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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Khumalo, Bhekuzulu |
| Abstract: | This paper we seek to develop a knowledge transfer model from knowledge economic theory. Knowledge transfer is accepted as the end of the cycle in the knowledge process it is therefore important to have a knowledge transfer model from existing knowledge economic theory. Endeavoring to build this model the paper at firsts looks at the concept of knowledge transfer and then the model is built. The model is built on the fundamentals of time, of the properties of knowledge in the short and long term, very distinct properties, it is a step in the right direction. |
| Keywords: | knowledge economics; knowledge transfer; knowledge properties; knowledge economics; risk; |
| JEL: | D81 A20 C02 D80 C60 |
| Date: | 2008–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8942&r=pke |
| By: | Degol Hailu (UNDP SURF) |
| Abstract: | The financial sector has numerous benefits. It matches savers and investors, lowers transactions costs and creates liquidity. However, less than 50 per cent of households in the developing countries have access to financial services. This compares to nearly 70 per cent access in the developed world. (...) |
| Keywords: | Equitable Access to Financial Services: is Micro-financing Sufficient? |
| Date: | 2008–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipc:opager:55&r=pke |
| By: | Kira Boerner; Christa Hainz |
| Abstract: | In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. This is surprising from a political economy perspective, as the majority of people in a corrupt country suffer from high corruption levels. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt offcials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that a lack of financial institutions can lead to more corruption as more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, as the rents from corruption are distributed differently. Thus, the economic system has an effect on political outcomes. Well-functioning financial institutions, in turn, increase the political support for anti-corruption measures. |
| Keywords: | Corruption, Financial Markets, Institutions, Development, Voting |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H11 O17 |
| Date: | 2007–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wdi:papers:2007-892&r=pke |
| By: | Dominique, C-Rene |
| Abstract: | SUMMARY: This note reviews consumers’ preference orderings in economics and shows that irrationality is a poor explanation for apparent violations of some axioms of order. Apparent violations seem to be better explained by the fact that consumers’ utility functions, if they exist at all, might not even belong to the class of quasi-concave functions. However, the main task of markets is the determination of equilibrium price vectors. The note shows in addition that, in Walrasian structures, quasi-concave utility functions are unnecessary for the determination of equilibrium price vectors. |
| Keywords: | Walrasian structures; preference orderings; irrationality; utility functions; and equilibrium price vectors. |
| JEL: | A1 A10 A14 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8906&r=pke |