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on Network Economics |
| By: | Shuhei Nishitateno |
| Abstract: | Growing production fragmentation makes analysis of network effects on trade in parts and components more important than ever. This study examines network effects on auto parts exports from six major auto producing countries using a panel dataset covering 49 destinations and 31 products over the period from 2002 to 2008. Unlike previous research, this study finds that, in the case of Japanese automakers, overseas production by subsidiary plants is less important in determining auto parts exports from Japan than it is for the other major auto producing countries. Japanese auto parts suppliers, unlike their counterparts in other countries, have a tendency to follow the Japanese auto makers in internationalizing their operations. This practice of meeting the need of automakers from overseas production plants weakens the network effects on auto parts exports from Japan. |
| Keywords: | Network effect, International trade, production fragmentation, keiretsu, automobile industry, Japan |
| JEL: | F14 L23 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pas:papers:2014-09&r=net |
| By: | Rong Rong (Department of Economics, Weber State University); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | Communication between departments within a firm may include deception. Theory suggests that telling lies in these environments may be strategically optimal if there exists a small difference in monetary incentives (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Galeotti et al, 2012). We design a laboratory experiment to investigate whether agents with different monetary incentives in a network environment behave according to theoretical predictions. We found that players’ choices are consistent with the theory. That is, most communication within an incentive group is truthful and deception often occurs between subjects from different groups. These results have important implications for intra-organizational conflict management, demonstrating that in order to minimize deceptive communication between departments the firm may need to reduce incentive differences between these groups. Length: 19 |
| Keywords: | social networks, deception, strategic information transmission, experiments |
| JEL: | D85 D02 C92 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1046&r=net |
| By: | Carlos León; Clara Machado; Miguel Sarmiento |
| Abstract: | Evidence suggests that the Colombian interbank funds market is an inhomogeneous and hierarchical network in which a few financial institutions fulfill the role of “super-spreaders” of central bank liquidity among market participants. Results concur with evidence from other interbank markets and other financial networks regarding the flaws of traditional direct financial contagion models based on homogeneous and non-hierarchical networks, and provide further evidence about financial networks’ self-organization emerging from complex adaptive financial systems. Our research work contributes to central bank’s efforts by (i) examining and characterizing the actual connective structure of interbank funds networks; (ii) identifying those financial institutions that may be considered as the most important conduits for monetary policy transmission, and the main drivers of contagion risk within the interbank funds market; (iii) providing new elements for the implementation of monetary policy and for safeguarding financial stability. Classification JEL: E5, G2, L14. |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdr:borrec:816&r=net |
| By: | Gaëtan Fournier (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne); Marco Scarsini (Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - LUISS, Roma) |
| Abstract: | We consider a Hotelling game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential customers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost bore by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in term of the induced price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost, and the induced price of stability, i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost. We show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are two and one, respectively. |
| Keywords: | Induced price of anarchy, induced price of stability, location games on networks, pure equilibria, large games. |
| JEL: | C72 R30 R39 |
| Date: | 2014–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:14033&r=net |