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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Luiz Bines (PUC-Rio); Juliano Assunção (PUC-Rio); Ricardo Dahis (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the effects of "Red Alerts", siren warnings of rocket threats, on voting behavior in Israel, focusing on the Likud party during the 2013 and 2015 elections. Using a novel dataset on Red Alert timing and location, we apply a difference-in-differences approach to compare voting patterns in areas newly exposed to Gaza's rocket range in 2014. Our analysis shows that Red Alerts on the days immediately before the election boosted Likud’s vote share by 2.5 p.p., or 15% of the average, while earlier alerts had no significant effect, highlighting the impact of threat salience on electoral outcomes. This research advances our understanding of how security threats influence political behavior. |
| Keywords: | terrorism, salience |
| JEL: | F5 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajr:sodwps:2024-04 |
| By: | Lukáš Linek; Michael Škvròák; Michal Šoltés; Vítìzslav Titl |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces a new Czech Political Candidate Dataset (CPCD), which compiles comprehensive data on all candidates who have run in any municipal, regional, national, and/or European Parliament election in the Czech Republic since 1993. For each candidate, the CPCD includes their first name, last name, age, gender, place of residence, university degree, party membership, party affiliation, ballot position, and election results for candidates and for parties. We matched candidates over various elections by using algorithms that rely on their personal information. We add information on political donations made to political parties. We source donation information from the Czech Political Donation Dataset (CPDD), our other newly built dataset, in which we compile records of individual donations to 12 leading political parties from official records for the period from 2017 to 2023. CPDD is publicly available along with the CPCD. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cer:papers:wp790 |
| By: | Gold, Robert; Lehr, Jakob |
| JEL: | D72 H54 R11 R58 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc24:302441 |
| By: | Ntounias, Theodoros; Schneider, Christina J; Thomson, Robert |
| Abstract: | Promissory representation is the idea that a significant part of representation consists of parties making promises to voters during election campaigns and keeping those promises if they hold enough power to do so after elections. In countries that are highly exposed to globalization, governing parties face significant challenges to fulfilling the promises they made to voters. At the same time, voters punish governing parties that fail to keep their campaign promises. This presents parties with the dilemma that while voters expect them to make ambitious promises during election campaigns, their capacity to deliver on those promises is undermined by the constraints of globalization. In response to this dilemma, parties rely on strategic ambiguity to avoid retrospective sanctioning by voters in future elections. Ambiguous campaign statements are reconcilable with a broad range of subsequent government policies and are therefore unlikely to be perceived as broken promises by voters. We analyze the use and effects of strategic ambiguity in a mixed-methods design consisting of a survey experiment and an observational study of 293 election platforms by 44 parties in six countries between 1970-2019. The findings shed new light on the widespread use of ambiguity in contemporary politics with important implications for democratic representation in a globalized world. |
| Keywords: | Social and Behavioral Sciences, elections, political campaigns, democracy, language, globalization |
| Date: | 2024–10–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:globco:qt0050h951 |
| By: | Laurent Bouton; Garance Genicot; Micael Castanheira De Moura; Allison Stashko |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the manipulation of electoral maps by political parties, commonly referred to as gerrymandering. At the core of our analysis is the recognition that not all inhabitants of a district vote. This is important for gerrymandering as districts must have the same population size, but only voters matter for electoral outcomes. We propose a model of gerrymandering that allows for heterogeneity in voter turnout across individuals. This model reveals a new strategy for the gerrymanderers: the pattern is to pack-crack-pack along the turnout dimension. Specifically, parties benefit from packing low-turnout supporters and high-turnout opponents, while creating cracked districts that combine moderate-to-high-turnout supporters with lower-turnout opponents. These findings yield testable empirical implications about the relationship between partisan support, turnout rates, and electoral maps. Using a novel empirical strategy based on comparing maps proposed by Democrats and Republicans during the 2020 U.S. redistricting cycle, we test these predictions and find supporting evidence. |
| Keywords: | Redistricting, Gerrymandering, Electoral Maps, Turnout |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eca:wpaper:2013/378612 |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (Université Jean Monnet Saint-Etienne, CNRS, Université Lumière Lyon 2, emlyon business school, GATE, 42023 Saint-Etienne, France); Herrade Igersheim (CNRS, BETA and University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France); Jean-François Laslier (Paris School of Economics, Paris, France) |
| Abstract: | This module presents a variety of studies on voting. They tackle different subjects: participation, Condorcet cycles, strategic voting, electoral campaigns, the voter’s behaviour and psychology. They use different methods that can be labelled ‘experimental’ and all of them are more or less direct tests of models and theories. The module is therefore an introduction, by examples, to various experimental methods in use in political science. The presentation in three sections goes by increasing complexity of the experiments themselves or of their analysis, starting with ‘classroom’ experiments that can be organized very simply and used for pedagogical purposes. |
| Keywords: | Voting, participation, strategic voting, voting behaviors, voters psychology, experiments |
| JEL: | C9 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2412 |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Cevat Giray Aksoy; Ceren Baysan; Carlos Molina; Gamze Zeki |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether enduring authoritarian regimes are in part rooted in the population’s misperceptions about their social and economic costs—as opposed to a general preference for authoritarianism. We explore this question using online and field experiments in the context of Türkiye’s May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. We confirm that voters, especially those supporting the incumbent authoritarian government systematically underestimate the extent to which democracy and media freedom have been eroded in Türkiye and their usefulness in dealing with natural disasters and corruption (two salient issues in Türkiye). We find that providing (accurate) information about the state and implications of democracy and media freedom have significant effects on beliefs and increase the likelihood of voting for the opposition by about 3.7 percentage points (6.2 percent) in the online experiment. In the field experiment, we estimate similarly-sized impacts on the ballot-box level vote share—with the information treatment leading to a 2.4 percentage point (4.4 percent) increase in the opposition’s vote share. Interestingly, both in the field and online, the results are driven not by further mobilizing opposition supporters, but by influencing those likely to vote for the governing coalition and those holding more misperceived beliefs about democracy and media freedom in Türkiye. The evidence suggests that at least part of the support for authoritarian regimes may be coming from misperceptions about their institutions and policies, and may be more malleable than typically presumed. |
| JEL: | P16 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33018 |
| By: | Sinha, Pankaj; verma, Kaushal; Biswas, Sumana; Tyagi, Shashank; Gogia, Shaily; Singh, Aakhyat; Kumar, Amit |
| Abstract: | Forecasting the vote share for the upcoming US presidential elections involves multiple pivotal economic and non-economic factors. Critical macroeconomic forces such as the rate of economic growth, tax burden, inflation, and unemployment significantly influence the votes gained or lost by the incumbent. However, these are not the only determinants of presidential elections. The study also considers various non-economic factors that directly impact voting behaviour and can enhance prediction accuracy. These non-economic factors include scandals under the incumbent president, existing crime rates, law enforcement, June Gallup ratings reflecting the sitting president's approval, the average Gallup ratings over their term, and the results of the mid-term elections. Additionally, new non-economic factors such as illegal immigration and illegal aliens apprehended can significantly influence the outcome of the upcoming US presidential elections. To study the combined effects of economic and non-economic factors, data from each election cycle is used in an empirical model to predict the popular vote share percentage for the Democratic Party in the 2024 elections. The findings suggest that a longer tenure in power, June Gallup ratings, average Gallup ratings, scandal ratings, and economic growth rate significantly impact the popular vote share of the incumbent party candidate. The final empirical model predicts that Kamala Harris, the Democratic Party candidate, will receive a popular vote share of 48.60% ± 0.1% in the 2024 Presidential Elections of the United States. |
| Keywords: | Linear Regression, Forecasting, Election, Microeconomic |
| JEL: | C1 C15 C40 C5 C6 H8 |
| Date: | 2024–10–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:122319 |
| By: | Paola Conconi; Florin Cucu; Federico Gallina; Mattia Nordotto |
| Abstract: | The European Union (EU) has long been accused of suffering from a "democratic deficit". The European Parliament (EP), the only EU institution directly elected by citizens, is seen as having limited powers. Moreover, its members (MEPs) are often portrayed as unresponsive to the interests of their constituents due to the second-order nature of European elections: instead of being shaped by EU policies, they are driven by domestic politics. In this paper, we provide evidence against these Eurosceptic arguments using data on a key policy choice made by MEPs: the approval of free trade agreements. First, we show that MEPs are responsive to the trade policy interests of their electorate, a result that is robust to controlling for a rich set of controls, fixed effects, and employing an instrumental variable strategy. Second, we carry out counterfactual exercises demonstrating that the EP's power to reject trade deals can help explain why only agreements with broad political support reach the floor. Finally, against the idea that European elections are driven solely by domestic politics, we find that the degree of congruence between MEPs' trade votes and their electorate's interests affects their re-election chances. |
| Keywords: | EU democratic deficit, European Parliament, roll-call votes, trade agreements |
| Date: | 2024–10–15 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp2041 |
| By: | Jakob Vanschoonbeek |
| Abstract: | The recent rise and distinct geography of populism highlights the need for high resolution data on the economic and political landscapes and improved spatial political economy models that explain their interrelation. This paper shows that divergent development generates political externalities in lagging regions. To do so, it develops a dynamic spatial political economy model that integrates redistributive taxation and agglomerated economic growth in a standard economic geography framework. It finds that divergent development induces skill-biased labor mobility towards faster growing locations, simultaneously reducing their willingness to pay redistributive taxes and increasing their electoral influence on redistributive policy. To empirically validate and calibrate the model, the Spatial Political Economy in Europe Database (SPEED) is introduced, containing newly georeferenced electoral maps, political party classifications and gridded (per capita) GDP estimates for most European countries in the 17th release of the Constituency-Level Electoral Archive (CLEA). Instrumental variable regressions exploiting geographically-determined differences in economic growth potential confirm a strong constituency-level causal relation between underdevelopment and radical vote shares in the past two centuries. Counterfactual simulations suggests that policies that enhance labor mobility or income redistribution may both increase radical vote shares at least in the short run, as they risk fueling backlash in lagging and leading regions respectively. |
| Keywords: | Economic geography, political economy, political discontent, long term effects of divergent development, quantitative model |
| Date: | 2024–10–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:vivwps:750408 |
| By: | Benoît Le Maux (University of Rennes 1, CREM-CNRS); Sonia Paty (Université Lumière Lyon 2, CNRS, Université Jean-Monnet Saint-Etienne, emlyon business school, GATE, 69007, Lyon, France) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the impact of territorial fragmentation on political representation by applying Taagepera’s cube root law to subnational governments. Our model reveals that the total number of local representatives is more elastic to changes in the number of jurisdictions (elasticity e = 2/3) than to variations in population size (e = 1/3), a relationship we refer to as the law of 2/3. As a result, political representation is amplified in fragmented areas. Empirical evidence from diverse datasets supports this new law. |
| Keywords: | Representative Democracy, Decentralization, Local public sector, Cube Root Law |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H7 H11 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2414 |
| By: | Richard Calvo; Vincent Pons; Jesse M. Shapiro |
| Abstract: | Many observers have forecast large partisan shifts in the US electorate based on demographic trends. Such forecasts are appealing because demographic trends are often predictable even over long horizons. We backtest demographic forecasts using data on US elections since 1952. We envision a forecaster who fits a model using data from a given election and uses that model, in tandem with a projection of demographic trends, to predict future elections. Even a forecaster with perfect knowledge of future demographic trends would have performed poorly over this period—worse even than one who simply guesses that each election will have a 50-50 partisan split. Enriching the set of demographics available does not change this conclusion. We discuss both mechanical and economic reasons for this finding, and show suggestive evidence that parties adjust their platforms in accordance with changes in the electorate. |
| JEL: | C53 D72 J11 P0 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33016 |
| By: | Pesaran, M. H.; Song, H. |
| Abstract: | This document is a follow up to the paper by Ahmed and Pesaran (2020, AP) and reports state-level forecasts for the 2024 US presidential election. It updates the 3, 107 county level data used by AP and uses the same machine learning techniques as before to select the variables used in forecasting voter turnout and the Republican vote shares by states for 2024. The models forecast the non-swing states correctly but give mixed results for the swing states (Nevada, Arizona, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Georgia). Our forecasts for the swing states do not make use of any polling data but confirm the very close nature of the 2024 election, much closer than APÂ’s predictions for 2020. The forecasts are too close to call. |
| Keywords: | Voter Turnout, Popular and Electoral College Votes, Simultaneity and Recursive Identification, High Dimensional Forecasting Models, Lasso, OCMT |
| JEL: | C53 C55 D72 |
| Date: | 2024–10–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2464 |
| By: | Bez, Charlotte; Steckel, Jan; Naumann, Lennard |
| JEL: | D72 L72 Q52 N56 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc24:302390 |
| By: | Ciril Bosch-Rosa; Bernhard Kassner; Steffen Ahrens |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between overconfidence and the political and financial behavior of a nationally representative sample. Consistent with theoretical predictions, our findings indicate that excessive confidence in one's judgment is associated with lower portfolio diversification, greater stock price forecasting errors, and more extreme political views. We also find that overconfidence correlates with an increased likelihood of voting absenteeism. Importantly, our analysis bridges the gap between the financial and political literature by showing that overprecision-induced behavior in the financial domain is associated with overprecise behavior in the political domain, and vice versa. In a companion survey that elicits overconfidence across various knowledge domains, we further show that overconfidence is consistent within respondents and across knowledge domains. All of these findings suggest that overconfidence is a pervasive bias that permeates many aspects of people's lives. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence, SOEP, Survey |
| JEL: | C83 D91 G41 |
| Date: | 2024–10–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdp:dpaper:0051 |
| By: | Gwenolé Le Velly (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); Philippe Delacote (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CEC - Chaire Economie du Climat - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres); Rachel E Golden Kroner (Betty and Gordon Moore Center for Science and Oceans, World Wildlife Fund - R.N.I. Lago Preola e Gorghi Tondi); Derya Keles (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) - Université de Haute-Alsace (UHA) Mulhouse - Colmar - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, Chaire économie du climat - Chaire économie du climat); Alexander Pfaff (Duke University [Durham]) |
| Abstract: | Despite global calls to raise protection for nature, efforts proliferate to reduce the extent of, and restrictions in, protected areas (PAs) via legal changes to downgrade, downsize, or degazette PAs (PADDD). Protected area downgrading, downsizing, and degazettement studies have considered the tropics, despite significant data and relevance for the Global North, and focused on fixed proxies for economic opportunity cost. Given important political dynamics, we focus instead on the U.S. and shifts in political representation. We examine 2001-2018 federal PADDD events in the U.S., using panel data to control for all fixed factors. We study how elections that shift representatives and senators affect U.S. PADDD. Indeed, shifts at district, state, and national levels appear to influence PADDD. Specifically, shifts that put Republicans into office raised risks for PADDD events, especially proposals. Our empirical results highlight shifts in political power as an ongoing challenge to conservation, even after the establishment of protected areas. |
| Keywords: | conservation policy, elections, political economy, protected areas, United States |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04704372 |
| By: | Jonathan Muringani; Rune Dahl Fitjar; Andres Rodriguez-Pose; ; |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the complex relationship between political and social trust, government quality, and economic development across 208 regions in the European Union (EU). We use a pooled data generalized structural equation model (GSEM) to show that political trust serves as a fundamental driver of regional economic development in the EU. Political trust is, in turn, influenced by both social trust and government quality. Social trust and government quality have quadratic effects on political trust, showing diminishing returns, while the effect of political trust on economic development is linear. Political trust mediates the relationship between social trust and economic development entirely, while government quality retains a direct relationship with economic development. These findings underscore the fundamental role that political trust plays as a mechanism through which both formal and informal institutions shape regional development. |
| Keywords: | EU, Political trust, Quality of government, regional economic development, social trust |
| JEL: | O43 D73 R11 H11 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2436 |
| By: | Andrea Mattozzi (University of Bologna, Italy; CEPR; Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis); Samuel Nocito (Sapienza University of Rome, Italy); Francesco Sobbrio (Tor Vergata University of Rome, Italy; CESifo) |
| Abstract: | We study the reaction of national politicians to rigorous fact-checking of their public statements. Our research design relies on a novel randomized field experiment conducted in collaboration with a leading fact-checking company. Our results show that fact-checking discourages politicians from making factually incorrect statements, with effects lasting several weeks. At the same time, we document that fact-checking neither increases nor displaces correct statements. Instead, fact-checked politicians tend to substitute incorrect statements with either no statements or with unverifiable ones. This suggests that they also respond by increasing the “ambiguity” of their language to escape the possibility of public scrutiny. |
| Keywords: | Fact-Checking, Politicians, Accountability, Verifiability, Ambiguity, RCT |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D8 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rim:rimwps:24-14 |
| By: | David Kreitmeir (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Over the past two decades, violence against land and environmental activists has been on the rise, besetting even stable democracies. Using a unique, fine-grained data set on social conflict events in Peru and exogenous variation in world mineral prices, I document a strong link between local mineral rents and violent state repression of socioenvironmental protests in a democratic institutional setting. I show that the increase in the use of excessive force cannot be explained by changes in protester behavior. Empirical findings highlight the role of local authorities: the election of a pro-mining mayor is associated with a higher prevalence of state repression and corruption in the constituency. The legal and democratic accountability of local authorities is, however, found to be limited. The reported increase in corruption does not translate into more investigations against pro-mining mayors for corruption offenses nor are reelection results of incumbents found to be negatively affected by state violence against protesters. Finally, I show that violent state repression is successful in forestalling conflict resolution agreements that acknowledge protesters’ demands. |
| Keywords: | Resource curse, mining, social conflict, state repression, civil society |
| JEL: | D74 H7 O13 O16 P16 Q34 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajr:sodwps:2024-05 |
| By: | Bierl, Konrad; Eisenack, Klaus; von Dulong, Angelika; Wieland, Peter |
| JEL: | Q28 Q48 R50 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc24:302400 |