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on Post Keynesian Economics |
| By: | Juan R. de Laiglesia |
| Abstract: | High quality institutions lower transaction costs, encourage trust, reinforce property rights and avoid the exclusion of sections of the population. Overcoming institutional bottlenecks that constrain entrepreneurial activities and the development of the private sector is a prerequisite for achieving pro-poor growth, in particular in Africa. As part of the Development Centre’s Work Programme 2005/2006 on institutional requirements for advancing peace and development in sub-Saharan-Africa, this explorative study sets the stage for forthcoming indepth case studies in Ghana and Cameroon. <BR>La médiocre performance de l’agriculture africaine est à mettre au compte non seulement d’une donnée naturelle difficile et d’une histoire de politiques extractives, mais aussi de goulots d’étranglement institutionnels fondamentaux. Ce document de travail présente un cadre pour l’analyse des goulots d’étranglement empêchant le développement agricole en Afrique sub- Saharienne. Il passe en revue la littérature au sujet des institutions et du développement agricole afin d’identifier les principaux obstacles institutionnels auxquels l’agriculture africaine fait face. |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:devaaa:248-en&r=pke |
| By: | Goulder, Lawrence H.; Pizer, William A. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Global climate change poses a threat to the well-being of humans and other living things through impacts on ecosystem functioning, biodiversity, capital productivity, and human health. Climate change economics attends to this issue by offering theoretical insights and empirical findings relevant to the design of policies to reduce, avoid, or adapt to climate change. This economic analysis has yielded new estimates of mitigation benefits, improved understanding of costs in the presence of various market distortions or imperfections, better tools for making policy choices under uncertainty, and alternate mechanisms for allowing flexibility in policy responses. These contributions have influenced the formulation and implementation of a range of climate change policies at the domestic and international levels. |
| Keywords: | climate change, global warming, energy |
| JEL: | Q40 Q50 Q54 |
| Date: | 2006–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-06-06&r=pke |
| By: | Pizer, William A. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | This paper argues against the common-sense conclusion that climate change demands a global market-based solution, such as international emissions trading. First, current experience suggests global cooperation is not necessary for initial mandatory actions. Second, when domestic targets vary across nations, there are a variety of reasons why international emissions trading, even though it creates aggregate economic gains for all nations, may not be desirable. These reasons include concerns over legitimizing target variations for future negotiations, real and perceived consequences of capital flows across nations, and distributional impacts within nations. Finally, the underlying need for global technology solutions suggests domestic mitigation policies that balance clear emissions price signals, incentives for technology development and deployment, and mechanisms to finance deployment to developing countries. International efforts, in turn, might focus on encouraging these domestic actions, facilitating the developing country investment mechanisms, and providing credible reviews of national action. |
| Keywords: | climate, change, international, treaty, Kyoto, emissions trading |
| JEL: | H87 Q54 D62 D63 |
| Date: | 2006–06–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-06-04&r=pke |
| By: | Jong-A-Pin, R. (Groningen University) |
| Abstract: | We examine the relationship between political instability and economic growth. Using an exploratory factor analysis we identify four dimensions of political instability: (1) mass civil protest, (2) politically motivated aggression, (3) instability within the political regime and (4) instability of the political regime. We show that individual political instability indicators are generally poor proxies for the underlying dimensions of political instability. Our panel estimates for a sample of 98 countries in the period 1984-2003 indicate that the various dimensions of political instability have different effects on economic growth. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:rugsom:06c05&r=pke |