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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Brian Fogarty (School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow); David Kimball (Department of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis); Lea Kosnik (Department of Economics, University of Missouri-St. Louis) |
| Abstract: | Debate over the existence and impact of voter fraud continues unabated in American politics. Despite minimal evidence of fraud cases and non-existent effects on election outcomes, Americans continue to believe voter fraud is rampant. In this paper, we examine a potential source of this disconnect – the U.S. news media. How the media cover voter fraud likely affects citizens’ beliefs and opinions on the subject. However, little research exists exploring voter fraud coverage. In this paper, we examine the patterns and themes of voter fraud coverage in local newspapers for each of the 50 states during the 2012 elections. Amongst the results, we show that ‘voter photo identification’ was a dominate topic in coverage. Further, presidential campaign spending and states that recently passed restrictive voting laws affected the language and which topics related to voter fraud received the most attention. Finally, we find that the number of fraud cases was unrelated to voter fraud news coverage. From an agenda setting standpoint, our results suggest Republicans may have been successful in making voter identification a salient issue during the 2012 elections. |
| Keywords: | media, politics, voting, voter, election, text analysis, content analysis. |
| JEL: | H0 |
| Date: | 2016–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msl:workng:1012&r=pol |
| By: | Enikolopov, Ruben; Petrova, Maria; Sonin, Konstantin |
| Abstract: | There is ample evidence that in democratic countries traditional mass media affect people’s behavior and foster political and corporate accountability. Do new media such as blogs play a similar role in non-democratic countries, where offline media are often suppressed? We study consequences of blog posts about corruption in Russian state-controlled companies. We show that anti-corruption blog posts by Aleksei Navalny, a popular Russian civic activist, had a negative causal impact on market returns of state-controlled companies. For identification, we exploit the analysis of the precise timing of blog posts combined with quasi-random variation in access to blog platform caused by hacker attacks. The effect becomes less pronounced and even positive for the posts that attract the most attention, consistent with disciplining effect of social media. Furthermore, the posts have a long-term impact on returns and are associated with higher management turnover and less minority shareholder conflicts. Taken together, our results suggest that social media can discipline corruption even in a country with limited political competition and heavily censored mass media. |
| Keywords: | financial markets; governance; political economy; social media |
| JEL: | L82 L86 P16 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11263&r=pol |
| By: | Mark T. Le Quement (University of Bonn); Isabel Marcin (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees of strategic communication. We use a 2 x 2 design varying the information protocol (communication vs exogenous public signals) and the group composition (heterogeneous vs homogeneous). Results are only consistent with the third model. Roughly 80% of (heuristic) subjects truth-tell and vote with the majority of announced signals. Remaining (sophisticated) agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule. |
| Keywords: | Committees, Voting, Information Aggregation, Cheap Talk, Experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D72 D82 D83 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2016_05&r=pol |
| By: | Galasso, Vincenzo (Bocconi University); Nannicini, Tommaso (Bocconi University) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. We implemented a survey experiment during the (mixed gender) electoral race for mayor in Milan (2011), and a field experiment during the (same gender) electoral race for mayor in Cava de' Tirreni (2015). In both cases, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to either a positive or a negative campaign by one of the opponents. The third (control) group received no electoral information. In Milan, the campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). In Cava de' Tirreni, we implemented a large scale door-to-door campaign in collaboration with one of the candidates, randomizing positive vs. negative messages. In both experiments, stark gender differences emerge. Females vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the opponent's positive campaign. Exactly the opposite occurs for males. These gender differences cannot be accounted for by gender identification with the candidate, ideology, or other observable attributes of the voters. |
| Keywords: | gender differences, political campaigns, randomized controlled trials, competitive persuasion |
| JEL: | D72 J16 M37 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9906&r=pol |
| By: | Vincenzo Galasso; Tommaso Nannicini |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the differential response of male and female voters to competitive persuasion in political campaigns. We implemented a survey experiment during the (mixed gender) electoral race for mayor in Milan (2011), and a field experiment during the (same gender) electoral race for mayor in Cava de’ Tirreni (2015). In both cases, a sample of eligible voters was randomly divided into three groups. Two were exposed to either a positive or a negative campaign by one of the opponents. The third—control—group received no electoral information. In Milan, the campaigns were administered online and consisted of a bundle of advertising tools (videos, texts, slogans). In Cava de’ Tirreni, we implemented a large scale door-to-door campaign in collaboration with one of the candidates, randomizing positive vs. negative messages. In both experiments, stark gender differences emerge. Females vote more for the opponent and less for the incumbent when they are exposed to the opponent’s positive campaign. Exactly the opposite occurs for males. These gender differences cannot be accounted for by gender identification with the candidate, ideology, or other observable attributes of the voters. Keywords: gender differences, political campaigns, randomized controlled trials, competitive persuasion. JEL classification: D72, J16, M37. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:575&r=pol |
| By: | Mattozzi, Andrea; Nakaguma, Marcos Y. |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a committee decision-making problem. Committee members are heterogeneous in their competence, they are biased towards one of the alternatives and career oriented, and they can choose whether to vote or abstain. The interaction between career concern and bias a¤ects the voting behavior of members depending on transparency of individual votes. We show that transparency attenuates the pre-existing biases of competent members and exacerbates the biases of incompetent members. Public voting leads to better decisions when the magnitude of the bias is large, while secret voting performs better otherwise. We provide experimental evidence supporting our theoretical conclusions. |
| Keywords: | Committees, Voting, Career Concern, Transparency |
| JEL: | D72 C92 D71 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2016/08&r=pol |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu; Georgy Egorov; Konstantin Sonin |
| Abstract: | An influential thesis often associated with De Tocqueville views social mobility as a bulwark of democracy: when members of a social group expect to join the ranks of other social groups in the near future, they should have less reason to exclude these other groups from the political process. In this paper, we investigate this hypothesis using a dynamic model of political economy. As well as formalizing this argument, our model demonstrates its limits, elucidating a robust theoretical force making democracy less stable in societies with high social mobility: when the median voter expects to move up (respectively down), she would prefer to give less voice to poorer (respectively richer) social groups. Our theoretical analysis shows that in the presence of social mobility, the political preferences of an individual depend on the potentially conflicting preferences of her “future selves,” and that the evolution of institutions is determined through the implicit interaction between occupants of the same social niche at different points in time. When social mobility is endogenized, our model identifies new political economic forces limiting the amount of mobility in society – because the middle class will lose out from mobility at the bottom and because a peripheral coalition between the rich and the poor may oppose mobility at the top. |
| JEL: | D71 D74 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22174&r=pol |
| By: | Brian Beach (Department of Economics, The College of William and Mary); Daniel Jones (Department of Economics, University of South Carolina) |
| Abstract: | Are budget and policy outcomes different under politicians with business experience? We study California city councils and implement a regression discontinuity strategy to provide causal evidence on this issue. Ultimately, we find no evidence that the election of a candidate with business experience has an impact on city expenditures, revenues, debt ratios, unemployment rates, and other outcomes. Future vote shares for candidates with business experience are also unaffected, which suggests that businesspersons are not having an impact that is observed to voters but unobserved in our data. We find weak evidence that the election of a businessperson may lead to lower borrowing costs. |
| JEL: | E |
| Date: | 2016–05–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwm:wpaper:169&r=pol |
| By: | Becchetti, Leonardo (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit); Salustri, Francesco (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit); Pelligra, Vittorio (Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit) |
| Abstract: | We use the Vote-with-the-Wallet game (VWG) to model socially or environmentally responsible consumption, an increasingly relevant but still under-researched phenomenon. Based on a theoretical model outlining game equilibria and the parametric interval of the related multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma (PD) we evaluate with a controlled lab experiment players’ behavior in the game and test the effects of an ex post redistribution mechanism between defectors and cooperators. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism interrupts cooperation decay and stabilizes the share of cooperators at a level significantly higher, even though inferior to the Nash equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | vote with the wallet; prisoner’s dilemma; lab experiment |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 M14 |
| Date: | 2015–09–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:aiccon:2015_143&r=pol |
| By: | Harrison, Mark (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | In a command economy, centralized political priorities take precedence over market equilibrium, and government purchases cannot be refused. This chapter describes the antecedents, origins, evolution, and outcomes of the Soviet command economy from the Bolshevik Revolution to World War II. The Soviet command economy was built in two phases, 1917 to 1920, and 1928 onward, with a ‘breathing space’ between. The present account gives prominence to features of a command economy that, while missing from the first phase, were developed during the breathing space, and then helped to ensure the relative success of the second phase. These were features that assured secrecy, security, and the selection of economic officials for competence and party loyalty. Like any economy in the international system, the command economy had a comparative advantage: the production of economic and military power. |
| Keywords: | command economy, communism, corruption, economic growth, incentives, personnel, policy reform, power, secrecy, security, Soviet Union, violence, war economy JEL Classification: H12, N44, P21 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:283&r=pol |
| By: | Efraim Benmelech; Esteban F. Klor |
| Abstract: | This paper provides the first systematic analysis of the link between economic, political, and social conditions and the global phenomenon of ISIS foreign fighters. We find that poor economic conditions do not drive participation in ISIS. In contrast, the number of ISIS foreign fighters is positively correlated with a country's GDP per capita and Human Development Index (HDI). In fact, many foreign fighters originate from countries with high levels of economic development, low income inequality, and highly developed political institutions. Other factors that explain the number of ISIS foreign fighters are the size of a country's Muslim population and its ethnic homogeneity. Although we cannot directly determine why people join ISIS, our results suggest that the flow of foreign fighters to ISIS is driven not by economic or political conditions but rather by ideology and the difficulty of assimilation into homogeneous Western countries. |
| JEL: | H0 H56 K42 O52 O53 |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22190&r=pol |
| By: | Steven Lalley (University of Chicago); E. Glen Weyl (Microsoft Research New England) |
| Abstract: | N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), individuals buy vote in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased, and the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. Heuristic arguments and experimental results have suggested that this simple, detail-free mechanism is utilitarian efficient. In an independent private-values environment, we rigorously prove that for any value distribution all symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of QV converge toward efficiency in large populations, with waste decaying generically as 1=N. |
| Keywords: | social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2016-13&r=pol |
| By: | Liverpool-Tasie, L. S. O. |
| Abstract: | This brief presents empirical results that revisit a conventional wisdom that inorganic fertilizer use across sub-Saharan Africa is too low. This expectation that more farmers should be using inorganic fertilizer and at higher rates implies it is profitable to use rates higher than observed if farmers are rational expected profit maximizers. This study exploits the political economy of fertilizer access in Nigeria to get consistent estimates of the effects of applied nitrogen on rice production. |
| Keywords: | Food Security and Poverty, |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:midcpb:234950&r=pol |
| By: | Michael Luca (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Deepak Malhotra (Harvard Business School, Negotiation, Organizations & Markets Unit); Christopher Poliquin (Harvard Business School) |
| Abstract: | There have been dozens of high-profile mass shootings in recent decades. This paper presents three main findings about the impact of mass shootings on gun policy. First, mass shootings evoke large policy responses. A single mass shooting leads to a 15% increase in the number of firearm bills introduced within a state in the year after a mass shooting. This effect increases with the number of fatalities. Second, mass shootings account for only 0.3% of all gun deaths, but have an outsized influence relative to other homicides. Our estimates suggest that the per-death impact of mass shootings on bills introduced is about 66 times as large as the impact of individual gun homicides in non-mass shooting incidents. Third, when looking at enacted laws, the impact of mass shootings depends on the party in power. A mass shooting increases the number of enacted laws that loosen gun restrictions by 75% in states with Republican-controlled legislatures. We find no significant effect of mass shootings on laws enacted when there is a Democrat-controlled legislature. |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:16-126&r=pol |
| By: | Stefan Eichler; T. Lähner; Felix Noth |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts’ regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district’s bank health increases the probability that this district’s representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector. |
| Keywords: | FOMC voting, regional banking sector instability, lobbying |
| JEL: | E43 E52 E58 G21 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iwh:dispap:15-16&r=pol |
| By: | Quoc-Anh Do; Kieu-Trang Nguyen; Anh N. Tran Roiser; Anh N. Tran |
| Abstract: | We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown. |
| Keywords: | Favoritism; patronage; authoritarian regime; political connection; hometown; infrastructure; disruptive politics |
| JEL: | N0 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:66422&r=pol |