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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Christian Corsi |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ter:wpaper:0044&r=ppm |
| By: | Zafer Akin; Abdullah Yavas |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tob:wpaper:0809&r=ppm |
| By: | Michael Ahlheim; Ulrike Lehr |
| Abstract: | Environmental valuation studies aim at the assessment of the social benefits or the social costs caused by some change in environmental quality (in the broadest sense). The most popular field of application of environmental valuation studies is project appraisal where the benefits arising from some environmental project (measured in terms of people's willingness to pay for that project) are assessed and confronted with the costs of the project or with the benefits from some alternative project if a choice has to be made between different projects. A closer look at the results of empirical valuation studies shows that in many surveys a negative correlation between the number auf household members and the willingness to pay (WTP) stated by a household for a project can be observed. These results are rather puzzling because in larger households more people are going to benefit from an environmental improvement than in small households. A plausible explanation for these results is that household budgets are tighter for large households than for smaller households with the same household income. Therefore, large households must state a smaller WTP for a project than smaller households with the same income and the same preferences. This might have consequences for the allocation of public funds in all cases where the realization of a specific environmental project depends on the absolute value of the aggregate social benefits it generates. In order to calculate the social benefits typically the WTPs of the different households affected by that project are added up. In this aggregation process the members of larger households have a lower weight and, therefore, their WTP has a smaller impact on the decision if a certain project is realized or not. The reason for this violation of the principle of horizontal equity is that for the computation of the social benefits not individual but household WTPs are aggregated. In this paper we suggest to use household equivalence scales for the evaluation of WTP data in order to reduce this discrimination of the members of large families. We demonstrate the effects of equivalence scales on the results of environmental valuation surveys using an empirical study carried out in Eastern Germany. |
| Keywords: | contingent valuation; Environmental Valuation; Equity |
| JEL: | D61 D63 H43 Q51 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hoh:hohdip:295&r=ppm |
| By: | Michael Ahlheim; Benchaphun Ekasingh; Oliver Frör; Jirawan Kitchaicharoen; Andreas Neef; Chapika Sangkapitux; Nopasom Sinphurmsukskul |
| Abstract: | Though contingent valuation is the dominant technique for the valuation of public projects, especially in the environmental sector, the high costs of contingent valuation surveys prevent the use of this method for the assessment of relatively small projects. The reason for this cost problem is that typically only contingent valuation studies which are based on face-to-face interviews are accepted as leading to valid results. Especially in countries with high wages face-to-face surveys are extremely costly considering that for a valid contingent valuation study a minimum of 1,000 completed face-to-face interviews is required. In this paper we try a rehabilitation of mail surveys as low-budget substitutes for costly face-to-face surveys. Based on an empirical contingent valuation study in Northern Thailand we show that the validity of mail surveys can be improved significantly if so-called citizen expert groups are employed for a thorough survey design. |
| Keywords: | contingent valuation; Environmental Valuation; Equity |
| JEL: | D6 H4 L3 Q25 Q51 |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hoh:hohdip:297&r=ppm |
| By: | De Silva Dakshina; Pagel Beatrice; Peeters Ronald (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | We study procurement auctions held in sequential and simultaneous formats. For thelatter format, we find less bid participation and more aggressive bidding for projects withstrong common value components and more competition for projects having strong privatevalue components. |
| Keywords: | microeconomics ; |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008005&r=ppm |
| By: | Régis Blazy (CREFI-LSF, University of Luxembourg); Gisèle Umbhauer; Laurent Weill |
| Abstract: | This research investigates how the legal sanctions prevailing under bankruptcy code impact on the design of debt contacts. Unlike most papers considering a passive behavior of the bank in case of default of the borrower, we assume the bank actively trades off between private renegotiation and costly bankruptcy procedure. Besides, the debtor’s investment policy – with a risk of asset substitution – and the creditor’s financial policy – endogenous interest rate – are explicitly modeled. The model focuses on three possible equilibriums. The first one encompasses situations where the firms stay with the best investment project (economic efficiency) and bankruptcy costs are avoided through private renegotiation (legal efficiency): this equilibrium requires a condition on bankruptcy costs and is independent of legal sanctions. A second equilibrium cover situations where the firms turn to the less profitable and riskiest project (economic inefficiency) and the default is still privately solved (legal efficiency): to avoid suboptimal investment, a minimal level of legal sanctions, whose threshold value depends on the interest rate, must apply. Last, we consider mixed strategies on the investment policy (partial economic efficiency): when financial distress occurs, two bargaining equilibriums prevail – pooling or separating – so costly bankruptcy may apply (legal inefficiency). Simulated results illustrate how the bank finally chooses between these equilibriums while the legal environment becomes more severe. First, as expected, when sanctions are getting higher, the probability of choosing the best project increases: simulations provide minimal levels of sanctions which guarantee the occurrence of the best equilibrium. As a result, extreme severity is not needed to ensure both economic and legal efficiency. Second, an increase of legal sanctions is likely to reduce the contractual interest rate, as the bank is more protected by the law, and cannot charge a risk premium anymore. A noteworthy consequence is that the debtor benefits in some extent of increased severity, as he is inclined to invest in the most profitable projects and, consequently, pays a lower interest rate. Third, a slight change of the legal environment may involve a drastic adjustment of financial variables, so that small changes in the law may involve financial instability. |
| Keywords: | Bankruptcy, Credit Lending, Interest Rate, Moral Hazard, Legal Sanctions |
| JEL: | G33 D82 D21 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crf:wpaper:08-04&r=ppm |