nep-pol New Economics Papers
on Positive Political Economics
Issue of 2024‒09‒02
thirteen papers chosen by
Eugene Beaulieu, University of Calgary


  1. Who Pays for the Church? Political Connections and Religious Clientelism in Post-War Italy By Troncone, Massimo; Valli, Roberto
  2. Political Cycles in Crop Residue Burning: Evidence from India By Meghna Agarwala; Shampa Bhattacharjee; Aparajita Dasgupta
  3. Coca Politics: Electoral Accountability and Tough-on-Crime Policies in Colombia By Gelvez, Juan David
  4. Establishing Fault: The Electoral Impact of Induced Earthquakes By Afiq bin Oslan
  5. Women's Suffrage and Men's Voting Patterns By Jeanne Lafortune; Francisco Pino
  6. Biased Forecasts and Voting: The Brexit Referendum Case By Jacopo Bizzotto; Davide Cipullo; André Reslow
  7. Behind the Support for Redistributive Politics: Social Preferences or Beliefs? By Pablo Brañas-Garza; Antonio Cabrales; María Paz Espinosa; Teresa García-Muñoz
  8. RLAs for 2-Seat STV Elections: Revisited By Michelle Blom; Peter J. Stuckey; Vanessa Teague; Damjan Vukcevic
  9. Public Attitudes Toward Forced Eradication: Protest, Gender, and Politics in Colombia By Gelvez, Juan David; Angulo, Juan Carlos
  10. Poverty, Competition, and Mass Patronage: Evidence from Southern Italy By Troncone, Massimo
  11. Displacement, Not Obstruction: Why Insecure Leaders Need Not Fear Free Media By Afiq bin Oslan; Ipek Ece Sener
  12. Worker Representativeses By Julian Budde; Thomas Dohmen; Simon Jäger; Simon Trenkle
  13. Gender Composition and Group Behavior: Evidence from US City Councils.* By Emilia Brito; Jesse Bruhn; Thea How Choon; E. Anna Weber

  1. By: Troncone, Massimo; Valli, Roberto (ETH Zürich)
    Abstract: Religious leaders wield significant electoral influence over their followers. In a clientelistic setting, politicians may seek to secure this influence by offering material benefits. To test this argument, we combine newly georeferenced information on the renovation history of Italian Catholic churches with a dataset of connections between Christian democratic politicians and Italian Catholic bishops. Leveraging the start of a connection with a difference-in-differences approach, we find that investments into church renovations increase when municipalities are represented by a politician with a personal connection to the sitting bishop. Additional results reveal that church investments increase only when bishops can plausibly mobilize support in favor of the connected politicians, and in places where Christian democrats are losing support. The findings shed new light on the individualistic strategies and motivations of elected politicians in influencing religious leaders.
    Date: 2024–07–26
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:nsyc3
  2. By: Meghna Agarwala (Ashoka University); Shampa Bhattacharjee (Shiv Nadar University); Aparajita Dasgupta (Ashoka University)
    Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between electoral incentives and crop residue burning (CRB) in India. Exploiting the asynchronous nature of state legislative assembly elections, we investigate whether the proximity to election timing influences CRB incidence. We construct a novel dataset combining 1-km resolution daily NASA remote sensing data on CRB with state electoral constituency information. Our findings reveal a significant increase in CRB before elections, suggesting political incentives play a role in its persistence. We provide evidence that this pre-electoral spike is unlikely to be driven by increased crop production, pointing instead to the relaxed law enforcement for political gain.
    Keywords: Crop Residue Burning; environmental regulation; Political cycles
    Date: 2024–07–25
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ash:wpaper:117
  3. By: Gelvez, Juan David (University of Maryland)
    Abstract: Governments across the Global South widely rely on tough-on-crime policies to control illicit drug production. Advocates argue these policies are necessary to control cartels; detractors claim they undermine human rights and ultimately yield minimal results in reducing drug production. How do these policies affect the government’s support? Who supports harsh crime policies? This paper addresses these puzzles by examining the political benefits of coca eradication in Colombia. I show that despite the electoral cost in coca-growing areas, politicians who rely on harsh eradication policies are more likely to benefit electorally, as their core supporters perceive aerial spraying as an effective strategy to combat drug production. Using a dynamic difference-in-differences design and a nationally representative survey, I show that right-wing politicians benefited politically from its aerial spraying eradication efforts, despite the punishment of voters living in coca-growing regions.
    Date: 2024–07–22
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:yn9rz
  4. By: Afiq bin Oslan
    Abstract: Political science has used natural disasters to study whether voters are sensitive to the environment. The complex nature of disasters, however, can present obstacles to causal identification. In this study, we look at a uniquely and overtly human-caused disaster—earthquakes from natural gas drilling in the Netherlands—to see whether these disasters persuade citizens to vote more environmentally. We combine polling station-level voting data with precisely calculated measures of earthquake impact, and we find that pro-environmental party vote share is generally higher in affected locations. These findings provide further support for the theory that environmental damage strengthens the preference for green parties, a relationship that will only become more important as human destruction of the environment worsens.
    Keywords: environmental politics, Green parties, natural disasters, exogenousvshocks
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2023-21
  5. By: Jeanne Lafortune; Francisco Pino
    Abstract: Previous studies of female suffrage have interpreted the change in voting patterns as reflecting a change in voter composition, in part because only aggregate voting data was available. We exploit the existence of separate counts for women and men votes in Chile before and after female suffrage. We show that inference based on aggregates is inaccurate because men also change their voting behavior. Two potential explanations are provided: men responded to female suffrage through strategic voting and men previously represented in part women's vote due to negotiation within the household. We show evidence consistent with both hypotheses.
    Date: 2024–08
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp560
  6. By: Jacopo Bizzotto; Davide Cipullo; André Reslow
    Abstract: This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We model a referendum in which a voter chooses between two policies. The voter relies on a forecaster to learn about the macroeconomic consequences of the policies. The forecaster favours one of the policies and faces a choice between lying to influence the vote and maintaining a reputation for honesty. The model yields three predictions. First, the forecaster is more likely to bias the forecast associated with the policy that is (i) less likely to be selected in the referendum and (ii) associated with greater macroeconomic uncertainty. Second, as the influence of the forecast on the voter’s decision increases, so does the likelihood that the forecaster lies. Third, the forecaster sticks to her biased forecasts even after the referendum, at least for some time. We show that these predictions are empirically supported in the context of the Brexit referendum.
    Keywords: Brexit, interest groups, forecaster behaviour, voting
    JEL: D72 D82 E27 H30
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11221
  7. By: Pablo Brañas-Garza; Antonio Cabrales; María Paz Espinosa; Teresa García-Muñoz
    Abstract: In this paper we explore how individual social preferences correlate with political support for redistribution. We ran an incentivized experiment with a large representative sample of the Spanish population. Our participants took six decisions that elicited their social preferences. Their choices could result in a different total surplus and different distributions of the surplus between the subject and an anonymous counterpart. In our sample, social preferences are unrelated to political support for distributive policies. The main correlates for support of redistribution are the beliefs concerning the importance of effort versus luck for success (fairness), the trust in government institutions (effectiveness) and the perceived importance of the poverty problem (need).
    Keywords: elicitation of social preferences, income distribution and politics, trust in government institutions
    JEL: C93 D31 D72
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11238
  8. By: Michelle Blom; Peter J. Stuckey; Vanessa Teague; Damjan Vukcevic
    Abstract: Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections are a principled approach to electing multiple candidates in a single election. Each ballot has a starting value of 1, and a candidate is elected if they gather a total vote value more than a defined quota. Votes over the quota have their value reduced by a transfer value so as to remove the quota, and are passed to the next candidate on the ballot. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are a statistically sound approach to election auditing which guarantees that failure to detect an error in the result is bounded by a limit. A first approach to RLAs for 2-seat STV elections has been defined. In this paper we show how we can improve this approach by reasoning about lower bounds on transfer values, and how we can extend the approach to partially audit an election, if the method does not support a full audit.
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msh:ebswps:2024-3
  9. By: Gelvez, Juan David (University of Maryland); Angulo, Juan Carlos
    Abstract: What drives public support for drug policies? This paper studies public opinion on the forced eradication of illicit coca crops in Colombia, focusing on the influence of social mobilization and racial identity. We conducted a nationally representative vignette experiment to gauge citizens’ support for eradicating illicit crops using aerial spraying. Our findings reveal three main patterns: i) Community protests against forced eradication significantly shape support for such measures, regardless of voters’ political affiliation and demographic characteristics. ii) Support for forced eradication is highly partisan, with less backing among left-wing supporters. iii) Gender notably influences attitudes towards forced eradication policies, with women displaying greater resistance. These findings underscore the importance of demographic and political factors, considering both those directly affected by eradication and those forming opinions about it, in shaping public opinion on drug policy. We discuss the policy implications and suggest directions for future research.
    Date: 2024–07–23
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:6ys2g
  10. By: Troncone, Massimo
    Abstract: This article argues that in a context of widespread clientelism and poverty, local public goods provision is a tool for mass patronage. Clientelistic incumbents under threat entice economically vulnerable voters into supporting the regime by creating jobs in the construction sector through infrastructural investments. The theory is tested using data on public works projects funded by the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, a massive place-based policy for the development of Southern Italy introduced after WWII. Empirically, I exploit within-politician shocks in competition induced by the electoral rule of the post-war Italian Senate. The results reveal that public works investments increase when Christian democratic senators are threatened in their own districts by the election of a communist senator, that this effect is particularly strong in areas characterized by low levels of employment, and that this distribution generates electoral returns.
    Date: 2024–07–26
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:rgz9t
  11. By: Afiq bin Oslan; Ipek Ece Sener
    Abstract: Leaders from across the political spectrum are often accused of manipulating the media to their benefit. Contemporary developments have proliferated the number of media sources available to citizens. We argue that new, independent media sources may actually be a boon for leaders looking to control information. Using a simple formal model, we demonstrate a phenomenon of “displacement†—where the presence of alter- native sources of information can actually encourage states to manipulate information. This is because alternative media sources mean that states only need to divert citizen attention without employing full obstruction, reducing the necessary effort expended. This result advances our understanding of how the contemporary state navigates an increasingly complex media landscape. We supplement the model with case studies on the media policies of Malaysian and Turkish governments.
    Keywords: public opinion, accountability, media, game theory
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2023-24
  12. By: Julian Budde; Thomas Dohmen; Simon Jäger; Simon Trenkle
    Abstract: We study the descriptive and substantive representation of workers through worker representatives, focusing on the selection of German works council representatives and their impact on worker outcomes. Becoming a professional representative leads to substantial wage gains for the elected, concentrated among blue-collar workers. Representatives are positively selected in terms of pre-election earnings and person fixed effects. They are more likely to have undergone vocational training, show greater interest in politics, and lean left politically compared to the employees they represent; blue-collar workers are close to proportionally represented among works councilors. Drawing on a retirement-IV strategy and event-study designs around council elections, we find that blue-collar representatives reduce involuntary separations, consistent with blue-collar workers placing stronger emphasis on job security.
    Keywords: worker representatives, works councils, linked administrative and survey data
    JEL: J51 J53 P16
    Date: 2024–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_581
  13. By: Emilia Brito; Jesse Bruhn; Thea How Choon; E. Anna Weber
    Abstract: How does gender composition influence individual and group behavior? To study this question empirically, we assembled a new, national sample of United States city council elections and digitized information from the minutes of over 40, 000 city-council meetings. We find that replacing a male councilor with a female councilor results in a 25p.p. increase in the share of motions proposed by women. This is despite causing only a 20p.p. increase in the council female share. The discrepancy is driven, in part, by behavioral changes similar to those documented in laboratory-based studies of gender composition. When a lone woman is joined by a female colleague, she participates more actively by proposing more motions. The apparent changes in behavior do not translate into clear differences in spending. The null finding on spending is not driven by strategic voting; however, preference alignment on local policy issues between men and women appears to play an important role. Taken together, our results both highlight the importance of nominal representation for cultivating substantive participation by women in high-stakes decision making bodies; and also provide evidence in support of the external validity of
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2024-002

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