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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Ethan Kaplan; Fernando Saltiel; Sergio S. Urzúa |
| Abstract: | This paper assesses if voting for democracy affects long-term electoral participation. We study the effects of participating in Chile's 1988 plebiscite, which determined whether democracy would be reinstated after a 15-year long military dictatorship. Taking advantage of individual-level voting data for upwards of 13 million Chileans, we implement an age-based RD design comparing long run registration and turnout rates across marginally eligible and ineligible individuals. We find that Plebiscite eligibility (participation) significantly increased electoral turnout three decades later, reaching 1.8 (3.3) percentage points in the 2017 Presidential election. These effects are robust to different specifications and distinctive to the 1988 referendum. We discuss potential mechanisms concluding that the scale of initial mobilization explains the estimated effects. We find that plebiscite eligibility induced a sizable share of less educated voters to register to vote compared to eligibles in other upstream elections. Since less educated voters tended to support Chile's governing left-wing coalition, we argue that the plebiscite contributed to the emergence of one party rule the twenty years following democratization. |
| JEL: | C21 D72 N46 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26440&r=all |
| By: | Ulubasoglu, Mehmet Ali; Yaraşır-Tülümce, Sevinç |
| Abstract: | We investigate the political factors involved in the allocation of public investments into Turkish electoral districts. In contrast to the general presumption in the literature, we argue that the Closed-List Proportional Representation electoral rule is associated with pork barrel politics, given the strong reelection motives of the legislators. Using a unique data set from Turkey covering detailed individual characteristics of approximately 2,000 MPs over five legislative periods during 1987–2004, we test this argument and demonstrate that the composition of legislator characteristics in a district proxying pork barrel engagement such as seniority, education, and former profession, matters significantly for attracting investments into specific geographic constituencies. The findings also indicate the strong presence of partisan motivations and targeted support for core and smaller opposition groups in public investment allocations. We also document that a stronger right-wing tendency in the cabinet, a single-party government, and fractionalized voter preferences and higher voter turnout in the electorate are all associated with increased public investments. |
| Keywords: | Pork Barrel; Turkey; Individual Legislator Characteristics |
| JEL: | H4 |
| Date: | 2019–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:96842&r=all |
| By: | David Kempe |
| Abstract: | In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, one assumes that all voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a common metric space. Voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving only this ordinal (comparison) information, should select a candidate approximately minimizing the sum of distances from all voters. It is known that while the Copeland rule and related rules guarantee distortion at most 5, many other standard voting rules, such as Plurality, Veto, or $k$-approval, have distortion growing unboundedly in the number $n$ of candidates. Plurality, Veto, or $k$-approval with small $k$ require less communication from the voters than all deterministic social choice rules known to achieve constant distortion. This motivates our study of the tradeoff between the distortion and the amount of communication in deterministic social choice rules. We show that any one-round deterministic voting mechanism in which each voter communicates only the candidates she ranks in a given set of $k$ positions must have distortion at least $\frac{2n-k}{k}$; we give a mechanism achieving an upper bound of $O(n/k)$, which matches the lower bound up to a constant. For more general communication-bounded voting mechanisms, in which each voter communicates $b$ bits of information about her ranking, we show a slightly weaker lower bound of $\Omega(n/b)$ on the distortion. For randomized mechanisms, it is known that Random Dictatorship achieves expected distortion strictly smaller than 3, almost matching a lower bound of $3-\frac{2}{n}$ for any randomized mechanism that only receives each voter's top choice. We close this gap, by giving a simple randomized social choice rule which only uses each voter's first choice, and achieves expected distortion $3-\frac{2}{n}$. |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1911.08129&r=all |
| By: | Maruyama, Yuuki |
| Abstract: | I define Shapley-Shubik Power Index per Person (SSPIPP) as the ratio of a political party's Shapley-Shubik Power Index in a parliament to the number of people who voted for the party. SSPIPP can be regarded as the political power each of them has. I calculate the optimal size of a political party that maximizes SSPIPP, and it shows that the more approval votes a parliament requires to pass bills, the smaller the optimal party size becomes. It also shows that in countries that require supermajority approval vote to pass bills, party system fragmentation tends to become permanent. |
| Date: | 2019–10–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:b9ey2&r=all |
| By: | Walter Bossert (CIREQ - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, University of Montreal - University of Montreal); Andrew E. Clark (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Conchita d'Ambrosio (INSIDE - INtegrative research unit on Social and Individual DEvelopment - University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]); Anthony Lepinteur (INSIDE - INtegrative research unit on Social and Individual DEvelopment - University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]) |
| Abstract: | Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum. |
| Keywords: | Economic index numbers,Insecurity,Political participation,Conservatism,Right-leaning political parties,Trump,Brexit |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02325984&r=all |
| By: | Mark Borgschulte; Heepyung Cho; Darren Lubotsky |
| Abstract: | Survey refusal in the Current Population Survey (CPS) has tripled over the last decade. This rise coincides with the emergence of rhetoric, largely from the political right, questioning the accuracy and integrity of government statistics. We examine how support for the Tea Party and the Republican party have affected CPS refusal rates and whether households are more likely to participate in the survey when their preferred political party holds the White House. Using state and metro vote shares or an individual-level model based on the longitudinal structure of the CPS, we find no evidence that Republican or Tea Party supporters drive the long-term upward trend in refusals. We do find evidence of a political cycle in response rates. Refusal rates since 2015 exhibit polarization, with the fastest growth in refusals among those least likely to support Trump and the Tea Party. Evidence from an analysis which generates exogenous variation in Tea Party support using rain on the day of the first Tea Party rally indicates that exposure to anti-survey rhetoric decreases refusal rates, consistent with the findings from our other analyses. |
| JEL: | C81 I32 J64 P48 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26433&r=all |
| By: | Blattman, Chris; Larreguy, Horacio; Marx, Benjamin; Reid, Otis |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effects of one of the largest anti-vote-buying campaigns ever studied—with half a million voters exposed across 1427 villages—in Uganda’s 2016 elections. Working with civil society organizations, we designed the study to estimate how voters and candidates responded to their campaign in treatment and spillover villages, and how impacts varied with campaign intensity. Despite its heavy footprint, the campaign did not reduce politician offers of gifts in exchange for votes. However, it had sizable effects on people’s votes. Votes swung from well-funded incumbents (who buy most votes) towards their poorly-financed challengers. We argue the swing arose from changes in village social norms plus the tactical response of candidates. While the campaign struggled to instill norms of refusing gifts, it leveled the electoral playing field by convincing some voters to abandon norms of reciprocity—thus accepting gifts from politicians but voting for their preferred candidate. |
| Date: | 2019–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:u34pr&r=all |
| By: | Darius, Philipp; Stephany, Fabian |
| Abstract: | With a network approach, we examine the case of the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and their potential use of a "hashjacking" strategy - the use of someone else’s hashtag in order to promote one's own social media agenda. Our findings suggest that right-wing politicians (and their supporters/retweeters) actively and effectively polarise the discourse not just by using their own party hashtags, but also by "hashjacking" the political party hashtags of other established parties. The results underline the necessity to understand the success of right-wing parties, online and in elections, not entirely as a result of external effects (e.g. migration), but as a direct consequence of their digital political communication strategy. |
| Date: | 2019–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:6gbc9&r=all |
| By: | Steven J. Bosworth; Dennis J. Snower |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how skill-biased growth can generate economic fragmentation (income dis-parities) that give rise to social fragmentation (the adoption of increasingly incompatible social identities and values), which generate political fragmentation (the adoption of increasingly incompatible economic policies). Our model of social fragmentation focuses on three values-driven identities: individualism (focused on status concerns), communitarianism (focused on the benefits of social affiliations), and multi-affilatedness (encompassing both individualistic and communitarian objectives). Our analysis shows how the high-, middle- and low-skilled people are drawn to individualistic, multi-affiliated and communitarian objectives, respectively. We show how skill-biased growth leads to an expansion of the individualistic and communitarian groups, at the expense of the tolerant multi-affiliates. Consequently, there is a narrowing of the moral foundations driving economic policy. We examine the conditions under which these developments increase size of the political constituency for protectionist-nationalist policies (which destroy productivity, compress the income distribution and promote the benefits of social affiliation). |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7935&r=all |
| By: | Julien Labonne; Sahar Parsa; Pablo Querubín |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effect of term limits on female political representation. Using data from Philippine municipalities where strict term limits have been in place since 1987, we show that term limits led to a large increase in the number of women running and winning in mayoral elections. However, we show that this increase is entirely driven by female relatives of the term-limited incumbents. We further show that the differential gender impact of this policy is driven by political dynasties' adaptive strategies to stay in power. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26431&r=all |
| By: | Anqi Jiao |
| Abstract: | This study investigates whether and how institutional investors affect corporate lobbying of firms in their portfolios. I find that firmsâ lobbying activities are positively associated with ownership by institutional investors who also lobby. The effect is stronger for the firms that face more constraints to lobbying. I use the Russell index reconstitution to establish causality. I further document three plausible channels. First, institutional investors support firmsâ lobbying by pushing for the same congressional bills. Second, institutional investors share political resources such as lobbyists with firms. Third, institutional investors protect firmsâ private information by voting against proposals on additional lobbying disclosure. Overall, the study shows that institutional investors can alleviate the constraints and costs in corporate lobbying. |
| JEL: | D72 G23 G38 P16 |
| Date: | 2019–08–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jmp:jm2019:pji208&r=all |
| By: | Krimmer, Robert; Duenas-Cid, David; Krivonosova, Iuliia; Serrano, Radu Antonio; Freire, Marlon; Wrede, Casper |
| Abstract: | The Åland Islands will use Internet Voting for the first time for expatriate voters at the next Parliamentary Elections, to be held in October 2019. This electoral modernization is a response to the need detected to introduce changes in order to better integrate expatriate voters and the younger generations into the electoral system, and represents a first step towards fully introducing i-Voting in future elections. This working paper provides a frame-work for the Ålandic electoral system for further analysis of the costs involved to introduce new voting channels following the CoDE Project methodology. |
| Date: | 2019–09–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:5zr2e&r=all |
| By: | Abdelghani Maddi (CEPN - Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord - UP13 - Université Paris 13 - USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The issue of Open Access (OA) in research is attracting growing interest both within the scientific community and on the political scene. Some centers specializing in the production of science indicators now include OA indicators by institution. In its 2019 ranking, the Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) provides a ranking of institutions according to their share of open access publications. This gives an idea of the degree of openness of institutions. However, the fact of not taking into account the disciplinary specificities and the specialization of the institutions makes the rankings based on the shares of the OA publications biased. We show that open access publishing practices vary considerably by discipline. As a result, we propose two methods of normalization of OA share; by WoS subject categories and by OST disciplines. Normalization corrects OA's share taking into account disciplinary practices. This allows a better comparability of different actors. Abstract The issue of Open Access (OA) in research is attracting growing interest both within the scientific community and on the political scene. Some centers specializing in the production of science indicators now include OA indicators by institution. In its 2019 ranking, the Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) provides a ranking of institutions according to their share of open access publications. This gives an idea of the degree of openness of institutions. However, the fact of not taking into account the disciplinary specificities and the specialization of the institutions makes the rankings based on the shares of the OA publications biased. We show that open access publishing practices vary considerably by discipline. As a result, we propose two methods of normalization of OA share; by WoS subject categories and by OST disciplines. Normalization corrects OA's share taking into account disciplinary practices. This allows a better comparability of different actors. |
| Keywords: | ranking,institution,normalisation,Open Access,bibliometrics |
| Date: | 2019–10–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cepnwp:hal-02328158&r=all |
| By: | Yuping Deng (School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha, P.R. China); Yanrui Wu (Business School, The University of Western Australia); Helian Xu (School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha, P.R. China) |
| Abstract: | A firm’s top manager and a government official may be connected due to special circumstances. This social relationship or political connection may provide industrial polluters with protection or a “pollution shelter” which could lead to severe environmental deterioration. This paper aims to examine the link between political connections and firms’ pollution discharges by using Chinese data. Empirical results show that political connections are the institutional origin for firms to adopt strategic pollution discharges. Government officials who are young, of low education, promoted locally and in office for a relatively long time are more likely to build political connections with polluters. This phenomenon may lead to inadequate enforcement of regulation and emission control. The pollution discharge of politically connected firms also varies considerably due to firm heterogeneity. This study also shows that pollution shelter effects caused by political connections are more obvious in the central and western regions, prefecture cities and capital-intensive industries. |
| Keywords: | Political connections; pollution discharges; political promotion; China |
| JEL: | Q51 L20 O12 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uwa:wpaper:19-15&r=all |
| By: | Martijn Dröes (Universiteit van Amsterdam); Hans R.A. Koster (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | The number of refugees around the world has increased substantially in the last decade. To cope with refugee flows, many countries have built refugee centers (RCs) for refugees to await the outcome of their asylum procedure. The opening of such centers often leads to considerable opposition from the local population. Using detailed housing transactions data from the Netherlands over the period 1990-2015, we examine locals' attitudes towards immigration by investigating households' willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid living near RCs. Comparing the price developments of opened RCs and those that are planned, we show that the opening of an RC decreases house prices within 2km by 3-6%. Using micro-data on home buyers' characteristics and employing a non-parametric hedonic pricing method, we identify households' individual preferences. We show that attitudes of higher income households towards RCs tend to be more negative, while those of foreign-born households are more positive. The WTP is also more negative for larger RCs. These results imply that when opening RCs, it is advisable to keep them relatively small and locate them in more ethnically diverse areas. |
| Keywords: | immigration, house prices, refugee centers, household preferences |
| JEL: | R31 E02 O18 |
| Date: | 2019–11–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190075&r=all |