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on Neuroeconomics |
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Issue of 2023‒12‒11
two papers chosen by |
| By: | Maria Gueltzow (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Hannu Lahtinen; Maarten J. Bijlsma (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Mikko Myrskylä (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany); Pekka Martikainen (Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This study explored the interplay between genetic predisposition, partnership status and depression by examining the association of a polygenic risk score (PGS) for depression with time to antidepressant purchasing and the moderating role of partnership status. We analysed data from 30, 192 Finnish individuals with an accelerated failure time model. While the cumulative hazard of antidepressant purchasing varied across PGS and partnership status – with the highest cumulative hazard in the widowed group, followed by divorced, single, married and cohabiting – we found no evidence for an interaction between PGS and partnership status. Results were robust to different model specifications, gender stratification, choice of PGS, and endogenous selection. Although antidepressant purchasing correlated with both PGS and partnership status, we found no evidence that partnership status could partially offset or amplify the association between the PGS for depression and depression incidence. |
| Keywords: | Finland, genetics, marital status, mental health |
| JEL: | J1 Z0 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dem:wpaper:wp-2023-049&r=neu |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]); Claire Rimbaud (Leopold Franzens Universität Innsbruck - University of Innsbruck); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action (e.g., recipient's payoff in a Dictator game). The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player (e.g., trustor's endowment in a Trust game). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision rights of the vulnerable player. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to both the dimension of the co-player's vulnerability and to the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of the co-player whose beliefs are disappointed. It is triggered by the willingness to respond to the co-player's beliefs on his strategy, regardless of whether this strategy concerns this player or a third player's vulnerability, that is, indirect vulnerability. |
| Keywords: | Guilt Aversion, Vulnerability, Psychological Game Theory, Trust Game, Dictator Game, Experiment |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03620418&r=neu |