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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Renato E. Reside, Jr. |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes the determinants of stress in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure investment. While project failures seldom occur, there are many stresses that hinder success. One of these is broad political risk: the prerogative of government executives to make sweeping changes in investment rules or regulations—through measures such as protracted tariff freezing—that undermine a project’s market value. Broad political risk can constitute the biggest threat to project outcomes. However, this is usually only realized after other risks, such as currency risk, have materialized first. Thus, broad political risk can be controlled. [ADBI Working Paper 133] |
| Keywords: | public-private partnerships (PPPs), infrastructure investment, government, political, currency |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3084&r=ppm |
| By: | Neela Mukherjee |
| Abstract: | Agriculture technology is undergoing rapid changes across the globe and Asian countries such as India, China, Bangladesh and many other countries are undertaking different policy initiatives to help farmers to build capacity to adopt new/improved technology towards bettering farm production, reducing poverty, human development and improving food security. The latest experience, during the last five years in three Asian countries – India, China and Bangladesh, provides interesting basis for cross-country comparison of rural areas, given similar socioeconomic context of project areas and infusion of agriculture technological change. Though project instruments of such changes and their strategies/approaches are quite different, such a comparative study helps to understand the actions/impacts of such differential strategies on the ground and helps to provide a platform to analyse cross-country achievements, constraints and lessons learnt in the sphere of agriculture technology and rural development. This paper compares the strategies, capacity building processes and outcomes/impacts of three projects during the period 2005-10. |
| Keywords: | Asia, agriculture technology, India, china, Bangladesh, policy initiatives, rural development, agricultural development, rural, cross-country achievements |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:3098&r=ppm |
| By: | Juergen Bitzer (Department of Economics, University of Oldenburg); Ingo Geishecker (Department of Economics, University of Goettingen); Philipp Schroeder (Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | Job-Market signaling is ranked high among the explanations why in- dividuals engage voluntarily in OSS projects. If true, signaling implies the existence of a wage premium for OSS engagement. However, due to a lack of data this issue has not been tested previously. Based on a novel data set comprising detailed demographic and wage information for some 7,000 German IT employees, this paper fills this gap. In the empirical analysis, however, we find no support for the signaling hypoth- esis, a result that is robust to different measures of OSS involvement and different model specifications. |
| Keywords: | open source software, signaling, wage differentials |
| JEL: | J31 J24 D01 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:old:wpaper:321&r=ppm |
| By: | Claudio Panico (KITeS, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Managing research collaborations remains challenging in many respects. The research efforts of the parties involved are hardly verifiable, and it is not possible to contract a clearly defined research output in advance. The parties negotiate to allocate potential gains, but the collaboration still is unstable and prone to disintegration. Although contractual forms of collaboration have become increasingly common and sophisticated, formal contracts are incomplete and produce a large variety of governance structures with specified ownership patterns and the configurations of control. In the context of a research collaboration between two parties with asymmetric positions, such as a large pharmaceutical company contracting with a small biotech, the company must decide how to allocate ownership and control rights while considering the effects on the biotech's bargaining position in the negotiation. This study shows that the forms of governance vary with the contractibility of effort and the stability of the collaboration, which suggests novel prescriptions for the management of research collaborations. |
| Keywords: | research collaborations, governance, contracts, property rights, control rights |
| Date: | 2010–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:kites32_wp&r=ppm |