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on Project, Program and Portfolio Management |
| By: | Marian Moszoro; Pawel Gasiorowski |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a model to assess the efficiency of the capital structure in public-private partnerships (PPP). A main argument supporting the PPP approach for investment projects is the transfer of know-how from the private partner to the public entity. The paper shows how different knowledge transfer schemes determine an optimal shareholding structure of the PPP. Under the assumption of lower capital cost of the public partner and lower development outlays when the investment is carried out by a private investor, an optimal capital structure is achieved with both the public and the private parties as shareholders. |
| Keywords: | Private sector , Public sector , Investment , |
| Date: | 2007–12–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/1&r=ppm |
| By: | Diewert, Erwin; Huang, Ning |
| Abstract: | The next international version of the System of National Accounts will recommend that R&D (Research and Development) expenditures be capitalized instead of being immediately expensed as in the present System of National Accounts 1993. An R&D project creates a new technology, which in principle does not depreciate like a reproducible asset. A new technology is however subject to obsolescence, which acts in a manner that is somewhat similar to depreciation. The paper looks at the net benefits of an R&D project in the context of a very simple intertemporal general equilibrium model and suggests that R&D expenditures be amortized using the matching principle that has been developed in the accounting literature to match the fixed costs of a project to a stream of future benefits. Of particular interest is the evaluation of the net benefits of a publicly funded project where the results are made freely available to the public. |
| JEL: | C43 C61 C67 C68 C82 D24 D42 D45 D57 D58 |
| Date: | 2008–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubc:bricol:diewert-08-01-18-09-24-04&r=ppm |
| By: | Eduardo Engel; Ronald Fischer |
| Abstract: | The government contracts with a foreign firm to extract a natural resource that requires an upfront investment and which faces price uncertainty. In states where profits are high, there is a likelihood of expropriation, which generates a social cost that increases with the expropriated value. In this environment, the planner's optimal contract avoids states with high probability of expropriation. The contract can be implemented via a competitive auction with reasonable informational requirements. The bidding variable is a cap on the present value of discounted revenues, and the firm with the lowest bid wins the contract. The basic framework is extended to incorporate government subsidies, unenforceable investment effort and political moral hazard, and the general thrust of the results described above is preserved. |
| JEL: | H21 H25 Q33 Q34 Q38 |
| Date: | 2008–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13742&r=ppm |
| By: | Frédéric Marty; Arnaud Voisin |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fce:doctra:0726&r=ppm |
| By: | Muller, Nichole |
| Abstract: | Till recently the investment policy of India was overtly nationalistic. Today however everything seems to be changing. The change is enormous. India is becoming very open to foreign investors. Governmental procedures have been simplified and for most of the enterprises no government permission is necessary. |
| Keywords: | investment; liberalization; taxes; VAT. |
| JEL: | K0 L52 K23 L53 |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:6809&r=ppm |