nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2006‒12‒22
three papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University
  1. The compromise game: Two-sided adverse selection in the laboratory By Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
  2. The Secret to Successful User Communities: An Analysis of Computer Associates User Groups By Schulz, Celine
  3. Co-Opetition and Prelaunch in Standard-Setting for Developing Technologies By Tobias Kretschmer; Katrin Muehlfeld
  1. By: Carrillo, Juan D.; Palfrey, Thomas R.
    Date: 2006–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1259&r=net
  2. By: Schulz, Celine
    Abstract: This paper provides the first large scale study that examines the impact of both individual- and group-specific factors on the benefits users obtain from their user communities. By empirically analysing 924 survey responses from individuals in 161 Computer Associates' user groups, this paper aims to identify the determinants of successful user communities. To measure success, the amount of time individual members save through having access to their user networks is used. As firms can significantly profit from successful user communities, this study proposes four key implications of the empirical results for the management of user communities.
    Keywords: Managing User Communities; Collective Action; Information Sharing
    JEL: O32 M10
    Date: 2006–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:msmdpa:1257&r=net
  3. By: Tobias Kretschmer; Katrin Muehlfeld
    Abstract: Firms faced with the decision of whether to standardize or not prior to introducing a newnetwork technology face a tradeoff: Compatibility improves the technology's chances ofconsumer acceptance, but it also means having to share the resulting profits with othersponsors of the standard. In this paper, we show that even prior to market introduction of anew technology, the timing of decisions is important and that firms have to weigh up thecooperative and competitive elements of pre-market choices. We also show that the option toprecommit to a technology before it is fully developed (as has been the case with theCompact Disc) can be profitable for network technologies.
    Keywords: Standardization, compact disc, preemption, war-of- attrition
    JEL: L63 O32
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0742&r=net
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