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on Network Economics |
| By: | Chang, C-L.; McAleer, M.J. |
| Abstract: | __Abstract__ The paper analyses academic journal quality and research impact using quality weighted citations versus total citations, based on the widely-used Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Science citations database (ISI). A new Index of Citations Quality (ICQ) is presented, based on quality weighted citations. The new index is used to analyse the leading 500 journals in both the Sciences and Social Sciences using quantifiable Research Assessment Measures (RAMs) that are based on alternative transformations of citations. It is shown that ICQ is a useful additional measure to 2YIF and other well known RAMs for the purpose of evaluating the impact and quality, as well as ranking, of journals as it contains information that has very low correlations with the information contained in the well known RAMs for both the Sciences and Social Sciences. |
| Keywords: | research assessment measures, impact factors, Eigenfactor, article influence, quality weighted citations, total conditions, index of citations quality, journal rankings |
| JEL: | C1 C81 Y10 |
| Date: | 2014–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ems:eureir:50641&r=net |
| By: | CARAYOL, Nicolas (GREThA, Université de Bordeaux IV, France); DELILLE, Rémy (GREThA, Université de Bordeaux IV, France); VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Saint Louis University; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players suffer or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly efficient networks is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anonymous and component efficient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously. |
| Keywords: | farsighted players, stability, equal bargaining power |
| JEL: | A14 C70 D20 |
| Date: | 2014–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2014004&r=net |
| By: | Uyttendaele P.; Khan A.; Peeters R.J.A.P.; Thuijsman F. (GSBE) |
| Abstract: | The primary question in coordination games concerns the possibility of achieving efficient coordination. We consider a situation where individuals from a finite population are randomly matched to play a coordination game. While this interaction is global in the sense that the co-player can be drawn from the entire population, individuals observe the strategies and payoffs of only the direct connections or neighbors in their social network. The most successful strategy used in the neighborhood is imitated. We study how the network structure in fluences the dynamic process of achieving efficient coordination. We simulate this coordination game for small-world and scale-free networks and find that segregation is an important factor in determining the possibility of efficient coordination. In addition, a classification tree analysis reveals segregation to be an important variable of the nonoccurrence of efficient coordination. |
| Keywords: | Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games; |
| JEL: | C73 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2014004&r=net |
| By: | MAULEON, Ana (CEREC, Saint Louis University; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium); ROEHL, Nils (Department of Economics, University of Paderborn; BiGSEM, Bielefeld University, Germany); VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent (CEREC, Saint Louis University; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market. |
| Keywords: | social networks, constitutions, stability, many-to-many matchings |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2014003&r=net |
| By: | Lindquist, Matthew J. (SOFI, Stockholm University); Zenou, Yves (Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | We study peer effects in crime by analyzing co-offending networks. We first provide a credible estimate of peer effects in these networks equal to 0.17. This estimate implies a social multiplier of 1.2 for those individuals linked to only one co-offender and a social multiplier of 2 for those linked to three co-offenders. We then provide one of the first empirical tests of the key player policy in a real world setting. This policy defines a micro-founded strategy for removing the criminal from each network that reduces total crime by the largest amount. Using longitudinal data, we are able to compare the theoretical predictions of the key player policy with real world outcomes. By focusing on networks for which the key player has disappeared over time, we show that the theoretical predicted crime reduction is close to what is observed in the real world. We also show that the key player policy outperforms other reasonable police policies such as targeting the most active criminals or targeting criminals who have the highest betweenness or eigenvector centrality in the network. This indicates that behavioral-based policies can be more efficient in reducing crime than those based on algorithms that have no micro-foundation. |
| Keywords: | crime, social networks, peer effects, social multiplier, key player, crime policies |
| JEL: | A14 K42 Z13 |
| Date: | 2014–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8012&r=net |