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on Open MacroEconomics |
By: | Maurizio Michael Habib (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.); Livio Stracca (European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany.) |
Abstract: | There is already a substantial literature documenting the fact that low yield currencies typically appreciate during times of global financial stress and behave as safe havens. The main objective of this paper is to find out what the fundamentals of safe haven currencies are. We analyse a large panel of 52 currencies in advanced and emerging countries over almost 25 years of data. We find that only a few factors are robustly associated to a safe haven status, most notably the net foreign asset position, an indicator of external vulnerability, and to a lesser extent the absolute size of the stock market, an indicator of market size and development. The interest rate spread against the US is significant only for advanced countries, whose currencies are subject to carry trade. More generally, we find that it is hard to predict what currencies would do when global risk aversion is high, as estimates are imprecise and often not stable or robust. This suggests caution in over-interpreting exchange rate movements during financial crises. JEL Classification: E44, F31, G15. |
Keywords: | VIX, global risk aversion, safe haven currencies, carry trade, globalisation. |
Date: | 2011–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20111288&r=opm |
By: | Rabah Arezki (International Monetary Fund (IMF)); Markus Brückner (School of Economics, University of Adelaide) |
Abstract: | This paper examines the effect that windfalls from international commodity price booms have on net foreign assets in a panel of 145 countries during the period 1970-2007. The main finding is that windfalls from international commodity price booms lead to a significant increase in net foreign assets, but only in countries that are ethnically homogeneous. In ethnically polarized countries, net foreign assets significantly decreased. To explain this asymmetry, the paper shows that in ethnically polarized countries commodity windfalls lead to large increases in government spending, political corruption, and the risk of expropriation, with no overall effect on GDP per capita growth. The paper's findings are consistent with theoretical models of the current account that have a built-in voracity effect. |
Keywords: | commodity windfalls; net foreign assets, polarization, political economy |
JEL: | F32 Q33 Z10 |
Date: | 2011–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:adl:wpaper:2011-06&r=opm |
By: | Popov, Vladimir |
Abstract: | If there is a negative terms of trade or financial shock leading to the deterioration in the balance of payments, there are two basic options for a country that has limited foreign exchange reserves. First, a country can maintain a fixed exchange rate (or even a currency board) and wait until the reduction of foreign exchange reserves leads to the reduction of money supply: this will drive domestic prices down and stimulate exports, raise interest rates and stimulate the inflow of capital, and finally will correct the balance of payments. Second, the country can allow the devaluation of national currency – flexible exchange rate will automatically bring the balance of payments back into the equilibrium. Because national prices are less flexible than exchange rates, the first type of adjustment is associated with the greater reduction of output. The empirical evidence on East European countries and other transition economies for 1998-99 period (outflow of capital after the 1997 Asian and 1998 Russian currency crises and slowdown of output growth rates) suggests that the second type of policy response (devaluation) was associated with smaller loss of output than the first type (monetary contraction). 2008-09 developments provide additional evidence for this hypothesis. |
Keywords: | Devaluation; capital account shocks; fixed and flexible exchange rates; macroeconomic response to shocks |
JEL: | F42 F32 F41 F31 F43 |
Date: | 2010 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:28112&r=opm |