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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Vymětal, Dominik |
| Abstract: | The book deals with theoretical concepts and ways of practical implementation of information sytems in companies. A successful information system project has to be based on the information strategy of the company. Taking the business strategy into consideration the information system value for the company is discussed. Methods of effective project management and controlling including team management and conflict handling are presented from customers and suppliers point of view. The methods proposed are illustrated by several case studies. |
| Keywords: | information system; project management; information technology; return of investment; feasibility study; team communication; projec evaluation; peocess management; real options; human ressources |
| JEL: | G11 D81 M53 M10 L21 D74 L86 L15 |
| Date: | 2008–04–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:10745&r=ppm |
| By: | Edward Calthrop; Bruno De Borger; Stef Proost |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with costs-benefit analysis of investment in transport infrastructure. Its contribution is twofold. Firstly, we develop a general equilibrium model to explore the impact of a small budgetary-neutral investment in transport infrastructure in a second-best setting, where other markets in the economy are distorted by taxes or external costs. The model incorporates different transport modes that are used both for intermediate inputs (freight) and for final consumption (passenger travel). An intuitive operational expression for the net economic benefit of an investment is derived that depends on the way the investment is financed. This expression generalizes recent findings in the literature. Secondly, we illustrate the results numerically using a small example. Our findings show that both the specific financing instrument used and the labour market consequences may have large implications for the net benefits of transport investments. Significant errors may be made in limiting cost-benefit analysis to transport markets only. |
| Keywords: | cost-benefit analysis, transport investments, marginal cost of funds.. |
| JEL: | H23 H43 H54 R13 R42 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0818&r=ppm |
| By: | Amihai Glazer; Stef Proost |
| Abstract: | We examine how diversification of projects assigned to an agency can enhance efficiency by informing a principal of the agency’s quality. Projects that appear inefficient in isolation may be justified when assigned to the same agency. Assigning different tasks to different special purpose governments, though allowing for technical efficiency in the management of each project, may nevertheless reduce overall efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Special purpose governments, Asymmetric information, Bureaucracy, Project evaluation |
| JEL: | D73 D83 H43 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0815&r=ppm |
| By: | Sophie Chemarin (LEEP - Laboratoire d'econometrie de l'école polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7657 - Polytechnique - X); Caroline Orset (LERNA - Economie des Ressources Naturelles - INRA : UR1081 - CEA : DPG - Université des Sciences Sociales - Toulouse I) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the impact of hyperbolic discounting preferences on the agent's information acquisition decision who wants to undertake a potential dangerous activity for human health or the environment. We find that below certain discount rate threshold, an agent prefers ignoring information and continuing his project. On the other hand, above this threshold, it is optimal for him to acquire information, and the investment for acquiring the information is increasing with the discount rate. We then conclude that hyperbolic discounting preferences limit the information acquisition. Moreover, we explain that the lack of self-control induced by hyperbolic discounting preferences also restraints the information acquisition. Finally, we analyze the efficiency of the strict liability rule and the negligence rule to motivate the agent to acquire information. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00240714_v1&r=ppm |
| By: | Bandza, Alexander J.; Vajjhala, Shalini P. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Recent policy debates suggest that geologic carbon sequestration (GS) will play an important role in any carbon-constrained future. As GS evolves from its current role as an end-stage process within enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operations to a long-term, dedicated emissions mitigation option, regulations must simultaneously evolve to address the risks of potential carbon dioxide (CO2) migration underground and leakage to the surface. Because CO2 injection practices are currently based on petroleum industry extraction techniques, risk assessment and regulatory frameworks are also derived from these experiences, and EOR serves as a critical point of departure for GS. In this paper, we develop a basic engineering–economic model of four strategies associated with key deployment pathways in the portfolio of EOR and GS projects -- (a) an indifferent strategy, where EOR is the priority without any consideration for long-term sequestration, (b) an afterthought strategy, where EOR is the primary goal, and a site is later secured for sequestration, (c) a planned strategy, where oil extraction and CO2 injection are co-optimized from the start, and (d) a dedicated strategy, where GS is the sole priority. We evaluate these strategies based on scenarios of oil and CO2 prices; leakage estimates; and transportation, injection, and monitoring costs from the literature and practice. Major results reveal that the afterthought strategy is the dominant strategy (i.e. the strategy with the greatest revenues) under a range of scenarios. This finding suggests that GS regulatory design needs to anticipate the use of the potentially leakiest or “worst” sites first. |
| Keywords: | carbon sequestration, enhanced oil recovery, leakage, regulatory design, risk management |
| JEL: | Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2008–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-29&r=ppm |