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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Carlo Alberto Magni |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a method for evaluating a project under certainty by means of a systemic outlook, which borrows from accounting the way of representing economic facts while replacing accounting values with cash values. The investor's net worth is regarded as a system whose structure changes over time. On this basis, a profitability index is presented, here named Systemic Value Added (SVA), which lends itself to a periodic decomposition. While as an overall index the Systemic Value Added coincides with the Net Final Value (NFV) of an investment, the systemic partition of a SVA is shown to differ from the Net Present Value (NPV) decomposition model proposed by Peccati (1987, 1992), which in turn bears a strong resemblance to Stewart's (1991) EVA model. The different assumptions the three models rely on are analysed: Some inconsistencies arise in the NFV-based approach, which give rise to Peccati's and Stewart's model, but they can be healed (only in a certain sense) by re-shaping the model and taking account of the systemic approach. To this end, the introduction of a shadow project is needed which enables us to avoid compounding. An interesting result is that we can decompose the SVA of a project by applying Peccati's argument to its shadow, or which is the same, by computing the shadow project's Economic Value Added. The paper then generalizes the approach allowing for a portfolio of projects, multiple debts and multiple synchronic opportunity costs of capital, for which a tetra-dimensional decomposition is easily obtained. |
| Date: | 2009–08–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000162:005737&r=ppm |
| By: | Axel Dreher; Peter Nunnenkamp; Hannes Öhler; Johannes Weisser |
| Abstract: | NGO aid is still widely believed to be superior to official aid (ODA). However, the incentives of NGOs to excel and target aid to the poor and deserving are increasingly disputed. We contribute to the emerging literature on the allocation of NGO aid by performing panel Tobit estimations for Swiss NGOs. The analysis offers new insights in two major regards: First, we cover the allocation of both self-financed and officially co-financed aid for a large panel of NGOs and recipient countries. Second, by classifying each NGO according to its financing structure, we address the unresolved question of whether financial dependence on the government impairs the targeting of NGO aid. It turns out that NGOs mimic the state as well as NGO peers. Officially refinanced NGOs are more inclined to imitate the allocation of ODA. However, the degree of financial dependence does not affect the poverty orientation of NGO aid and the incentives of NGOs to engage in easier environments. The allocation of self-financed aid differs in several respects from the allocation of officially co-financed aid, including the role of financial dependence for imitating the state and herding among NGOs. |
| Keywords: | NGO aid; aid allocation; official co-financing; financial dependence |
| JEL: | F35 |
| Date: | 2009–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:gotcrc:001&r=ppm |
| By: | Ferro, Gustavo; Logares, Candelaria; Roitman, Mauricio |
| Abstract: | In this paper, it is shown the relationship between coverage in water and sanitation, and hydric disease’s incidence. There are synthesized the situations of the more affected regions and there are presented the Millennium Development Goals on the subject. Briefly, there are summarized the social cost/benefit analysis applicable to public projects, and it is studied the particular case of its application to the Millennium Development Goals in water and sanitation. |
| Keywords: | water; health; Millennium Development Goals |
| JEL: | L95 I18 |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:16618&r=ppm |