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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Le Barbanchon, Thomas; Sauvagnat, Julien |
| Abstract: | We study and quantify the implications of voter bias and electoral competition for the gender composition of politicians. We show that unfavorable voters' attitudes towards women and local gender earnings gaps correlate negatively with the share of female candidates in both French Parliamentary elections, and across countries. Using within-candidate variation only, we also find that female candidates in French elections obtain lower vote shares in municipalities with higher gender earnings gaps. We then propose a model of political selection with voter bias. We show theoretically that when voters are biased against women, political parties facing gender quotas tend to select male candidates in the most contestable districts. We take this test to the data using the introduction of gender quotas in France, and find strong support for the existence of a voter bias in favor of male candidates. Finally, we calibrate our model and confirm in simulations that electoral competition significantly hinders the effectiveness of gender quotas in boosting women's presence in politics. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Competition; gender attitudes; Gender Quotas; women in politics |
| JEL: | D72 D78 J16 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13238&r=pol |
| By: | Sakuyama, T. |
| Abstract: | This article aims to clarify the linkage between electoral rules and politicians protectionist motives. Specifically, hypotheses on the positive impacts of the proportional representation formula and constituency size on candidates attitudes toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are tested by estimating an ordered probit model using survey data on Japan s national elections in 2012, 2013, and 2016. By extending the coverage to the upper house elections, this article adds value to the previous literature. The estimation results confirm that proportional representation formula and constituency size have a positive impact on candidates support for the TPP in the lower house election in 2012, but have no influence in the upper house elections in 2013 and 2016. Moreover, constituency size is no longer significant once the sample is limited to single-member district candidates even in the 2012 lower house election. It is therefore concluded that, contrary to the previous literature, constituency size that manifests electoral incentives is not a notable cause of candidates protectionist bias. In contrast, it is found that candidates political ideology, such as their affinity for agriculture and Asia as well as antipathy to small government and immigrants, is proved to be the main drivers of candidates protectionist motives. Acknowledgement : I am grateful to the participants to the Annual Conference of the Japan Public Choice Society at Kwansei Gakuin University in 2017. This work is supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant Number 16K07911. |
| Keywords: | International Relations/Trade |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae18:277151&r=pol |
| By: | De Benedetto, Marco Alberto |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of the electoral system on the quality of politicians, measured by the average educational attainment, at the local level in Italy over the period 1994-2017. Since 1993, municipalities below 15,000 inhabitants vote with a single-ballot system, whereas cities above 15,000 inhabitants threshold are subject to a double ballot. Exploiting the discontinuous policy change nearby the population cut-off we have implemented a RDD and found that runoff elections lead to a decrease in the educational attainment of local politicians by about 2% compared to years of schooling of politicians in municipalities voting with a single-ballot scheme. We speculate that the negative effect is driven by the different selection process of candidates adopted by political parties between runoff and single-ballot system. Findings are similar when we use alternative measures of quality of politicians related both to the previous occupation and to previous political experience, and when we control for different measures of political closeness. |
| Keywords: | Regression discontinuity design; Electoral system; Education; Political competition. |
| JEL: | C31 D72 I20 J42 |
| Date: | 2018–10–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:89511&r=pol |
| By: | Garance Genicot ⓡ; Laurent Bouton ⓡ; Micael Castanheira ⓡ |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the political determinants of inequality in government interventions under the majoritarian and proportional representation systems. Using a model of electoral competition with targetable government intervention and heterogeneous localities, we uncover a novel relative electoral sensitivity effect in majoritarian systems. This effect, which depends on the geographic distribution of voters, can incentivize parties to allocate resources more equally under majoritarian systems than proportional representation systems. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that government interventions are more unequal in majoritarian systems. |
| JEL: | D72 H00 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25205&r=pol |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles); Abdelmonaim Tlidi (UCA - Université Cadi Ayyad [Marrakech, Maroc]) |
| Abstract: | For three-candidate elections, we compute under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption, the conditional probabilities of the Absolute Majority Winner Paradox (AMWP) and the Absolute Majority Loser Paradox (AMLP) under the Plurality rule, the Borda rule, and the Negative Plurality rule for a given number of voters. We also provide a representation of the conditional probability of these paradoxes for the whole family of weighted scoring rules with large electorates. The AMWP occurs when a candidate who is ranked first by more than half of the voters is not selected by a given voting rule; the AMLP appears when a candidate who is ranked last by more than half of the voters is elected. As no research papers have tried to evaluate the likelihood of these paradoxes, this note is designed to fill this void. Our results allow us to claim that ignoring these two paradoxes in the literature, particularly AMWP, is not justified. |
| Date: | 2018–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01896273&r=pol |
| By: | Jeannette Brosig-Koch; Timo Heinrich; Heike Hennig-Schmidt; Claudia Keser; Joachim Weimann |
| Abstract: | Since Mancur Olson's "Logic of collective action" it is common conviction in social sciences that in large groups the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Following Olson’s logic, the impact of an individual’s costly contribution becomes smaller if the group gets larger and, consequently, the incentive to cooperate decreases with group size. Conducting a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects, we demonstrate that Olson's logic does not generally account for observed behavior. Large groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is almost negligible are still able to provide a public good in the same way as small groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is much higher. Nevertheless, we find that small variations of the MPCR in large groups have a strong effect on contributions. We develop a hypothesis concerning the interplay of MPCR and group size, which is based on the assumption that the salience of the advantages of mutual cooperation plays a decisive role. This hypothesis is successfully tested in a second series of experiments. Our result raises hopes that the chance to organize collective action of large groups is much higher than expected so far. Since Mancur Olson's "Logic of collective action" it is common conviction in social sciences that in large groups the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Following Olson’s logic, the impact of an individual’s costly contribution becomes smaller if the group gets larger and, consequently, the incentive to cooperate decreases with group size. Conducting a series of laboratory experiments with large groups of up to 100 subjects, we demonstrate that Olson's logic does not generally account for observed behavior. Large groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is almost negligible are still able to provide a public good in the same way as small groups in which the impact of an individual contribution is much higher. Nevertheless, we find that small variations of the MPCR in large groups have a strong effect on contributions. We develop a hypothesis concerning the interplay of MPCR and group size, which is based on the assumption that the salience of the advantages of mutual cooperation plays a decisive role. This hypothesis is successfully tested in a second series of experiments. Our result raises hopes that the chance to organize collective action of large groups is much higher than expected so far. |
| Date: | 2018–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2018s-02&r=pol |
| By: | Laurent Bartholdi; Wade Hann-Caruthers; Maya Josyula; Omer Tamuz; Leeat Yariv |
| Abstract: | A celebrated result in social choice is May's Theorem, providing the foundation for majority rule. May's crucial assumption of symmetry, often thought of as a procedural equity requirement, is violated by many choice procedures that grant voters identical roles. We show that a modification of May's symmetry assumption allows for a far richer set of rules that still treat voters equally, but have minimal winning coalitions comprising a vanishing fraction of the population. We conclude that procedural fairness can coexist with the empowerment of a small minority of individuals. Methodologically, we introduce techniques from discrete mathematics and illustrate their usefulness for the analysis of social choice questions. |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1811.01227&r=pol |
| By: | Paul J.J. Welfens (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen (EIIW)) |
| Abstract: | The 2016 US presidential election resulted in the populist Donald Trump becoming the 45th President of the United States. While many observers assume that this reflects a transitory phase of populism in the US, a closer analysis suggests that there will be a structural populist threat for the US, the West and the world economy. There is survey evidence that US voters consider the inequality which has emerged in the US over many years as unacceptable. At the same time the Lindh-McCall survey results show that the relative majority of US voters expect that big companies rather than government will correct this inequality. This is illusory and wishful thinking and will serve to create continued voter frustration for the lower half of households – this refers to the poorer half of US households – and populism could indeed expand on the basis of such frustration for many years to come. The main drivers of rising inequality in the US, namely ICT expansion, financial globalization and the rise of China’s exports will continue in the medium term so that US voters’ frustration is a structural problem that cannot easily be remedied and that has consequences for transatlantic and global economic relations as well as security policy implications. While the decline of the income share for the lower half of income earners in Western Europe has been rather modest in 1981-2015, the decline of that share in the US has been dramatic, namely from 20% to 13%. The EU is nevertheless threatened by US populism since its political representatives are trying to export their ideology and approach to Italy and other Western continental EU countries. In the UK, a subtle populism is already becoming more apparent under the heading of BREXIT. If the EU27 could defend the model of the Social Market Economy and export this system to Asia and Africa while joining political forces with ASEAN – and possibly China – to defend the multilateral economic order, European impulses could help to contain US populism. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, collective decision making, populism, inequality, international economics |
| JEL: | D7 F00 F02 P16 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwu:eiiwdp:disbei253&r=pol |
| By: | Riatu Mariatul Qibthiyyah (Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indonesia); Ummi Salamah (Department of Communication, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas Indonesia) |
| Abstract: | The online media has not only capture news at the national level but also deliver news on specific regions, either the province(s) or local governments. A focus on delivering more local economic news, may also align to trend of decentralization policies, triggered especially after period of post-1998 and the adoption of sub-national election (Morrell, 2005). Previous studies mostly explored of how economic news may affect election outcome (Holbrook, 2004), but not on the effect to related economic outcome. We use news data from four large media online, as follows: Kompas, Okezone, Republika, Sindonews, and Tribunnews, over the year of 2010 up to 2015. The data of economic news category, as it focused on news at the province and local level, are specific news classified in 13 categories. Based on fixed-effect panel regression, our preliminary finding indicates of how economic news may positively affected economic outcome – referring to per capita GRDP (Gross Regional Domestic Product). By category ofecoonomic news, news on investments and on tourism tat have positive effect on province per capita GRDP. Meanwhile, on the effect of political event, we only found a significant effect of province election in the case of election year 2012. For these provinces with election year in 2012, more economic news instead associated with lower province per capita GRDP. |
| Keywords: | decentralization — news media — economic news — economic development |
| JEL: | L82 H89 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lpe:wpaper:201826&r=pol |
| By: | S. Nageeb Ali (Department of Economics, Penn State University); Aislinn Bohren (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) |
| Abstract: | A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or "deliberating" before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal must use a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose the equilibrium played by the committee, or use a non-anonymous or non-monotone social choice rule. |
| Keywords: | Information Aggregation, Committees, Deliberation, Collusion |
| JEL: | D7 D8 |
| Date: | 2018–09–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:18-022&r=pol |
| By: | Asongu, Simplice A; Odhiambo, Nicholas M |
| Abstract: | This study assesses linkages between social media and governance dynamics in 49 Africancountries for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on ordinary least squares andquantile regressions. Ten bundled and unbundled governance dynamics are used, notably: (i)political governance (entailing ???voice & accountability??? and political stability/no violence);(ii) economic governance (involving regulation quality and government effectiveness); (iii)institutional governance (comprising the rule of law and corruption-control) and (iv) generalgovernance (entailing political, economic and institutional governance). Social media ismeasured with Facebook penetration. The findings show that Facebook penetration ispositively associated with governance dynamics and these positive nexuses differ in terms ofsignificance and magnitude of significance throughout the conditional distribution of thegovernance dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Governance; Social media; AfricaGovernance; Social media; Africa |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uza:wpaper:25008&r=pol |
| By: | Dreher, Axel; Lang, Valentin; Rosendorff, B. Peter; Vreeland, James Raymond |
| Abstract: | We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries' votes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Introducing new data on voting behavior in the UNSC over the 1960-2015 period, our results show that states allied with the US receive more bilateral aid when voting in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of states less allied with the US are rewarded with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not receive such perks. |
| Keywords: | Aid; IMF; United Nations Security Council; voting; World Bank |
| JEL: | F35 O11 O19 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13290&r=pol |
| By: | Allen, Franklin; Qian, Jun; Shen, Lin |
| Abstract: | An interesting aspect of corruption is that its damaging effects on economic performance differ significantly across countries. In this paper, we show that if a central government collects sufficient taxes, it can curtail corruption by paying for performance of local government officials. An alternative way to reduce corruption is to introduce competition among local government officials. Difference in axing ability and the magnitude of competition among government officials can help explain the heterogenous effects of corruption across countries. |
| Keywords: | Competition; Corruption; institutions; taxes; user fee |
| JEL: | H0 P5 |
| Date: | 2018–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13218&r=pol |