|
on Network Economics |
| By: | Mohamed Belhaj (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579); Frédéric Deroïan (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales - CNRS : UMR6579) |
| Abstract: | This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma. |
| Keywords: | Communication Network, Endogenous Efforts, Strategic Complements |
| Date: | 2008–11–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00339159_v1&r=net |
| By: | Martina Kauffeld-Monz (Institute for Urban Science and Structural Policy (IfS Berlin), Germany.); Michael Fritsch (Friedrich Schiller University Jena, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW-Berlin), and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany.) |
| Abstract: | The discussion on regional innovation systems emphasizes the duality of local and global links. While the former enable effective knowledge exchange between regional actors, the latter are considered to provide regional systems with knowledge diverse to their knowledge base. Our empirical analysis of 18 German regional innovation networks highlights the importance of public research organizations for inter-regional knowledge exchange. The broker and gatekeeper function of public research organizations may be particularly important in lagging regions that typically suffer from a lack of large firms who often assume the role of "gatekeepers of knowledge". |
| Keywords: | Regional systems of innovation, innovation networks, knowledge broker, gatekeeper |
| JEL: | D83 D85 L14 |
| Date: | 2008–22–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-089&r=net |
| By: | Jean-Philippe BERROU (GREThA-GRES); François COMBARNOUS (GREThA-GRES) |
| Abstract: | As to explore social networks influence in African informal economy, this paper fits in the conceptual framework of reticular embeddedness. By going into the analyse of ties strength, our purpose is to question the real influence of ties content. We use a recent original dataset to evaluate how entrepreneurs’ networks influence their activities economic outcomes. ‘Multiple name generators’ method provides a vast amount of information about ties content, which can be treated by factor analysis to describe and categorize networks. Finally, we show that not only business ties but the particular configuration of ties strength in networks improve informal earnings. |
| Keywords: | Informal economy; embeddedness; social networks; informal earnings |
| JEL: | O17 Z13 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grs:wpegrs:2008-19&r=net |
| By: | Behringer, Stefan |
| Abstract: | This paper looks at competition in the Telecommunications industry with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination. Allowing for asymmetric networks and non-cooperatively chosen access prices simultaneously allows to explicitly derive non-reciprocal equilibrium access price choices that are above the efficient level. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric Networks; Access Pricing; Interconnection; Competition Policy; Telecommunications. |
| JEL: | L96 L51 L41 K21 D40 |
| Date: | 2008–11–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11795&r=net |
| By: | Diana Barro (Department of Applied Mathematics and SSAV, University of Venice); Antonella Basso (Department of Applied Mathematics and SSAV, University of Venice) |
| Abstract: | In this contribution we carried out a wide simulation analysis in order to study the contagion mechanism induced in a portfolio of bank loans by the presence of business relationships among the positions. To this aim we jointly apply a structural model based on a factor approach extended in order to include the presence of microeconomic relationships that takes into account the counterparty risk, and a network model to describe the business connections among interdependent firms. The network of firms is generated resorting to an entropy spatial interaction model. |
| Keywords: | credit risk, bank loan portfolios, contagion models, entropy spatial models |
| JEL: | D61 C63 |
| Date: | 2008–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpaper:186&r=net |
| By: | Behringer, Stefan |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of spillovers in a model of endogenous technical change resulting from learning or network effects on the existence of a lower bound to market concentration. |
| Keywords: | Market Structure; Endogenous Technical Change; Learning; Spillovers; Research and Development |
| JEL: | O32 D4 L1 |
| Date: | 2008–01–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11797&r=net |
| By: | Ponzo, Michela; Scoppa, Vincenzo |
| Abstract: | A number of papers considers the use of informal networks (the help of relatives, friends and acquaintances) to find an employment as an efficient mechanism to match workers to jobs. However, evidence in Italy shows that informal networks tend to be used more in less productive jobs and less developed regions. We aim to show that informal networks – rather than being an efficient channel of information transmission – may interfere with a genuine process of selection of workers, favoring socially connected people in place of more talented workers. Using the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) we estimate with a Probit model the determinants of the probability of using informal networks. We find that informal networks tend to be used by low educated individuals, in low productivity jobs, in high unemployment areas, where opportunistic behavior are widespread and in jobs paying a wage rent. We offer a stripped-down model of nepotism to explain theoretically these findings. |
| Keywords: | Keywords: Informal Networks; Favoritism; Nepotism; Italian Labour Markets. |
| JEL: | D73 J31 J71 M51 J24 |
| Date: | 2008–10–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:11764&r=net |
| By: | David Card (UC Berkeley); Alexandre Mas (UC Berkeley); Jesse Rothstein (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | A great deal of urban policy depends on the possibly of creating stable, economically and racially mixed neighborhoods. Many social interaction models - including the seminal Schelling (1971) model - have the feature that the only stable equilibria are fully segregated. These models suggest that if home-buyers have preferences over their neighborhoods' racial composition, a neighborhood with mixed racial composition is inherently unstable, in the sense that a small change in the composition sets off a dynamic process that converges to 0% or 100% minority share. Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) outline an alternative "one-sided" tipping model in which neighborhoods with a minority share below a critical threshold are potentially stable, but those that exceed the threshold rapidly shift to 100% minority composition. In this paper we examine the racial dynamics of Census tracts in major metropolitian areas over the period from 1970 to 2000, focusing on the question of whether tipping is "two-sided" or "one-sided." The evidence suggests that tipping behavior is one-sided, and that neighborhoods with minority shares below the tipping point attract both white and minority residents. |
| Date: | 2008–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:indrel:1067&r=net |