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on Network Economics |
| By: | Breitmoser, Yves; Vorjohann, Pauline |
| Abstract: | In the canonical network model, the connections model, only three specific network structures are generically efficient: complete, empty, and star networks. This renders many plausible network structures inefficient. We show that requiring robustness with respect to stochastic transmission failures rehabilitates incomplete, circular network structures. Specifically, we show that near the "bifurcation" where both star and complete network are efficient in the standard connections model, star and complete network are generally inefficient as transmission failures become possible. As for four-player networks, we additionally show that the circle network is uniquely efficient and robust near this bifurcation. |
| Keywords: | communication network; information flow; stochastics; robustness; efficiency; connections model |
| JEL: | C70 D85 |
| Date: | 2012–11–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:42862&r=net |
| By: | Natalia Letki (PGPE Project, Institute of Sociology, University of Warsaw); Mierina, I. (Inta) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we treat social networks as a resource of individuals, that is used in conjunction with other types of capital, and similarly to other types of capital, its use is context-specific. We propose a conditional mechanism for how context determines networks use: not only does context affect network mobilisation, but that it affects behaviour of different groups differently. We test this proposition on the example of social and economic polarisation influencing probability of turning to networks for help by different income groups. Our findings show that although the poor have the greatest need to turn to networks to compensate for the shortage of other forms of capital, when context becomes adverse, in comparison with other groups they are always disadvantaged in terms of networks mobilisation. |
| Keywords: | social capital, networks, inequality, income, post-communist, Central Eastern Europe |
| Date: | 2012–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aia:ginidp:dp45&r=net |
| By: | Frank J. van Rijnsoever; Leon Welle; Sjoerd Bakker |
| Abstract: | The aim of this paper is to empirically examine the influence of different types of credibility on the legitimacy to grant individual actors within consortia an innovation subsidy. Theorizing from the viewpoint of resource dependence theory and the sociology of expectations, we hypothesize that four types of credibility are related to legitimacy: scientific credibility, market credibility, expectation track record, and social capital. We operate on two levels of analysis, the actor and the consortium. We quantitatively analyze the Dutch electric vehicle subsidy program as case. We develop a model that accurately forecasts which consortia are most likely to receive subsidies. We demonstrate that social capital and market credibility positively influence the likelihood of receiving innovation subsidies, while scientific credibility sources and expectation track record have a negative influence. Based on these findings we provide policy recommendations and avenues for further research. |
| Keywords: | Electric Vehicle Technology; Expectations; Resource Dependence Theory; Credibility; Legitimacy; Innovation Policy |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:12-07&r=net |
| By: | Coenen, Michael; Jovanovic, Dragan |
| Abstract: | We analyze a constrained dictator game in which the dictator splits a pie which will be subsequently created through simultaneous investments by herself and the recipient. We consider two treatments by varying the maximum attainable size of the pie leading to either high or low investment incentives. We find that constrained dictators and recipients invest less than a model with self-interested players would predict. While the splitting decisions of constrained dictators correspond to the theoretical predictions when investment incentives are high, they are more selfish when investment incentives are low. Overall, team productivity is negatively affected by lower investment incentives. -- |
| Keywords: | Bargaining Game,Dictator Game,Investment Incentives,Team Production |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D01 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:77&r=net |