| Abstract: |
Response time is increasingly used to shed light on the process by which
individualsmake decisions. As mistakes may be correlated with response time it
could, however, bemisleading to use this measure to draw inference on
preferences. To demonstrate we build on arecent literature, which uses
response time to determine whether individuals intuitively aregenerous or
selfish. Examining public good games researchers have shown that fast
decisionmakers appear more generous than slow decision makers and this has
been interpreted asevidence that generosity is intuitive and impulsive while
selfishness is a calculated responseRand et al. 2012; Nielsen, et al. 2014.
Modifying the public good game to have an interiordominant strategy
equilibrium we ask if the negative correlation between response time andgiving
is sensitive to the location of the equilibrium and whether it may result from
mistakes.When the equilibrium is located below the midpoint of the strategy
space we replicate earlierfindings. However, when the equilibrium is located
above the midpoint of the strategy space weget instead a positive correlation
between response time and giving. While contributiondistributions vary
significantly by treatment for slow decision makers, these differences are
notsignificant for fast decision makers. Fast decision makers are in both
treatments more likely tomake contributions that simultaneously lower
individual and group earnings. We argue that thenegative correlation between
response time and giving rather than reflecting spontaneousgiving, results
from confused participants quickly selecting contributions that lie, on
average, inthe middle of the strategy space. Our results demonstrate that
inference on preferences fromresponse time requires that we take into account
how mistakes are correlated with response time. |