New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2007‒11‒10
two papers chosen by
Daniela Raeva


  1. Individual Differences in Allocation of Funds in the Dictator Game Associated with Length of the Arginine Vasopressin 1a Receptor (AVPR1a) RS3 Promoter-region and Correlation between RS3 Length and Hippocampal mRNA By Ariel Knafo; Salomon Israel; Ariel Darvasi; Rachel Bachner-Melman; Florina Uzefovsky; Lior Cohen; Esti Feldman; Elad Lerer; Efrat Laiba; Yael Raz; Lubov Nemanov; Inga Gritsenko; Christian Dina; Galila Agam; Brian Dean; Gary Bornstein; Richard P. Ebstein
  2. Tax Evasion: Cheating Rationally or Deciding Emotionally? By Giorgio Coricelli; Mateus Joffily; Claude Montmarquette; Marie-Claire Villeval

  1. By: Ariel Knafo; Salomon Israel; Ariel Darvasi; Rachel Bachner-Melman; Florina Uzefovsky; Lior Cohen; Esti Feldman; Elad Lerer; Efrat Laiba; Yael Raz; Lubov Nemanov; Inga Gritsenko; Christian Dina; Galila Agam; Brian Dean; Gary Bornstein; Richard P. Ebstein
    Abstract: Human altruism is a widespread phenomenon that puzzled evolutionary biologists since Darwin. Economic games illustrate human altruism by demonstrating that behavior deviates from economic predictions of profit maximization. A game that most plainly demonstrates this altruistic tendency is the Dictator Game. We hypothesized that human altruistic behavior is to some extent hardwired and that a likely candidate that may contribute to individual differences in altruistic behavior is the arginine vasopressin 1a (AVPR1a) receptor that in some mammals such as the vole has a profound impact on affiliative behaviors. In the current investigation, 203 male and female university students played an online version of the Dictator Game, for real money payoffs. All subjects and their parents were genotyped for AVPR1a RS1 & RS3 promoter-region repeat polymorphisms. Parents did not participate in online game playing. Since variation in the length of a repetitive element in the vole AVPR1a promoter region is associated with differences in social behavior we examined the relationship between RS1 and RS3 repeat length (base pairs) and allocation sums. Participants with short versions (308-325 bp) of the AVPR1a RS3 repeat allocated significantly (Likelihood ratio=14.75, p=0.001, DF=2) fewer shekels to the 'other' than participants with long versions (327-343 bp). We also implemented a family-based association test, UNPHASED, to confirm and validate the correlation between the AVPR1a RS3 repeat and monetary allocations in the Dictator Game. Dictator Game allocations were significantly associated with the RS3 repeat (global p value: Likelihood ratio chi-sq = 11.73, DF= 4, p-value = 0.019). The association between the AVPR1a RS3 repeat and altruism was also confirmed using two self-report scales (the Bardi-Schwartz Universalism and Benevolence Value-expressive Behavior Scales). RS3 long alleles were associated with higher scores on both measures. Finally, long AVPR1a RS3 repeats were associated with higher AVPR1a human postmortem hippocampal mRNA levels than short RS3 repeats (One way-ANOVA: F=15.04, p=0.001, DF= 14) suggesting a functional molecular genetic basis for the observation that participants with the long RS3 repeats allocate more money than participants with the short repeats. This is the first investigation showing that a common human polymorphism, with antecedents in lower mammals, contributes to decision making in an economic game. The finding that the same gene contributing to social bonding in lower animals also appears to operate similarly in human behavior suggests a common evolutionary mechanism.
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp457&r=neu
  2. By: Giorgio Coricelli (CNRS); Mateus Joffily (CNRS); Claude Montmarquette (CIRANO, University of Montréal); Marie-Claire Villeval (CNRS-GATE, University of Lyon and IZA)
    Abstract: The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate the role of emotions as a possible explanation of tax compliance. Our laboratory experiment shows that emotional arousal, measured by Skin Conductance Responses, increases in the proportion of evaded taxes. The perspective of punishment after an audit, especially when the pictures of the evaders are publicly displayed, also raises emotions. We show that an audit policy that induces shame on the evaders favors compliance.
    Keywords: tax evasion, emotions, neuro-economics, physiological measures, shame, experiments
    JEL: C91 C92 D87 H26
    Date: 2007–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3103&r=neu

This issue is ©2007 by Daniela Raeva. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.