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on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Ruben Durante (Département d'économie); Paolo Pinotti; Andrea Tesei |
| Abstract: | We investigate the long-term impact of early exposure to Berlusconi’s commercial TV network, Mediaset, on voting behavior and civic engagement in Italy. To do so, we exploit differences in Mediaset signal reception across Italian municipalities due to the network’s staggered introduction over the national territory and to idiosyncratic geomorphological factors. We find that municipalities exposed to Mediaset prior to 1985 exhibit greater electoral support for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, when he first ran for office, relative to municipalities that were exposed only later on. This difference, estimated between 1 and 2 percentage points, is extremely robust and tends to persist in the following four elections. This effect can hardly be attributed to differential exposure to partisan news bias since, prior to 1985, content on Mediaset channels was dominated by light-entertainment programs and no news programs were broadcast until 1991, by which time the network was accessible to the entire population. Instead, we present evidence that early exposure to commercial TV was associated with a substantial decline in social capital consistent with the diffusion of a culture of individualism and civic disengagement that favored the political success of Berlusconi. |
| Keywords: | mass media, voting, civic engagement |
| JEL: | L82 D72 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/7o52iohb7k6srk09n8t4pad92&r=pol |
| By: | Fedele, Alessandro (Free University of Bozen/Bolzano); Naticchioni, Paolo (University of Cassino) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we study optimal choices of self-selection into politics and commitment once in office on the part of citizens with heterogeneous abilities and heterogeneous motivations. Politicians can moonlight, i.e., they can work in the market sector while appointed in parliament. Our theoretical framework shows that high-ability citizens may enter politics. Yet while high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians are likely to shirk, high-ability motivated (public-fit) ones are more committed to parliamentary activity. We test our predictions by using a unique database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of the market-fit and the public-fit politicians in that they both display a pre-election income greater than that of the Italian population. We also show that the commitment of the market-fit parliamentarians in terms of voting attendance is negatively affected by income opportunities, whilst this is not the case for the public-fit ones. |
| Keywords: | motivation, moonlighting politicians |
| JEL: | P16 J45 J24 J32 |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7500&r=pol |
| By: | Agustín Casas |
| Abstract: | Parties' candidates are chosen by different nomination rules. Recent empirical evidence shows that these rules influence the attributes of the nominees; for instance, open primaries in the U.S. choose more extreme candidates than closed primaries. Despite this evidence, the literature does not provide an explanation of why appealing to a more moderate electorate -as during open primariesresults in more extreme candidates. I build a model that shows that open primaries elect \predictable extremists", while, for instance, party leaders would chose \moderate mavericks". I obtain these results through a model that puts together 3 pieces of partisan politics: affiliation decisions, nomination rules, and an observed endogenous valence, which (together with party membership) signals the candidates' ideologies. Moreover, I investigate the welfare implications of three methods: nomination by the party leader, by closed primaries, and by open primaries. I show the conditions under which nomination by party leaders leads to higher social welfare than nomination by open primaries. Furthermore, I show that higher screening by parties, leads to more ideologically uncertain candidates. In sum, I argue that party affiliation decisions, and endogenous valence play a large role in understanding the effects of nomination rules on the political equilibria. |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we1315&r=pol |
| By: | Mizuno, Nobuhiro |
| Abstract: | Alliances between national governments and rural elites are observed in post-colonial Africa. In such alliances, the national governments preserve rural-elite authority formed during the colonial era and cede their resources and prerogatives to the rural elites. This paper develops a model of bargaining between a national government and a rural elite, in which the bargaining power of the national government is endogenously explained by the ability of the rural elite to compel obedience from rural residents. Since indirect colonial rule is a significant source of the rural-elite control over residents, the result implies that cross-regional variations in colonial policies lead to variations in the feature of post-colonial alliances between African national governments and rural elites. |
| Keywords: | Africa; Colonialism; Politics |
| JEL: | H11 H20 N47 P16 Q13 |
| Date: | 2013–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:48771&r=pol |
| By: | Verena Dill |
| Abstract: | Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and administrative data from 1996 to 2009, I investigate the question whether or not right-wing extremism of German residents is affected by the ethnic concentration of foreigners living in the same residential area. My results show a positive but insignificant relationship between ethnic concentration at county level and the probability of extreme right-wing voting behavior for West Germany. However, due to potential endogeneity issues, I additionally instrument the share of foreigners in a county with the share of foreigners in each federal state (following an approach of Dustmann/Preston 2001). I find evidence for the interethnic contact theory, predicting a negative relationship between foreigners’ share and right-wing voting. Moreover, I analyze the moderating role of education and the influence of cultural traits on this relationship. |
| Keywords: | Ethnic concentration, extreme right-wing voting, group threat, interethnic contact |
| JEL: | D72 R23 J15 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp565&r=pol |
| By: | Matthias Neuenkirch (University of Aachen); Florian Neumeier (University of Marburg) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze the relationship between certain characteristics of incumbent central bank governors and their interest rate-setting behavior. We focus on (i) occupational backgrounds, (ii) party affiliation, and (iii) experience in office and estimate augmented Taylor rules for 20 OECD countries and the period 1974-2008. Our findings are as follows. First, the tenures of central bank governors who are affiliated with a political party are characterized by a relatively dovish monetary policy stance, irrespective of their partisan ideology. Second, party affiliation appears to be more important than occupational background, i.e., all bankers with(out) a party affiliation behave very similarly to each regardless of their specific occupational background. Third, party members react significantly less to inflation and more to output the longer they stay in office. |
| Keywords: | Central Bank Governors, Monetary Policy, Occupation, Partisanship, Taylor Rules |
| JEL: | E31 E43 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201336&r=pol |
| By: | Ilan Nehama (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel) |
| Abstract: | Optimal Lobbying is the problem a lobbyist or a campaign manager faces in a full-information voting scenario of a multi-issue referendum when trying to influence the result. The Lobby is faced with a profile that specifies for each voter and each issue whether the voter approves or rejects the issue, and seeks to find the smallest set of voters it must influence to change their vote, for a desired outcome to be obtained. This computational problem also describes problems arising in other scenarios of aggregating complex opinions, such as principal-agents incentives scheme in a complex combinatorial problem, and bribery and manipulation in Truth-Functional Judgement Aggregation. We study the computational complexity of Optimal Lobbying when the issues are aggregated using an anonymous monotone function and the family of desired outcomes is an upward-closed family. We analyze this problem with regard to two parameters: the minimal number of supporters needed to pass an issue, and the size of the maximal minterm of the desired set. We show that for the extreme values of the parameters, the problem is tractable, and provide algorithms. On the other hand, we prove intractability of the problem for the non-extremal values, which are common values for the parameters. |
| Date: | 2013–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp642&r=pol |
| By: | David K. Levine; Salvatore Modica |
| Abstract: | In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare. |
| Keywords: | Game theory |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedlwp:2013-023&r=pol |