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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Jenny C. Aker; Paul Collier; Pedro C. Vicente |
| Abstract: | African elections often reveal low levels of political accountability. We assess different forms of voter education during an election in Mozambique. Three interventions providing information to voters and calling for their electoral participation were randomized; an SMS-based information campaign, an SMS hotline for electoral misconduct, and the distribution of a free newspaper. To measure impact, we look at official electoral results, reports by electoral observers, behavioral and survey data. We find positive effects of all treatments on voter turnout. We observe that the distribution of the newspaper led to more accountability-based participation and to a decrease in electoral problems. JEL codes: D72, O55, P16 |
| Keywords: | voter education, political economy, cell phones, newspapers, randomized experiment, field experiment, Mozambique, Africa |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unl:unlfep:novafrica:wp1304&r=pol |
| By: | Vítor Castro (Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra and NIPE, Portugal); Rodrigo Martins (Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra and GEMF, Portugal) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the presence of political cycles inside the Portuguese governments’ aggregate expenditures by using annual data for 10 expenditure components. The results indicate that the choice of the expenditure components to be increased during election periods by Portuguese governments generally relates to more visible items such as general public services, social protection and health care. |
| Keywords: | Political Budget Cycles; Portugal; Elections; Fiscal Policy. |
| JEL: | H72 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2014-23.&r=pol |
| By: | Corneo, Giacomo; Neher, Frank |
| Abstract: | Does redistribution in democracies cater to the will of the majority? We propose and apply a simple empirical strategy based on survey data to address that longstanding issue. Differently from previous evaluations of the median-voter theory, ours does not assume that voters are guided by pecuniary motives alone. We find that most democracies do implement the amount of redistribution advocated by the median voter and the probability to serve the median voter increases with the quality of democracy. However, we detect a non-negligible share of democracies that implement a minority-backed amount of redistribution. Such outcomes cannot be explained by political absenteeism of the poor. They can be explained by the electoral bundling of redistribution with values and rights issues. |
| Keywords: | democracy; income redistribution |
| JEL: | D3 D7 H1 |
| Date: | 2014–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10086&r=pol |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans; Imhof, Stephan; Tejada, Oriol |
| Abstract: | We examine optimal procedures for public project provision, financing, and redistribution in democracy. We consider a large and heterogeneous decision body and show that first-best outcomes are obtained by a procedure that involves two proposal-making rounds, the right of the minority to move first, and a ban on subsidies for the agenda-setters. We explore the robustness of the result and consider applications of our rules. For instance, the result rationalizes those rules of democracies that grant minorities in the electorate or in parliament the right to initiate collective decisions on new project proposals. We further show that the above procedure constitutes the unique minimal form of political competition that ensures first-best outcomes. |
| Keywords: | constitutional design; majority rule; public project provision; subsidies |
| JEL: | D72 H40 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10154&r=pol |
| By: | Dirk Foremny; Ronny Freier; Marc-Daniel Moessinger; Mustafa Yeter |
| Abstract: | We advance the literature on political budget cycles by testing separately for cycles in expenditures for elections in the legislative and the executive. Using municipal data, we can separately identify these cycles and account for general year effects. For the executive branch, we show that it is important whether the incumbent re-runs. To account for the potential endogeneity associated with this decision, we apply a unique instrumental variables approach based on age and pension eligibility rules. We find sizable and significant effects in expenditures before council elections and before joint elections when the incumbent re-runs. |
| Keywords: | Election cycles, municipal expenditures, council and mayor elections, instrumental variables approach |
| JEL: | H11 H71 H72 H74 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1429&r=pol |
| By: | Resul Cesur (University of Connecticut); Naci Mocan (Louisiana State University, NBER and IZA) |
| Abstract: | Using a unique survey of adults in Turkey, we find that an increase in educational attainment, due to an exogenous secular education reform, decreased women’s propensity to identify themselves as religious, lowered their tendency to wear a religious head cover (head scarf, turban or burka) and increased the tendency for modernity. We also find that education has a negative impact on women’s propensity to vote for Islamic parties. The impact of education on religiosity and voting preference is not working through migration, residential location or labor force participation. There is no statistically significant impact of education on men’s tendency to vote for Islamic parties and education does not influence the propensity to cast a vote in national elections for either men or women. |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koc:wpaper:1422&r=pol |
| By: | Gari Walkowitz (University of Cologne); Arne R. Weiss (University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office-holders and increases citizens' trust. We hypothesize that competition increases campaign promises by office-holders, who feel committed to what they promise. Using a novel repeated multi-person investment-game with periodic elections, we indeed find that elected office-holders shirk less (i.e., they back-transfer more to citizens relative to investments) as compared to randomly appointed office-holders. Surprisingly, this effect cannot be explained through competition inflating the level of electoral promises. Nevertheless, promises do matter; in fact, they carry greater weight for the behavior of elected office-holders than for their randomly appointed counterparts. Elections also have a positive short-term effect on citizens' trust by cutting off both low and excessively high promises. |
| Keywords: | elections, promises, shirking, trust game |
| JEL: | D72 D02 D03 C71 C91 |
| Date: | 2014–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cgr:cgsser:05-07&r=pol |
| By: | Bhanu Gupta; Abhiroop Mukhopadhyay |
| Abstract: | The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India is one of the largest public employment programmes in the developing world. It was introduced by the central government led by Indian National Congress (INC). While its implementation is, in principle, based on demand for work from households, we investigate how political competition affects intra district allocation of funds under the scheme. Using longitudinal data on funds allocated to blocks and elections held at the block level and addressing the issue of endogeneity by focusing on a subsample of blocks which had close elections, we find that the funds allocated were 22 percent higher in blocks where the INC seat share was less than 39 percent in the previous election. We provide a mechanism by for the effect by showing that the results are only true when the MP of the district, a member of the body that approves the block fund allocation, is from INC. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwp:bwppap:esid-042-14&r=pol |
| By: | Keefer, Philip; Milanovic, Branko |
| Abstract: | This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but still contested -- assumption of the political economy literature, left-wing governments redistribute more. In addition, consistent with recent research on the importance of party organization and the organizational differences between younger and older parties, older left-wing parties are more likely to internalize the long-run costs of redistribution and to be more credible in their commitment to redistribution, leading them to redistribute less. With entirely different data, the paper also provides evidence on mechanisms: left-wing governments not only redistribute more, they tax more; older left-wing parties, though, tax less than younger ones. |
| Keywords: | Inequality,Emerging Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Poverty Impact Evaluation,Rural Poverty Reduction |
| Date: | 2014–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7129&r=pol |
| By: | Luca, Davide; Rodriguez-Pose, Andres |
| Abstract: | One of the most important decisions that governments face is how to allocate the public resources necessary for development, given each country’s budget constraints. According to the literature on the links between wealth and institutional performance, highly kleptocratic countries are expected to show higher levels of politicisation of the public purse. The article tests the extent to which socioeconomic criteria (equity and efficiency) or electoral concerns determined the geographical distribution of public investment in the 81 provinces of Turkey between 2004 and 2012. Our results show that, although electoral concerns mattered for the allocation, socioeconomic measures remained the most relevant predictors of investment. Moreover, in contrast to official regional development policy principles, the Turkish state tended to favour areas with a higher level of development over those with greater ‘socioeconomic need’. Our results therefore challenge much of the distributive politics literature, which has overly emphasised the role of pork-barrel in public policy-making. At the same time, they underline the need of paying more attention to the political economy of regional development strategies. |
| Keywords: | distributive politics; political geography; public investments; regional development policies; Turkey |
| JEL: | H76 O12 O53 R12 R58 |
| Date: | 2014–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10043&r=pol |
| By: | Markus Jantti (Stockholm University); Gerald Jaynes (Dept. of Economics, Yale University); John E. Roemer (Dept. of Political Science & Cowles Foundation, Yale University) |
| Abstract: | Based on theoretical models of budget-balanced social insurance and individual choice, we argue that in addition to the well-known empathy mechanism whereby ethnic heterogeneity undermines sentiments of solidarity among a citizenry to reduce welfare generosity, population heterogeneity affects the generosity of a polity's social insurance programs through another distinct mechanism, political conflict. Ethnic heterogeneity likely intensifies political conflict and reduces welfare generosity because heterogeneity of unemployment risk makes it more difficult to achieve social consensus concerning tax-benefit programs. Utilizing two separate regression analyses covering highly diverse polities, the 50 U.S. states and District of Columbia (CPS data), and 13 OECD countries (LIS data), we find strong evidence that empirically distinct empathy and political conflict effects on unemployment insurance programs characterize contemporary politics. Our findings suggest existing analyses of the negative relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the size of the welfare state likely over- or underestimate the empathy effect. For example, perhaps surprisingly, had our analysis of US data omitted a measure of unemployment dispersion, the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization would have been underestimated. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, Welfare state, Social insurance, Ethnic fractionalization |
| JEL: | H53 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1972&r=pol |
| By: | Brian Levy; Alan Hirsch; Ingrid Woolard (Saldru and School of Economics, University of Cape Town) |
| Abstract: | In a dramatic few years, South Africa shifted from being trapped in an apparently intractable conflict between a dominant white minority and an oppressed black majority to being a democratic state with an outstanding progressive liberal constitution. It moved from being the epitome of racial conflict to a model of peaceful transition. And yet, twenty years later, the cracks in the settlement are all too clear and the risks of internal conflict are growing. The transition is truncated.. |
| Keywords: | South Africa, Political settlement, Inclusive society, Development |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:138&r=pol |
| By: | Massimiliano Ferraresi (University of Ferrara, Italy); Leonzio Rizzo (University of Ferrara, Italy); Alberto Zanardi (University of Bologna, Italy) |
| Abstract: | We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001-2007 to empirically test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Municipalities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him, while the rest of the municipalities uses a run-off plurality rule where multiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones. |
| Keywords: | federal budget, double-ballot, coalition, list, taxes, expenditure |
| JEL: | H3 H21 H77 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipu:wpaper:13&r=pol |
| By: | Alessandro Moro (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an agent-based computational model of violent political revolution in which a subjugated population of agents and an armed revolutionary organization try to overthrow a central authority and its loyal forces. The model replicates several patterns of rebellion consistent with the major historical revolutions and provides an explanation for the multiplicity of outcomes that can arise from an uprising. This last point is of particular interest if we consider the heterogeneity of political outcomes produced by the recent revolutionary episodes in the so-called Arab Spring. |
| Keywords: | Political Revolutions, Arab Spring, Agent-Based Models |
| JEL: | C63 D74 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2014:21&r=pol |
| By: | Hans Gersbach (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Ulrich Schetter (ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Maik T. Schneider (ETH Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | We explore optimal and politically feasible growth policies in the form of basic research investments and taxation. Basic research is a public good that benefits innovating entrepreneurs, but its provision and financing also affect the entire economy -- in particular, occupational choices of potential entrepreneurs, wages, dividends, and aggregate output. We show that the impact of basic research on the general economy rationalizes a taxation pecking order to finance basic research. More specifically, in a society with desirably dense entrepreneurial activity, a large share of funds for basic research should be financed by labor taxation, while a minor share should be left to profit taxation. Such tax schemes will induce a significant proportion of agents to become entrepreneurs, thereby rationalizing substantial investments in basic research that fosters their innovation prospects. These entrepreneurial economies, however, may make a majority of workers worse off, giving rise to a conflict between efficiency and equality. We discuss ways of mitigating this conflict and thus strengthening the political support for growth policies. |
| Keywords: | Basic research; economic growth; entrepreneurship; income taxation; political economys; |
| JEL: | D72 H20 H40 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:14-206&r=pol |
| By: | Pratap Bhanu Mehta; Michael Walton |
| Abstract: | This paper offers an interpretation of India’s recent political economy in relation to the longer-term history since independence. It argues that an understanding of both ideas and interests is required for this interpretation. While politics and policy are often portrayed in terms of a tussle between market-based reform and populist social provisioning, the interpretation here sees more continuity, and the coexistence of such seemingly competing narratives, that reflect the "cognitive maps" of the major actors. The performance of the state, and ideas around the state, remain central to India’s politics. While the theme of a "corrupt state" is a longstanding one, India’s future development will depend crucially on improving state functioning, through both the deepening of democracy and administrative reform. The cognitive maps of political, bureaucratic and business elites will continue to play an important role in policy and institutional designs, and in particular over whether there will be the kinds of transformational changes that are being demanded by an increasingly aspirational electorate. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwp:bwppap:esid-036-14&r=pol |
| By: | Voigtländer, Nico; Voth, Hans-Joachim |
| Abstract: | Can infrastructure investment win “hearts and minds”? We analyze a famous case in the early stages of dictatorship – the building of the motorway network in Nazi Germany. The Autobahn was one of the most important projects of the Hitler government. It was intended to reduce unemployment, and was widely used for propaganda purposes. We examine its role in increasing support for the NS regime by analyzing new data on motorway construction and the 1934 plebiscite, which gave Hitler great powers as head of state. Our results suggest that road building was highly effective, reducing opposition to the nascent Nazi regime. |
| Keywords: | establishment of dictatorships; infrastructure spending; Nazi regime; political economy; pork-barrel politics |
| JEL: | H54 N44 N94 P16 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9983&r=pol |
| By: | Fabian Wahl (University of Hohenheim) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the origins of the guild revolts in late medieval central Europe. At first, using newly compiled city level data, their temporal evolution and spatial distribution is discussed. Afterwards, the paper provides a historical discussion and empirical analysis of their origins. The results show that pre-existing city-level political institutions and location in a large territorial state were important for the emergence of late medieval guild revolts. Furthermore, the agricultural productivity of the region around a city matters in a negative way confirming the role of the late medieval agricultural crisis in the outbreak of the revolts. Other important factors are a cityÕs urban environment and market potential, its degree of autonomy and its commercial, industrial as well as political importance. This suggests that economic change can trigger political changes. I also found evidence for the existence of spatial spillovers from the developments in neighboring cities implying that rational strategic considerations played a role in the spread of the revolts. |
| Keywords: | Late Medieval, Early-Modern Period, Political Institutions, Political Change, Guild Revolts, Cities |
| JEL: | N44 N94 O10 R11 H11 D72 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0069&r=pol |
| By: | Asongu Simplice (Yaoundé/Cameroun) |
| Abstract: | The Eubank (2012, JDS) findings on taxation, political accountability and foreign aid has had an important influence in academic and policy-making debates. Eubank has warned that his findings should not be generalized across Africa until they are backed by robust empirical evidence. This paper puts some empirical structure to the celebrated literature. The empirical evidence which is based on data from 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 broadly confirms the Somaliland-based Eubank (2012) hypothesis that in the absence of foreign aid, the dependence of government on local tax revenues provides the leverage for better political governance. |
| Keywords: | Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa |
| JEL: | B20 F35 F50 O10 O55 |
| Date: | 2014–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:14/017&r=pol |
| By: | Uchenna EFOBI (Covenant University, Nigeria); Ibukun BEECROFT (Covenant University, Nigeria); Simplice ASONGU (Yaoundé/Cameroon) |
| Abstract: | This note reconciles an on-going debate on the effect of foreign aid on corruption by introducing a previously missing heterogeneity dimension of aid. The relationship was estimated using dynamic system GMM and quantile regressions (QR). Results show that both narratives in the debate are correct, contingent on the type of development assistance. The QR results are robust to endogeneity when the independent variables of interest are instrumented with their first-lags. |
| Keywords: | Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa |
| JEL: | B20 F35 F50 O10 O55 |
| Date: | 2014–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:agd:wpaper:14/025&r=pol |
| By: | Anni Huhtala; Piia Remes |
| Abstract: | The preferences expressed in voting on nuclear reactor licenses and the risk perceptions of citizens provide insights into social costs of nuclear power and decision making in energy policy. We introduce an analytical model which shows that where people?s risk perceptions affect their stand on nuclear power, a perceived probability of accident results in external costs. These costs consist of disutility caused by unnecessary anxiety - due to misperceived risks relating to existing reactors - and where licenses for new nuclear reactors are not granted, delayed or totally lost energy production. Empirical evidence is derived from Finnish surveys eliciting explicitly the significance of risk perceptions in respondents? preferences regarding nuclear power and their views on its environmental and economic impacts. Various model specifications show that the estimated marginal impact of a high perceived risk of nuclear accident is statistically significant and that such a perception considerably decreases the probability of a person supporting nuclear power. The public?s risk perceptions translate into a significant social cost, and are likely to affect the revenues, costs and financing conditions in the nuclear power sector in the future. |
| Keywords: | energy, vote, nuclear accident, subjective risks, probabilities, binary variable, instrumental variable |
| Date: | 2014–11–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fer:wpaper:57&r=pol |
| By: | Antony Millner; Geoffrey Heal |
| Abstract: | Intertemporal conflicts occur when a group of agents with heterogeneous time preferences must make a collective decision about how to manage a common asset. How should this be done? We examine two methods: an 'Economics' approach that seeks to implement efficient allocations, and a 'Politics' approach in which agents vote over consumption plans. We compare these methods by varying two characteristics of the problem: are agents' preferences known or are they hidden information, and can they commit to intertemporal collective plans or not? We show that if commitment is possible the Economics approach always Pareto dominates the Politics approach, in both full and hidden information scenarios. By contrast, without commitment the group may be better off if the Politics approach is adopted. We investigate when Politics trumps Economics analytically, and then apply our model to a survey of economists' views on the appropriate pure rate of time preference for project appraisal. For a wide range of model parameters, and under both full and hidden information, the Politics approach is supported by a majority of agents, and leads to higher group welfare. |
| JEL: | D9 H43 Q2 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20705&r=pol |
| By: | A. Berthou; H. Ehrhart |
| Abstract: | This paper provides new empirical evidence regarding the formation of international trade networks. We test whether trade experience in a given country can generate new trade opportunities with other countries, and investigate the role played by geographical and political factors. We address the issue of the endogeneity in the formation of trade networks by using the experience of ancient trade linkages between former colonies and their former colonizers (colonial trade linkages). We firstly show, using aggregate trade data, that former colonies have more trade with countries being geographically more proximate or having more trade with the former colonizer (colonial trade spillovers). We then show that the microeconomic dynamics of former colonies’ exports and imports at the product level is significantly influenced by the geographical proximity between trade partners and the former colonizer, or their degree of economic integration. These results are consistent with the predictions from models of trade networks (Chaney2014). Overall, they confirm that the microeconomic dynamics of trade contribute to shape the cross-sectional distribution of aggregate trade flows across countries. |
| Keywords: | International trade dynamics, networks formation, colonies. |
| JEL: | F14 F15 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:526&r=pol |
| By: | Michalopoulos, Stelios; Papaioannou, Elias |
| Abstract: | We examine the link between pre-colonial statehood and contemporary regional African development, as reflected in satellite images on light density at night. We employ a variety of historical maps to capture the former. Our within-country analysis reveals a strong positive correlation between pre-colonial political centralization and contemporary development (and urbanization). If anything, the association strengthens when we account for measurement error on the historical maps of pre-colonial political organization. |
| Keywords: | Africa; development; ethnicity; institutions; state capacity |
| JEL: | O10 O40 O43 |
| Date: | 2014–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10258&r=pol |
| By: | Abdul-Gafaru Abdulai; David Hulme |
| Abstract: | Through an analysis of Ghana's HIPC Fund, which was established as part of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) process, this paper shows how aid-financed efforts to reduce regional inequality in Ghana have failed. Dominant political elites agreed to policies of regional inequality reduction to access aid funding, but, once approved, such funds were allocated on quite different criteria in ways that marginalised the poorest. Analyses here reinforce the growing recognition that developmental outcomes in most poor countries are not shaped so much by the design of 'good' policies per se, but more importantly by the power relationships within which policy-implementing institutions are embedded. Aid donors seem unable to fully grasp this important lesson, and so their capacity to contribute to reducing regional inequality remains limited. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bwp:bwppap:esid-041-14&r=pol |
| By: | Athanasios Lapatinas (University of Ioannina); Anastasia Litina (CREA, Université du Luxembourg); Eftichios Sophocles Sartzetakis (University of Macedonia) |
| Abstract: | The paper introduces an additional channel via which corruption may adversely affect environmental quality. It is argued that, in the presence of corruption, politicians may allocate a large fraction of public funds to environmental projects aiming not at improving environmental quality, but rather at increasing their ability to extract rents. This type of behavior has a direct and an indirect effect on environmental quality. First, due to extensive rent-seeking, the effectiveness of environmental projects is disproportional to the amount of public funds allocated to them. Second, citizens who observe the poor outcome of environmental projects, increase tax evasion thus reducing public funds. A vicious circle of extensive tax evasion and rent seeking activities emerges, that has a detrimental effect on envi- ronmental quality. Anecdotal evidence from a number of countries that experience high levels of corruption shows little or no improvements in environmental quality despite the implementation of environmental projects. In line with our theoretical findings, this ineffectiveness of the environmental policy is present even when the technology involved is advanced. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Environment, Technology |
| JEL: | Q5 D73 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:14-29&r=pol |
| By: | Hofman, Irna; Visser, Oane |
| Abstract: | After more than two decades of agrarian change in Tajikistan, farming structures seem to crystallise. The first signs towards farm individualisation were observed only around 2000, which were the result of significant pressure from outside, when the post-conflict state was highly susceptible to pressure from multilateral institutions. Over time, striking differences in agrarian structures have emerged nation-wide; from highly fragmented, autonomous farms, to elite-controlled large-scale cotton farming. In this paper we analyse and describe the Tajik path of reform, and locate the Tajik case amongst the other reformers in the CIS. We use a political economy and geographical approach to understand the way in which different geographies of transition have emerged in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. Particular pathways of reform are conditioned by geographical factors, in which in turn, a local political economy comes into play that further shapes the emergence of particular farm models over time. |
| Abstract: | Nach mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten der postsowjetischen Transformation in Tadschikistan scheinen sich (verschiedene) Strukturen in der Landwirtschaft heraus zu kristallisieren. Die ersten Anzeichen in Richtung einer Individualisierung waren erst im Jahr 2000 zu erkennen. Dies geschah vor allem aufgrund erheblichen Druckes von außen, als der Post-Konflikt-Staat anfällig war für den Druck von multilateralen Institutionen. Im Laufe der Zeit entstanden landesweit markante Unterschiede in den Agrarstrukturen. Diese reichen von stark fragmentierten, autonomen Betrieben, bis hin zu Eliten-gesteuerte Großbetrieben in der Baumwollproduktion. In diesem Beitrag analysieren und beschreiben wir den tadschikischen Weg der Reformen und vergleichen den tadschikischen Fall mit anderen postsowjetischen Ländern. Wir verwenden einen politisch-ökonomischen sowie einen geographischen Ansatz, um die Art und Weise von Landreform und Agrartransformation zu verstehen. Der Verlauf der Reformen ist bedingt durch geographische Faktoren. Hier entwickeln sich wiederum lokale politische Ökonomien, die weitere Formen von bestimmten Bauernbetrieben prägen. |
| Keywords: | agrarian change,political economy,former Soviet Union,Central Asia,Agrartransformation,politische Ökonomie,ehemalige Sowjetunion,Zentralasien |
| JEL: | Q10 Q15 Z1 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iamodp:151&r=pol |