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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Marco Novarese (Universita del Piemonte Orientale); Christian Zimmermann (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | We study how the democratization of the diffusion of research through the Internet could have helped non traditional fields of research. The specific case we approach is Heterodox Economics as its pre-prints are disseminated through NEP, the email alert service of RePEc. Comparing heterodox and mainstream papers, we find that heterodox ones are quite systematically more downloaded, and particularly so when considering downloads per subscriber. We conclude that the Internet definitely helps heterodox research, also because other researcher get exposed to it. But there is still room for more participation by heterodox researchers. |
| Keywords: | NEP, RePEc, heterodox economics, diffusion of research |
| JEL: | B50 A14 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-17&r=pke |
| By: | Roy Grieve (Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde) |
| Abstract: | This note looks into the issue of whether or not Sraffa had any significant influence on Keynes’s thinking in the period of preparation of the General Theory. Questioning the view recently expressed by Pasinetti (2007), we suggest there is reason to surmise that Sraffa may have pointed Keynes to a way of escape from the traditional conception of the rate of interest, a line of thought which Keynes developed into the liquidity preference explanation of interest on money. |
| Keywords: | General Theory (Emergence); LIquidity Preference; Sraffa; Own Rates |
| JEL: | B22 B51 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:str:wpaper:0804&r=pke |
| By: | L.A. Duhs (School of Economics, The University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | J.K. Galbraith's heyday was in the 1950s-70s. He was one of the most cited economists of his time, and attracted much praise and blame. In 1994, Krugman was a caustic critic and dismissed Galbraith's influence as a victory of style over substance. He castigated Galbraith as but “a policy entrepreneur”, yet by 2004, Krugman appeared to have undergone a striking metamorphosis, and his New York Times columns (2000-2006) conspicuously echo Galbraith’s understanding of socio-economic issues. This newer Krugman questions consumer sovereignty, bemoans the power of producers, questions the uses to which State power is put, worries about a medical-industrial complex, and laments the hijacking of public policy by private interests. Is this new Krugman merely a journalist, who has left scientific economics behind, or has he 'seen the light' as to what really constitutes ‘good economics’ and a more holistic scientific procedure? |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:369&r=pke |
| By: | Jack Vromen |
| Abstract: | Hodgson and Knudsen’s Generalized Darwinism (GD) and the Continuity Hypothesis (CH) put forward by Witt are currently vying for hegemony in the ontology of evolutionary economics. GD and the CH allegedly advance rivaling Darwinian foundations for the development of full-fledged causal evolutionary economic theories. Yet upon closer inspection it is not clear that GD and the CH are mutually exclusive rivals. For one thing, GD and the CH address different sorts of issues. Whereas GD aims at identifying general features that evolutionary processes in different domains (notably the biological and economic domain) have in common, the CH takes as its starting point the causal relations that obtain between antecedent biological evolution and ongoing economic evolution. It seems the one does not exclude the other. This impression is strengthened by the fact that Hodgson endorses rather than opposes something similar to the CH. The paper argues that the critical issue in settling whether or not GD and the CH are mutually exclusive is how much substantive content is given to GD and the CH respectively. Pushed by the critique of Witt (and some of his Evolutionary Economics Group members, Cordes and Buenstorf) that GD has not fully shaken off features that are specific for the biological domain, Hodgson and Knudsen seem to take recourse to a version of GD that is so abstract and general that it is rendered virtually vacuous. As such GD can not contribute much to the development of a full-fledged domain-specific causal economic theory of processes of economic change. It seems the CH fares better in this respect. The CH does offer building blocks for evolutionary theories of consumption and of production. But the problem with the GD is that it is unclear what constructive role (if any) Darwinian evolutionary theory has played in specifying the building blocks. The paper concludes with suggesting two other ways in which Darwinian evolutionary theory might be useful for studying economic evolution. |
| Keywords: | Length 29 pages |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-05&r=pke |
| By: | Dani Rodrik |
| Abstract: | The focus of policy reform in developing countries has moved from getting prices right to getting institutions right, and accordingly countries are increasingly being advised to move towards "best-practice" institutions. This paper argues that appropriate institutions for developing countries are instead "second-best" institutions -- those that take into account context-specific market and government failures that cannot be removed in short order. Such institutions will often diverge greatly from best practice. The argument is illustrated using examples from four areas: contract enforcement, entrepreneurship, trade openness, and macroeconomic stability. |
| JEL: | O1 |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14050&r=pke |
| By: | L.A. Duhs (School of Economics, The University of Queensland) |
| Abstract: | Sen joins a line of economists – including Cropsey, Schumacher, Myrdal, Ward, Higgins and Etzioni – who have objected to the implicit political philosophy within orthodox neo-classical economics. He argues that the good or just society requires policies to remove all forms of “unfreedoms”, and policies to equalise the extent of capability deprivation. This capabilities approach calls for a rejection of utilitarianism, libertarianism and Rawlsianism in favour of the conception of justice provided by his putatively Smithian/Aristotelian approach. In taking the expansion of freedom to be both the principal end and the principal means of development, however, Sen ignores other philosophical positions which lead to quite different conclusions. Accordingly, his argument remains incomplete and unpersuasive, and the most fundamental questions remain to be resolved. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qld:uq2004:366&r=pke |
| By: | Arrigo Opocher (University of Padua) |
| Abstract: | Both J. S. Mill and A. Marshall had a lifelong concern with the living conditions of the working classes and theorized the possibility of a new age, characterized by a widespread mental and moral cultivation. This paper compares the precise arguments put forward by them in the period ranging from Mill‟s “The Claims of Labour” (1845) to Marshall's "Principles" (1890), against the background of the evidence of progress they had. It is argued that, at different stages and with different specific arguments, their predictions relied on self-reinforcing mechanisms, in which a better life was the cause, no less than the effect, of progress. In order to make similarities and differences more transparent from a logical point of view, two simple mathematical formulations are proposed. |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0078&r=pke |