tasks from companies, selection of most competitive teams of researchers capable to work with companies, and strengthening reputation in business environment. Companies were interested in getting government funding in order to solve their technological problems; to strengthen, due cooperation with universities, their research capacity, and to use modern research infrastructure located at universities. The analysis allowed identification of the major effects of the matching grants mechanism. They included: strengthening of university orientation towards solving practical tasks which are of interest to business; institutionalization of relations between universities and business in the sphere of innovation activity; broadening of research cooperation and the formation of research consortiums; harmonization of research and educational tasks in universities, and orientation of the parties towards continuing cooperation in the innovation sphere. |
| Keywords: | STI policy evaluation; public R&D subsidies; matching grants; university-industry linkages; behavioral additionality; innovations |
| JEL: | D21 I28 O31 |
| Date: | 2012–12–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43622&r=ppm |
| By: | Werner Güth (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena); Hartmut Kliemt |
| Abstract: | We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an "objective" (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though. |
| Keywords: | Fair Procedures, Egalitarian Mechanisms, Unanimity, Constitutional Political Economy, Non-State Communities, Governing the Commons, Crowding out |
| JEL: | H4 H61 D62 D63 D71 |
| Date: | 2013–01–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2013-003&r=ppm |
| By: | J. Edward Taylor (UC Davis) |
| Abstract: | As soon as a household receives a cash transfer, it usually spends it. This transmits the transfer?s impacts from the beneficiary household to others inside and outside the local economy, including households not eligible for the transfer. As the programme?s influences swirl around the project?s zone of influence (ZOI), they create local general equilibrium (LGE) effects in addition to the programme?s direct impact on the beneficiary households. Local economy-wide impact evaluation (LEWIE) is designed to capture the full impact of government programmes (as well as other exogenous shocks; see Taylor and Filipski, 2012) on local economies. (?) |
| Keywords: | A Methodology for Local Economy-Wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) of Cash Transfers |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipc:wpaper:99&r=ppm |
| By: | Marco Corsino; Roberto Gabriele; Anna Giunta |
| Abstract: | The empirical evidence concerning the impact of R&D subsidies on both sides of the innovation process (input and output) and the overall performance of the firm is mixed. Moreover, while the role of regions in implementing innovation policies has increased since the last decade, little is known on the effectiveness of regional policy. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of a local R&D policy implemented in the Italian province of Trento, during the period 2002-07. The econometric analysis is based on counterfactual models. We evaluate the achievements of the local policy maker with respect to the following objectives: (i) prompt additional investment in innovation; (ii) enhance the overall competitiveness of the business sector in the regional area. We find that R&D incentives positively affect investments in intangible assets and human capital, while they have no effect on firms’ turnover, labor productivity and profitability. |
| Keywords: | Regional Innovation Policy, Ex Post Evaluation, Subsidies, Research and Development, Counterfactual Models |
| JEL: | O25 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtr:wpaper:0169&r=ppm |
| By: | Hirota, Haruaki; Yunoue, Hideo |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a fiscal common-pool problem in a Japanese local government. Especially, we focus on the relationship between council size and land development expenditure of local government using a dataset of 13,989 municipalities in Japan from FY2001 to FY2006. We deal with an identification of causal effects by applying regression discontinuity design’s framework to address problem of endogeneity bias. Our results show that land development expenditure of small municipalities induce the fiscal common-pool problem over public projects. |
| Keywords: | fiscal common-pool problem; council size; government expenditure; regression discontinuity design |
| JEL: | H77 H76 |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43723&r=ppm |
| By: | Iossa, Elisabetta (DEF, University of Rome Tor Vergata, CEPR, CMPO and EIEF); Rey, Patrick (TSE,IDEI) |
| Abstract: | We study how career concerns affect the dynamics of incentives in a multi-period contract, when the agent’s productivity can evolve exogenously (random shocks) or improve endogenously through investment. We show that incentives are stronger and performance is higher when the contract approaches its expiry date. Contrary to common wisdom, long-term contracts may strengthen reputational effects whereas short-term contracting may be optimal when investment has persistent, long-term effects. |
| Keywords: | Career concerns, contract duration,contract renewal, reputation and dynamic incentives. |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:26678&r=ppm |