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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | V. VAN PETEGHEM; M. VANHOUCKE; |
| Abstract: | Learning effects assume that the efficiency of a resource increases with the duration of a task. Although these effects are commonly used in machine scheduling environments, they are rarely used in a project scheduling setting. In this paper, we study and model learning effects in a project scheduling environment and apply the model to the discrete time/resource trade-o_ scheduling problem (DTRTP), where each activity has a _fixed work content for which a set of execution modes (duration/resource requirement pairs) can be defined. Computational results emphasize the significant impact of learning effects on the project schedule, measure the margin of error made by ignoring learning and show that timely incorporation of learning effects can lead to significant makespan improvements. |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:10/633&r=ppm |
| By: | Nava Kahana (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University,IZA, Bonn); Yosef Mealem (Netanya Academic College, The School of Banking & Finance Netanya, Israel); Shmuel Nitzan (Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University) |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on indivisible multiple-cost–single-benefit projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the single beneficiary has complete information on the cost and benefit of the project while the government official has no such information and the cost bearers have information only on each other's costs. |
| Keywords: | indivisible project; single beneficiary; multiple-cost bearers; unilateral information; efficient and fair implementation |
| JEL: | D61 D62 D78 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2009-14&r=ppm |
| By: | Daniel Krähmer (University of Bonn); Roland Strausz (Humboldt University Berlin) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. To model the procurer’s problem, we extend a standard sequential screening model to endogenous information acquisition with moral hazard. The optimal contract displays systematic distortions in information acquisition. Due to a rent effect, adverse selection induces too much information acquisition to prevent cost overruns and too little information acquisition to prevent false project cancelations. Moral hazard mitigates the distortions related to cost overruns yet exacerbates those related to false negatives. The optimal mechanism is a menu of option contracts that achieves the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation. |
| Keywords: | Information acquisition, procurement, dynamic mechanism design |
| JEL: | D82 H57 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:303&r=ppm |
| By: | Kenny, Charles; Musatova, Maria |
| Abstract: | "Red flags"are indicators of potential issues regarding governance failure, collusion or corruption in projects. While some specific red flags can be powerful indicators of issues to be addressed, the hypothesis of this paper is that many proposed red flags are potentially too ubiquitous and randomly distributed to be useful as indicators of significant governance failure. The paper examines project documentation from a small sample of World Bank water and sanitation projects in an attempt to collect data on the presence or absence of 13 commonly accepted red flags. This paper finds that: (i) almost every contract reviewed raised at least one of 13 red flags analyzed; (ii) potentially tainted contracts did not exhibit notably more red flags than control contracts; and (iii) the occurrence of multiple red flags in the same contract was rare enough to suggest that joint occurrence was largely by chance, not as a result of a strongly causal inter-relationship between flags. The ubiquity and apparent randomness of these red flags suggests that their roll-out as a monitoring tool requires additional thought as to interpretation, context and use. The paper examines an alternate tool for uncovering potential problem projects -- supplier concentration. Across a very small sample, there does appear to be a relationship between such concentration and potential problem projects. |
| Keywords: | Post Conflict Reconstruction,Debt Markets,Government Procurement,Investment and Investment Climate,Literature&Folklore |
| Date: | 2010–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5243&r=ppm |
| By: | Massimo Florio (DEAS, Università di Milano); Davide Sartori (Centre for Industrial Studies (CSIL)) |
| Abstract: | This paper, presented at the Sixth European Conference on Evaluation of Cohesion Policy (Warsaw, 30 November-1 December 2009), discusses why there is a strong need of ex-post Cost-Benefit analysis and which conditions should be met for a proper ex-post exercise to be carried out in the framework of Cohesion Policy major projects. After an introduction about the objectives and instruments of the 2007-2013 EU Cohesion Policy, and in particular the legal framework for co-financing environmental and transport projects, the paper illustrates and discusses some methodological choices which have been made by the authors of the EC CBA Guide. It is showed that, without an ex-post Cost-Benefit analysis, the ex-ante exercise is also weakened as a decision making tool. In particular, in the light of evidence from literature about the most common mistakes and pitfalls in ex-ante project appraisal, it is explained how systematic ex-post evaluation is important in particular linked to ex-ante incentives to reveal true information about the projects characteristics (especially on investment costs and demand forecast which are often respectively under and overestimated due to an optimism bias) and ex-post performance assessment. The EC has a unique role to play in this context, and recommendations are given about how to improve the use of CBA for investment decisions and how to contract co-funding of major projects in the framework of incentive theory. |
| Keywords: | CBA, Cohesion Policy, Incentives |
| JEL: | D61 H43 R58 |
| Date: | 2010–01–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mst:wpaper:1001&r=ppm |
| By: | Pennings, H.P.G.; Sereno, L. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University) |
| Abstract: | This study sets up a compound option approach for evaluating pharmaceutical R&D investment projects in the presence of technical and economic uncertainties. Technical uncertainty is modeled as a Poisson jump that allows for failure and thus abandonment of the drug development. Economic uncertainty is modeled as a standard di¤usion process which incorporates both up-and downward shocks. Practical application of this method is emphasized through a case analysis. We show that both uncertainties have a positive impact on the R&D option value. Moreover, from the sensitivity analysis, we nd that the sensitivity of the option with respect to economic uncertainty and market introduction cost decreases when technical uncertainty increases. |
| Keywords: | G13;G24;G30;compound option;jump-discussion process;R&D;pharmaceutical industry |
| Date: | 2010–02–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:1765018211&r=ppm |
| By: | Bamberger, Michael; Rao, Vijayendra; Woolcock, Michael |
| Abstract: | This paper provides an overview of the various ways in which mixing qualitative and quantitative methods could add value to monitoring and evaluating development projects. In particular it examines how qualitative methods could address some of the limitations of randomized trials and other quantitative impact evaluation methods; it also explores the importance of examining"process"in addition to"impact", distinguishing design from implementation failures, and the value of mixed methods in the real-time monitoring of projects. It concludes by suggesting topics for future research -- including the use of mixed methods in constructing counterfactuals, and in conducting reasonable evaluations within severe time and budget constraints. |
| Keywords: | Poverty Monitoring&Analysis,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education,Poverty Impact Evaluation,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences |
| Date: | 2010–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5245&r=ppm |
| By: | Gabriel Ahlfeldt (Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics (LSE), University of London) |
| Abstract: | This article investigates the 2008 referendum held in opposition against the "Mediaspree", a major urban development project in Berlin that has been perceived as a threat of displacement of local residents and culture. Using precinct level data we find a high degree of localized resistance around the project area, conditional on socio-demographic characteristics. Comparison to local appreciation rates shows that in an environment of very low owner occupancy public (re)development projects are opposed the more residents associate an increase in area valuation. This effects is, however, not strong enough to explain the localized resistance. Considering a micro-level data set on music nodes, our results suggest that resistance is rather attributable to a feared loss of specific cultural amenities and neighborhood character. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Amenities, Urban Development, Displacement, Hedonic Modeling, Mediaspree |
| JEL: | Z10 R20 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hce:wpaper:032&r=ppm |