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on Network Economics |
| By: | Camelia Minoiu; Javier A. Reyes |
| Abstract: | In this paper we explore the properties of the global banking network using cross-border bank lending data for 184 countries over 1978-2009. Specifically, we analyze financial interconnectedness using network metrics of centrality, connectivity, and clustering. We document a relatively unstable global banking network, with structural breaks in network indicators identifying several waves of capital flows. Interconnectedness rankings, especially for borrowers, are relatively volatile over the period. Connectivity tends to fall during and after systemic banking crises and sovereign debt crises. The 2008-09 global financial crisis stands out as an unusually large perturbation to the cross-border banking network. |
| Keywords: | Banking crisis , Capital flows , Cross country analysis , Emerging markets , Financial crisis , International banking , Loans , |
| Date: | 2011–04–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:11/74&r=net |
| By: | GRANDJEAN, Gilles (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium) |
| Abstract: | Evidence suggests that in developing countries, agents rely on mutual insurance agreements to deal with income or expenditure shocks. This paper analyzes which risk-sharing networks can be sustained in the long run when individuals are far- sighted, in the sense that they are able to forecast how other agents would react to their choice of insurance partners. In particular, we study whether the farsightedness of the agents leads to a reduction of the tension between stability and efficiency that arises when individuals are myopic. We find that for extreme values of the cost of establishing a mutual insurance agreement, myopic and farsighted agents form the same risk-sharing networks. For intermediate costs, farsighted agents form efficient networks while myopic agents don't. |
| Keywords: | risk-sharing, networks, farsighted agents, stability, efficiency |
| JEL: | C70 D85 |
| Date: | 2011–02–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cor:louvco:2011014&r=net |
| By: | Lincoln, James R.; Guillot, Didier |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the changing process of strategic alliance formation in the Japanese electronics industry between 1985 and 1998. With data on 123-135 Japanese electronics/electrical machinery makers, we use a dyad panel regression methodology to address a series of hypotheses drawn largely from embeddedness theory on how the firms’ horizontal and vertical keiretsu business group affiliations and prior alliance networks supported and constrained partner choice in new R&D (innovation) and nonR&D (implementation) domestic economy alliances. We find that in the first half of our series (1985-91; the “preburst†period) keiretsu served as infrastructure or platform for new strategic alliances that had both innovation and implementation goals. In the second half of our series (1992-98, the “postbubble†period) the keiretsu effects on innovation alliance formation were gone, but the groups’ role in nonR&D or implementation alliances, the purpose of which was often cost reduction, had expanded. Our results suggest that Japanese electronics firms over this interval of time adapted rationally to the heightened uncertainty and stringency of the Japanese domestic economic environment by searching outside their preexisting networks for innovation alliances while at the same time exploiting those networks for implementation alliances addressed to cost-reduction and other operational aims. The study speaks to embeddedness theory in showing that economic actors are not deterministically constrained by business group or other preexisting network ties but may in rational fashion exploit or abandon those ties with an eye to advancing corporate and alliance goals. |
| Keywords: | Organizational Behavior and Theory |
| Date: | 2011–05–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:indrel:1997489&r=net |
| By: | Coughlin, Cletus C; Wall, Howard J. |
| Abstract: | Ethnic networks—as proxies for information networks—have been associated with higher levels of international trade. Previous research has not differentiated between the roles of these networks on the extensive and intensive margins. The present paper does so using a model with fixed effects, finding that ethnic networks increase trade on the intensive margin but not on the extensive margin. |
| Keywords: | Ethnic Networks; State Exports; Intensive Margin; Extensive Margin |
| JEL: | R10 F10 |
| Date: | 2011–01–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30758&r=net |
| By: | Bruno S. Frey |
| Abstract: | Gordon Tullock has been one of the most important founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical “Tullock Challenges”. The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, or to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by the governments to manipulate the policy consequences. In general “What is important, will be manipulated by the government”. To restrain government manipulation one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism, or introduce random mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Happiness, social networks, constitutional economics, random mechanisms, public choice |
| JEL: | D72 H10 I31 P16 D02 |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:015&r=net |