|
on Positive Political Economics |
| By: | Tom Vogl |
| Abstract: | Elections between black and white candidates tend to involve close margins and high turnout. Using a novel dataset of municipal vote returns during the rise of black mayors in U.S. cities, this paper establishes new facts about turnout and competition in close interracial elections. In the South, but not the North, close black victories were more likely than close black losses, involved higher turnout than close black losses, and were more likely than close black losses to be followed by subsequent black victories. These results are consistent with a model in which the historical exclusion of Southern blacks from politics made them disproportionately sensitive to mobilization efforts by political elites, leading to a black candidate advantage in close elections. The results contribute to a growing body of evidence that the outcomes of reasonably close elections are not always random, which suggests that detailed knowledge of the electoral context is a precondition to regression discontinuity analyses based on vote shares. |
| JEL: | C18 D72 J00 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18320&r=pol |
| By: | Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International); Clémence VERGNE (Banque mondiale); Blanca MORENO DODSON |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether foreign aid affects the probability of incumbent's re-election and then the Schumpeterian quality of democracy in developing countries. We present a simple theoretical framework, which captures the competitiveness of elections through the Tullock's approach based on the Contest Success Function. We obtain an ambiguous theoretical effect of foreign aid on the incumbent probability to be reelected: Foreign aid increases the prize of the electoral contest stimulating the challenger to increase his campaign effort; But, the incumbent may divert part of the aid, improving his advantage and reducing political competition. We investigate empirically this effect using panel data from 60 aid-recipient countries between 1980 and 2005. Our analysis shows that foreign aid increases the incumbent's re-election probabilities. However, this effect depends on recipients' democratic level and on the nature of foreign aid, consistently with our theoretical framework. While financial aid increases the probability of incumbent's re-election, political aid, especially through assistances in developing competitive electoral systems, reduces this probability. |
| Keywords: | Foreign aid; Elections; Incumbent's advantage |
| JEL: | O11 F35 D72 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1379&r=pol |
| By: | Martin Halla; Alexander F. Wagner; Josef Zweimüller |
| Abstract: | This paper explores one potentially important channel through which immigration may drive support for extreme-right-wing parties: the presence of immigrants in the voters' neighborhoods. We study the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Under the leadership of Jörg Haider, this party increased its share of votes from less than 5 percent in the early 1980s to 27 percent by the year 1999. Using past regional settlement patterns as a source of exogenous variation, we find a significantly positive effect on FPÖ votes of the residential proximity of immigrants and citizens, explaining roughly a quarter of the cross-community variance in those votes. It is the proximity of low- and medium-skilled immigrants that drives this result; high-skilled immigrants have no (or even a negative) effect on FPÖ votes. |
| Keywords: | Immigration, political economy, voting |
| JEL: | P16 J61 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:083&r=pol |
| By: | Francesco Nicolli (University of Ferrara); Francesco Vona (OFCE Sciences-Po and Skema Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes different methods to aggregate heterogeneous policies for renewable energy. We compare time-varying indicators built using principal component analysis with average-based indicators. The main goal of the paper is to account for the evolution of both types of policy indicators with a set of common variables. Our empirical results are consistent with predictions of political-economy models of environmental policies as lobbying, income and, to a less extent, inequality have expected effects on policy. The brown lobbying power, proxied by entry barriers in the energy sector, has negative influence on the policy indicators even when taking into account endogeneity in its effect. The results are also robust to dynamic panel specifications and to the exclusion of groups of countries. Interestingly, too, corruption has only an indirect effect on policy mediated by entry |
| Keywords: | Renewable Energy Policy, Political Economy, Product Market Regulation, Lobbying, Policy Indicators |
| JEL: | Q42 Q48 D72 O38 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2012.51&r=pol |
| By: | Bertocchi, Graziella (University of Modena and Reggio Emilia); Dimico, Arcangelo (Queen's University Belfast) |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the empirical relevance of de facto vs. de jure determinants of political power in the U.S. South between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. We apply a variety of estimation techniques to a previously unexploited dataset on voter registration by race covering the counties of Mississippi in 1896, shortly after the introduction of the 1890 voting restrictions encoded in the state constitution. Our results indicate that de jure voting restrictions reduce black registration but that black disfranchisement starts well before 1890 and is more intense where a black majority represents a threat to the de facto power of white elites. Moreover, the effect of race becomes stronger after 1890 suggesting that the de jure barriers may have served the purpose of institutionalizing a de facto condition of disfranchisement. |
| Keywords: | race, voting, institutions, education, inequality |
| JEL: | J15 N41 O43 P16 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6741&r=pol |
| By: | van Jaarsveldt, Leon |
| Abstract: | Using OLS and binary logistic regression, in combination with the OSOR-model on a secondary dataset, the 2010-post election survey by Pew Internet and American Life project, this paper traces the direct paths of Facebook, Twitter, and mobile phone on online political participation and online political and government information seeking, as well as the indirect paths through wider view exposure and credibility. Findings provide support for the political use of Facebook and mobile phones as credible sources in both online political participation and online political information seeking, while not for Twitter. This suggests that Twitter is not seen as a platform for credible political engagement or information seeking or exposure to diverse views. By comparison, the path for Facebook through wider view exposure is also seen to lead to political participation and online political information through the path of credibility. This implies that any policy attempt to censor or control social media is a move in the wrong direction. There are also some implied findings for the need of an opinion leader. -- |
| Keywords: | Political participation,online political information seeking,Facebook,Twitter,mobile phones,wider view exposure,credibility,critical debate,opinion leader |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itse12:60356&r=pol |
| By: | David Stadelmann (University of Fribourg); Benno Torgler (QUT) |
| Abstract: | Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations in making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum was held. We also show that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they listen to parliament rather than interest groups. |
| Keywords: | Bounded rationality, voting, referenda attention, rules of thumb |
| JEL: | D03 D72 D83 H70 |
| Date: | 2012–07–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:dpaper:287&r=pol |
| By: | Andreas Kuhn (University of Zurich, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper describes individuals' inequality perceptions, distributional norms, and redistributive preferences in a panel of OECD countries, primarily focusing on the association between these subjective measures and the effective level of inequality and redistribution. Not surprisingly, the effective level of redistribution (after tax-and-transfer inequality) is positively (negatively) correlated with redistributive preferences. There is also evidence showing that the subjective and objective dimension of inequality and redistribution are, at least partially, linked with individuals' political preferences and their voting behavior. The association between objective and subjective measures of inequality and redistribution vanishes, however, once more fundamental country characteristics are taken into account. This suggests that these characteristics explain both redistributive preferences as well as the effective level of redistribution and after tax-and-transfer inequality. |
| Keywords: | inequality perceptions, distributional norms, redistributive preferences, inequality, redistribution, political preferences |
| JEL: | D31 D63 J31 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:nrnwps:2012_08&r=pol |
| By: | Rebecca B. Morton (Department of Politics, NYU); Marco Piovesan (Harvard Business School); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics University of Vienna) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate information aggregation through majority voting when some voters are biased. In such situations, majority voting can have a "dark side", i.e. result in groups making choices inferior to those made by individuals acting alone. We develop a model to predict how two types of social information shape efficiency in the presence of biased voters and we test these predictions using a novel experimental design. In line with predictions, we find that information on the popularity of policy choices is beneficial when a minority of voters is biased, but harmful when a majority is biased. In theory, information on the success of policy choices elsewhere de-biases voters and alleviates the inefficiency. In the experiment, providing social information on success is ineffective. While voters with higher cognitive abilities are more likely to be de-biased by such information, most voters do not seem to interpret such information rationally. |
| JEL: | C92 D7 D02 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hbs:wpaper:13-017&r=pol |
| By: | Kuloglu, Ayhan; Lobont, Oana-Ramona; Topcu, Mert |
| Abstract: | Economic, cultural, social, psychological, political, administrative and religious effects of corruption are manifested by functional, political and moral degradation of local public authorities, which is a result of the expansion of political corruption, by reducing the transparent and accountable political power or by social tensions and increasing impoverishment of the population. In the executive activity, corruption has an effect on the reduced quality of public administration, the existence of an informal decision-making system and close links between organized crime, corrupt officials and politicians. Thus, outwardly effects of corruption, even in international relations, is manifested by the conduct of incompetent, irresponsible, provocative and subjective – conventional behavior of persons in positions of responsibility which, in dealing with foreign partners, primarily promotes personal and corporate interests against national interests, which, inevitably undermines the country's image and credibility as a partner in international relations. This paper tries to show a more accurate picture of the extent of corruption in Europe, through individual analysis of indicators measuring corruption and by quantifying the relation between corruption and political, administrative and economic determinants factors, through a regressive “pool data” model. For a fine approximation of the decision-making mechanism, in accordance with the policies they generate, there is a necessity the knowledge and understanding of how the political elements are transformed into real elements to measure their incidence. This paper adds to the empirical literature on the relationship between corruption and economic growth by incorporating the impact of economic freedom. |
| Keywords: | Political corruption; economic freedom; economic growth |
| JEL: | F4 E6 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40365&r=pol |
| By: | Leopoldo Fergusson; James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik; Juan F. Vargas |
| Abstract: | We develop a political economy model where some politicians have a comparative advantage in undertaking a task and this gives them an electoral advantage. This creates an incentive to underperform in the task in order to maintain their advantage. We interpret the model in the context of fighting against insurgents in a civil war and derive two main empirical implications which we test using Colombian data during the presidency of Álvaro Uribe. First, as long as rents from power are sufficiently important, large defeats for the insurgents should reduce the probability that politicians with comparative advantage, President Uribe, will fight the insurgents. Second, this effect should be larger in electorally salient municipalities. We find that after the three largest victories against the FARC rebel group, the government reduced its efforts to eliminate the group and did so differentially in politically salient municipalities. Our results therefore support the notion that such politicians need enemies to maintain their political advantage and act so as to keep the enemy alive. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18313&r=pol |
| By: | Roman Horváth (Charles University, Prague and IOS, Regensburg); Kateřina Šmídková; Jan Zápal |
| Abstract: | We assess whether the voting records of central bank boards are informative about future monetary policy using data on five inflation targeting countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom). We find that in all countries the voting records, namely the difference between the average voted-for and actually implemented policy rate, signal future monetary policy, making a case for publishing the records. This result holds even if we control for the financial market expectations; include the voting records from the period covering the current global financial crisis and examine the differences in timing and style of the voting record announcements. |
| Keywords: | monetary policy, voting record, transparency, collective decision-making |
| JEL: | D78 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ost:wpaper:316&r=pol |