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on Network Economics |
| By: | Yann Bramoullé (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université); Christian Ghiglino (Essex Pathways, University of Essex - University of Essex) |
| Abstract: | We introduce loss aversion into a model of conspicuous consumption in networks. Agents allocate their income between a standard good and a status good to maximize a Cobb-Douglas utility. Agents interact over a connected network and compare their status consumption to their neighbors' average consumption. Loss aversion has a profound impact. If loss aversion is large enough relative to income heterogeneity, a continuum of Nash equilibria appears and all agents consume the same quantity of status good. Otherwise, there is a unique Nash equilibrium and richest agents earn strict status gains while poorest agents earn strict status losses. |
| Keywords: | Loss Aversion,Conspicuous Consumption,Social Networks |
| Date: | 2022–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03630455&r= |
| By: | Huiling Yuan; Guodong Li; Junhui Wang |
| Abstract: | This paper introduces one new multivariate volatility model that can accommodate an appropriately defined network structure based on low-frequency and high-frequency data. The model reduces the number of unknown parameters and the computational complexity substantially. The model parameterization and iterative multistep-ahead forecasts are discussed and the targeting reparameterization is also presented. Quasi-likelihood functions for parameter estimation are proposed and their asymptotic properties are established. A series of simulation experiments are carried out to assess the performance of the estimation in finite samples. An empirical example is demonstrated that the proposed model outperforms the network GARCH model, with the gains being particularly significant at short forecast horizons. |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2204.12933&r= |
| By: | Anne Albert-Cromarias (CleRMa - Clermont Recherche Management - ESC Clermont-Ferrand - École Supérieure de Commerce (ESC) - Clermont-Ferrand - UCA - Université Clermont Auvergne); Alexandre Asselineau (CEREN - Centre de Recherche sur l'ENtreprise [Dijon] - BSB - Burgundy School of Business (BSB) - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Dijon Bourgogne (ESC)) |
| Abstract: | This article deals with the mechanism of coopetition formation from a network perspective, focusing in the wine industry. Through a comprehensive approach, we study the case of four vineyards in central France that are located in a low-profile wine-growing region and made up of very small firms fighting in a highly competitive market. While everything seems to encourage them to collaborate, these vineyards have so far remained unable to develop an effective coopetition strategy beyond a few specific initiatives. We seek to identify the reasons for these difficulties by analysing exogenous and endogenous coopetitive drivers. Our results provide theoretical contributions theory by showing that: the formation stage can lead to effective or ineffective coopetition; coopetition in an embedded network is specific; and coopetition intentionality plays a role in this formation stage. |
| Keywords: | Wine,Small business,Coopetition,Network,Coopetition formation |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03631930&r= |
| By: | Toke S. Aidt (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge); Jean Lacroix (Université Paris-Saclay, Faculté Jean Monnet, RITM); Pierre-Guillaume Méon (Centre Emile Bernheim, Université libre de Bruxelles) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies a new mechanism that allows political elites from a non-democratic regime to survive a democratic transition: connections. We document this mechanism in the transition from the Vichy regime to democracy in post-World War II France. The parliamentarians who had supported the Vichy regime were purged in a two-stage process where each case was judged twice by two di erent courts. Using a di erence-in-di erences strategy, we show that Law graduates, a powerful social group in French politics with strong connections to one of the two courts, had a clearance rate that was 10 percentage points higher than others. This facilitated the persistence of that elite group. A systematic analysis of 17,589 documents from the defendants' dossiers is consistent with the hypothesis that the connections of Law graduates to one of the two courts were a major driver of their ability to avoid the purge. We consider and rule out alternative mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Purges, Political transitions, Elite persistence, Connections |
| JEL: | D73 K40 N44 P48 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dia:wpaper:dt202204&r= |