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on Network Economics |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | In the dynamic game we consider, players are the members of a fixed network. Everyone is initially endowed with an information item that he is the only paper to hold. Players are offered a finite number of periods to centralize the initially dispersed items in the hands of any one member of the network. In every period, each agent strategically chooses whether or not to transmit the items he holds to this neighbors in the network. The sooner all the items are gathered by any individual, the better it is for the group of players as a whole. Besides, the agent who first centralizes all the items is offered an additional reward that he keeps for himself. In this framework where information transmission is strategic and physically restricted, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a group to pool information items in every equilibrium. This condition is independent of the network structure. The architecture of links however affects the time needed before items are centralized in equilibrium. This paper provides theoretical support to Bonacich (1990)'s experimental results. |
| Keywords: | Social network ; social dilemma ; dynamic network game ; strategic communication |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00367894_v1&r=net |
| By: | Jeanne Hagenbach (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Frédéric Koessler (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris) |
| Abstract: | We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to the individuals who decide to whom they reveal their private information about the state. The information transmission occurring in the communication stage is characterized by a strategic communication network. We provide an explicit link between players' preferences and the equilibrium strategic communication networks. A key feature of our equilibrium characterization is that whether communication takes place between two agents not only depends on the conflict of interest between these agents, but also on the number and preferences of the other agents with whom they communicate. Apart from some specific cases, the equilibrium communication networks are quite complex despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogeneity. In general, strategic communication networks cannot be completely Pareto-ranked, but expected social welfare always increases as the communication network expands. |
| Keywords: | Cheap talk ; coordination ; incomplete information ; networks |
| Date: | 2009–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00367692_v1&r=net |
| By: | Byung-Wook Kwon |
| Abstract: | The focus of this paper is to provide an overview of developments in broadband power line technologies and related policy issues. The electric power grid is a hostile environment for high-speed data transmission, but after years of development, the technology to deliver high-speed data over the existing electric power delivery network has emerged, somewhat tentatively, in the marketplace. This technology, referred to as Broadband over Power Lines (BPL), uses medium- and low-voltage power lines to provide broadband Internet access to residential users and businesses and is considered by some as a third access technology offering potential competition to xDSL telecommunication lines and cable modems. Recent trends, however, indicate that the focus of BPL technology is shifting from providing broadband connectivity to smart meter usage allowing households to reduce energy costs and allow energy companies to better manage their networks by developing a “smart grid”. |
| Date: | 2009–06–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaab:157-en&r=net |
| By: | Thomas de Haan |
| Abstract: | The OECD Document “Convergence and Next Generation Networks” analysed developments in Next Generation Networks (NGN), and the convergence of core and access networks. The aim of that paper was to review areas where policy changes may be required and to put forward recommendations for considerations in areas where change may be necessary to support new developments and to ensure that telecommunication policy goals can be met. The paper depicted areas of regulatory interest, arising from the deployment of NGN. The objective was to identify policy and regulatory issues that government and national regulatory authorities may have to confront in the framework of the development of core next generation networks. It noted that the issue of ‘Numbering, naming and addressing” was a policy area that would need further analysis and that ENUM was one of the potentially significant developments in the converging world of telephone numbering, naming and addressing. |
| Date: | 2009–06–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaab:156-en&r=net |
| By: | Sonja C. Kassenboehmer; John P. Haisken-DeNew |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the role of social assistance payments (SAP or Sozialhilfe) in determining levels of life satisfaction in Germany using the SOEP 1995–2004. We find strong evidence that individuals in Germany are negatively influenced by increased SAP payments controlling for income, whether or not they actually receive such payments (stigma and social jealousy). While there are obvious benefits to making SAP to those needy, there are substantial negative externalities experienced by those who neither receive SAP nor qualify (counterfactual SAP). Furthermore, these negative effects are even stronger for those who do receive benefits (stigma) suggesting that social jealousy and stigma are a force to be reckoned with when evaluating social policy.We show that the added benefits of increasing SAP are reduced by 50 to 100% because of social jealousy and stigma costs, whereas child benefits (Kindergeld) are seen to enhance life satisfaction over and above a simple income effect. Further, own-earned income, over and above the SAP subsistence level is valued much higher than transfer payments at the SAP subsistence level, suggesting a policy focus on increasing employment integration efforts for SAP recipients as opposed merely to providing SAP transfers. |
| Keywords: | Well being, life satisfaction, social assistance, stigma, social jealousy |
| JEL: | I31 I38 J64 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0117&r=net |