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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Cerulli Giovanni (Ceris - Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, Rome, Italy); Poti' Bianca (Ceris - Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, Rome, Italy) |
| Abstract: | The aim of the paper is twofold: to verify a full policy failure of public support on private R&D effort, when in presence of a potential plurality of public incentives; to compare the most recent econometric methods used for the analysis of the input additionality. Compared to previous studies our work wants to trace out an advance in two directions: adding more robustness by comparing results from various econometric techniques and providing an analysis of the R&D policy effect behind the average results. A by-product of the paper is a taxonomy of the econometric methods used in the literature, according to the structure of the models, the type of dataset and the available policy information. We exploit the third wave of the Community Innovation Survey for Italy (1998-2000) with a sample size of 1,221 supported and 1,319 non-supported firms. Given the used type of data, the article presents two main limits: first, we do not know the level of the subsidy, so that we can control only for the presence of a total crowding-out; second, we can check only the short-run effect of the supporting policy, while an increase in the private R&D effort could be more likely in the medium term. Our results suggest that: 1. the main factors influencing the probability to participate to the incentive policy are R&D experience, human skills, liquidity constraints, but also foreign capital ownership; 2. on average, the total substitution of private funding by the public one is excluded for Italy as a whole, although some cases of total crowding-out are found: low knowledge intensive services, very small firms (10-19 employees) and the auto-vehicle industry. We get, on average, 885 additional thousand Euros of R&D expenditure per firm with a ratio equal to 4.62: it means that if a generic control unit does 1 thousand Euros of R&D expenditure a matched treated does 4.62 thousand Euros. The additionality for the R&D intensity is about 0.014 with a ratio of about 2.67. |
| Keywords: | Business R&D; Public Incentives; Econometric Evaluation |
| JEL: | O32 C52 O38 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csc:cerisp:200809&r=ppm |
| By: | Giovanni Villani |
| Abstract: | Cooperative investments in R&D are a significant driving force of the modern economy. As it well-known, the R&D investments are uncertain and the strategic alliances create synergies and additional information that increase the success probabilities about R&D projects. The theory of real option games takes into account both the flexibility value of an investment opportunity and the strategic considerations. In particular way, while the non-cooperative options are exercised in the interest of the option holders' payoffs, the cooperative ones are exercised in order to maximize the total partnership value. In our model we develop an interaction between two firms that invest in R&D and we show the effects of cooperative synergies on several equilibriums. Moreover, we consider that the R&D investments are characterized by positive network externalities that induce more benefits in case of reciprocal R&D success. |
| Keywords: | Real Exchange Options; Cooperation games; Information Revelation; R&D investments. |
| JEL: | G13 C71 D80 O32 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:19-2008&r=ppm |
| By: | Stephan Litschig; Yves Zamboni |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents. |
| Keywords: | Law enforcement, corruption, local governance, institutions |
| JEL: | H75 K42 M42 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1143&r=ppm |
| By: | Bandeira, Pablo |
| Abstract: | What is institutional development? How important is it? Which institutions promote development? Why they are not naturally implemented? How can we support them? These are the questions that this article tries to answer, based on the recent international literature on the topic, within the framework of current aid ineffectiveness. |
| Keywords: | Institutional Development; Good Governance; Aid Effectiveness. |
| JEL: | O43 P48 |
| Date: | 2009–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:13372&r=ppm |