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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | LE BRETON, Michel (Université de Toulouse 1, GREMAQ and IDEI, Toulouse, France); MORENO-TERNERO, Juan D. (Universidad de Malaga, Spain; Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Seville, Spain; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium); SAVVATEEV, Alexei (New Economic School, Moscow, Russia); WEBER, Shlomo (Southern Methodist University, Dallas, USA and New Economic School, Moscow, Russia) |
| Abstract: | This article studies a model of coalition formation for the joint production (and finance) of public projects, in which agents may belong to multiple coalitions. We show that, if projects are divisible, there always exists a stable (secession-proof) structure, i.e., a structure in which no coalition would reject a proposed arrangement. When projects are in- divisible, stable allocations may fail to exist and, for those cases, we resort to the least core in order to estimate the degree of instability. We also examine the compatibility of stability and fairness on metric environments with indivisible projects. To do so, we explore, among other things, the performance of several well-known solutions (such as the Shapley value, the nucleolus, or the Dutta-Ray value) in these environments. |
| Keywords: | stability, fairness, membership, coalition formation |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2010–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2010079&r=ppm |
| By: | NAGAOKA Sadao |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effects of uncertainty, rent dissipation, and a bundle of patents on corporate licenses. We use a newly developed data set, based on a large-scale survey (4,000 patents) of Japanese inventors, which uniquely covers the nature of the underlying research projects. Our major findings are the following. First, consistent with a theoretical prediction of our model, uncertainty of the licensing value of the patent increases significantly the licensorfs willingness to license, for a given license possibility. This effect significantly accounts for a substantial part of the observed gap between unilateral and cross-licensing for upstream inventions. Second, a higher quality patent is more likely to be offered for a license and more likely to be licensed once offered for a license. Third, the positive effect of the importance of the first mover advantage upon the licensorfs willingness to license is no weaker when the patent is used internally by the licensor. This suggests that the rent dissipation effect is significantly controlled contractually or is weak due to competition in the technology market. Fourth, the size of the bundle of the complementary patents enhances cross licenses and reduces unilateral licenses, with the former effect becoming increasingly dominant, and that inventions related to the core business of a licensor are more likely to be cross licensed. |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:11004&r=ppm |
| By: | Valentina Giannini (Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), Ca’ Foscari University and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) |
| Abstract: | Climate change mitigation can be achieved, according to many, by means of Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in the Tropics (REDD). Within the climate change policy debate we thus find discussions on how to reduce GHG emissions by designing appropriate REDD programmes and projects. In this paper I try to capture this debate by looking at the role of five major international organizations, which were chosen to represent the different aspects related to REDD. In order for REDD to be successful, not only GHG reduction, but also multiple benefits should be achieved: indigenous and local peoples’ involvement, livelihood improvement, fair and equitable labour, biodiversity conservation, and sustainable forest management, to name some of the most relevant. The selected international organizations are: UN-REDD, The GEF, The CBD, ITTO, and ILO. The role of these is assessed, to understand not only what has been defined and achieved, but also what possible way forward the organizations are envisioning, and what issues remain to be addressed. |
| Keywords: | Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, REDD, Climate Change, Climate Policy Debate, Mitigation, Multiple Benefits, UN-REDD, The GEF, The CBD, ITTO, ILO |
| JEL: | O13 O20 Q23 Q28 Q54 Q56 Q57 |
| Date: | 2010–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.157&r=ppm |
| By: | Eva I. Hoppe (Department of Economics, University of Cologne); David J. Kusterer (Department of Economics, University of Cologne); Patrick W. Schmitz (Department of Economics, University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | A government agency wants an infrastructure-based public service to be provided. Our experimental study compares two different modes of provision. In a public-private partnership, the two tasks of building the infrastructure and operating it are delegated to one private contractor (a consortium), while under traditional procurement, these tasks are delegated to separate contractors. We find support for the theoretical prediction that, compared to traditional procurement, a public-private partnership provides stronger incentives to make cost-reducing investments (which may increase or decrease service quality). In two additional treatments, we study governance structures which explicitly take subcontracting within private consortia into account. |
| Keywords: | experiment, incomplete contracts, procurement, public-private partnerships |
| JEL: | D86 H11 L33 |
| Date: | 2011–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:02-02&r=ppm |
| By: | Pierre Dehez; Daniela Tellone |
| Abstract: | A group of firms decides to cooperate on a project that requires a combination of inputs held by some of them. These inputs are non-rival but excludable goods i.e. public goods with exclusion such as knowledge, data or information, patents or copyrights. We address the question of how firms should be compensated for the inputs they contribute. We show that this problem can be framed within a cost sharing game whose Shapley comes out as a natural solution. The main result concerns the regular structure of the core that enables a simple characterization of the nucleolus. However, compared to the Shapley value, the nucleolus defines compensations that appear to be less appropriate in the context of data sharing. Our analysis is inspired by the problem faced by the European chemical firms within the regulation program REACH that requires submission by 2018 of a detailed analysis of the substances they produce, import or use. |
| Keywords: | cost sharing, Shapley value, core, nucleolus. |
| JEL: | C71 H41 M41 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-04&r=ppm |