nep-mon New Economics Papers
on Monetary Economics
Issue of 2006‒03‒05
forty-five papers chosen by
Bernd Hayo
Philipps-University Marburg
  1. Inflation Inertia and Monetary Policy Shocks By Julia Lendvai
  2. Inflation-Target Expectations and Optimal Monetary Policy By Sujit Kapadia
  3. Inflation, Central Bank Independence and the Legal System By Bernd Hayo; Stefan Voigt
  4. Money Demand and Inflation in Madagascar By Koffie Ben Nassar
  5. Suppressed Inflation and Money Demand in Zimbabwe By Sònia Muñoz
  6. Monetary Policy Rules and Inflation Targets in Emerging Economies Evidence for Mexico and Israel By Rebeca I Muñoz Torres
  7. Financial Dollarization in Latin America By Robert Rennhack; Masahiro Nozaki
  8. On the Optimality of Delay in 'Monetary Policy as a Process of Search' By Doyle, Matthew
  9. Multiple breaks in lending rate pass-through A cross country study for the euro area By Gianluca Di Lorenzo; Giuseppe Marotta
  10. Inflation Persistence, Fiscal Constraints and Non-cooperative Authorities Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union By Titiana Kirsanova; David Vines; Mathan Satchi; Simon Wren-Lewis
  11. The information content of the term structure of interest rates about future inflation – an illustration of the importance of accounting for a time-varying real interest rate and inflation risk premium By Christian Mose Nielsen
  12. Credit Frictions, Housing Prices and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules By Andrea Pescatori; Caterino Mendicino
  13. Inflation prediction from the term structure: the Fisher equation in a multivariate SDF framework By Chiona Balfoussia; Mike Wickens
  14. The Impact of Foreign Interest Rates on the Economy: The Role of the Exchange Rate Regime By Julian di Giovanni; Jay C. Shambaugh
  15. Testing for Asymmetries in the Preferences of the Euro-Area Monetary Policymaker By Manuel M F Martins; Alvaro Aguiar
  16. Do ECB's statements steer short-term and long-term interest rates in the euro zone? By Marie Musard-Gies
  17. Central Banking at the Periphery of the British Empire: Colonial Burma, 1886-1937 By Sean Turnell
  18. Effects of a Labor Market Reform on the Effectiveness of the Monetary Policy By Ana Paula Ribeiro; Alvaro Aguiar
  19. Do Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences Help Explain Observed Inflation Outcomes? By Doyle, Matthew; Falk, Barry L.
  20. "The Fed and the New Monetary Consensus: The Case for Rate Hikes, Part Two" By L. Randall Wray
  21. Declining Output Volatility in Germany: Impulses, Propagation, and the Role of the Monetary Policy By Ulrich Fritsche; Vladimir Kuzin
  22. Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence By Athanasios Papadopoulos; Giuseppe Diana; Moise Sidiropoulos
  23. Inflation Differentials and Different Labor Market Institutions in the EMU By Ester Faia; Alessia Campolmi
  24. Inflation Persistence Revisited By Marika Karanassou; Dennis J Snower
  25. Measuring inflation persistence: A structural time series approach By Maarten Dossche; Gerdie Everaert
  26. Fiscal Dominance and Inflation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo By Jean-Claude Nachega
  27. Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How? By Alan Blinder
  28. Macroeconomic Shocks and Central Bank Disclosure Policy: Is increased Transparency Necessarily Beneficial? By Phillip Lawler; Jonathan James
  29. American in the Shadows: Harry Dexter White and the Design of the International Monetary Fund By James M. Boughton
  30. Pressure on Monetary Policy: the Italian Evidence By Chiara Dalle Nogare; Matilde Vassalli
  31. Beyond Purchasing Power Parity: Nominal exchange rates, output shocks and non linear/asymmetric equilibrium adjustment in Central Europe By Michael Arghyrou; Virginie Boinet; Christopher Martin
  32. Stylized Facts on Bilateral Trade and Currency Unions: Implications for Africa By Charalambos G. Tsangarides; Pierre Ewenczyk; Michal Hulej
  33. Inflation Targets as Focal Points By Maria Demertzis; Nicola Viegi
  34. "The Case for Rate Hikes: Did the Fed Prematurely Raise Rates?" By L. Randall Wray
  35. Does Inflation in China Affect the United States and Japan? By Luke Willard; Tarhan Feyzioglu
  36. Inflation and Financial Depth By Bruce D. Smith; Mohsin S. Khan; A. Senhadji Semlali
  37. Devaluation without common knowledge By Celine Rochon
  38. The Empirics of Foreign Exchange Intervention in Emerging Market Countries The Cases of Mexico and Turkey By Roberto Guimaraes; Cem Karacadag
  39. Central Banking by Committee By Anne Sibert
  40. Identifying "Problem Banks" in the German Co-operative and Savings Bank Sector: An Econometric Analysis By Klaus Schaeck; Simon Wolfe
  41. Strengthening IMF Crisis Prevention By Jonathan David Ostry; Jeromin Zettelmeyer
  42. Revisiting the Martingale hypothesis for exchange rates By Young-Sook Lee; Tae-Hwan Kim; Paul Newbold
  43. Monitoring and Commitment in Bank Lending Behavior By Rodolphe Blavy
  44. Aggregate Implications of Wealth Redistribution: The Case of Inflation* By Matthias Doepke; Martin Schneider
  45. Time Consistent Policy in Markov Switching Models By Fabrizio Zampolli; Andrew Blake
  1. By: Julia Lendvai (University of Namur)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:51&r=mon
  2. By: Sujit Kapadia (Balliol College University of Oxford)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:81&r=mon
  3. By: Bernd Hayo (Philipps University Marburg); Stefan Voigt (University of Kasel and ICER)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:57&r=mon
  4. By: Koffie Ben Nassar
    Keywords: Demand for money , Madagascar , Inflation , Prices , Money markets , Exchange rates , Interest rates , Economic models ,
    Date: 2005–12–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/236&r=mon
  5. By: Sònia Muñoz
    Keywords: Inflation , Zimbabwe , Demand for money , Price controls , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–01–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/15&r=mon
  6. By: Rebeca I Muñoz Torres (University of Leicester)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:3&r=mon
  7. By: Robert Rennhack; Masahiro Nozaki
    Keywords: Dollarization , Latin America , Monetary policy , Credit , Flexible exchange rates , Exchange rate depreciation ,
    Date: 2006–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/7&r=mon
  8. By: Doyle, Matthew
    Abstract: Caplin and Leahy (1996) show that, when central bankers learn about the economy by observing its response to policy shock, cautious monetary policy may be ineffectual as private agents correctly anticipate that today's interest rate cuts are likely to be followed by future cuts. The central banker has to account for this strategic response of private agents to small interest rate cuts by acting more aggressively than would otherwise be the case. Caplin and Leahy, however, do not examine whether or not this strategic behavior on the part of private agents represents a constraint on the ability of monetary policy to implement optimal investment outcomes. The purpose of this paper is to show that the kinds of strategic interactions between investors and the central banker highlighted by Caplin and Leahy affect only the policy rule and do not influence the investment outcome in equilibrium.
    Keywords: Monetary Policy, Strategic Delay
    JEL: E5
    Date: 2006–02–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12503&r=mon
  9. By: Gianluca Di Lorenzo; Giuseppe Marotta
    Abstract: A new approach to search for structural breaks in the retail lending rA new approach is proposed for searching multiple unknown breaks, possibly associated with EMU, in the short term business lending rate pass-through. Multiple breaks are detected in five out of nine countries of the euro area. The last break occurs much before the start of EMU for France, several months after that event for Austria, Italy and Germany. Long run pass-throughs decrease (except for France) sizably below one (except for the Netherlands); heterogeneity in the monetary transmission increases across countries. These results raise doubts on claims of a more effective monetary policy under EMU.
    Keywords: Interest rates; Monetary policy; Economic and Monetary Union; Cointegration analysis; Structural breaks
    JEL: E43 E52 E58 F36
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:modena:0602&r=mon
  10. By: Titiana Kirsanova (University of Exeter); David Vines (Balliol College University of Oxford); Mathan Satchi (University of Kent); Simon Wren-Lewis (University of Exeter)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:17&r=mon
  11. By: Christian Mose Nielsen (Aalborg University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:86&r=mon
  12. By: Andrea Pescatori (Universitat Pompeu Fabra); Caterino Mendicino (Stockholm School of Economics)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:67&r=mon
  13. By: Chiona Balfoussia (University of York); Mike Wickens (University of York and CEPR)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:16&r=mon
  14. By: Julian di Giovanni; Jay C. Shambaugh
    Keywords: Exchange rate regimes , Interest rates , Economic growth , Monetary policy , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–02–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/37&r=mon
  15. By: Manuel M F Martins (Universidade do Porto); Alvaro Aguiar (Universidade do Porto)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:41&r=mon
  16. By: Marie Musard-Gies (University of Orleans)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:56&r=mon
  17. By: Sean Turnell (Department of Economics, Macquarie University)
    Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to bring to light the efforts to fashion a central bank in Burma during the years in which the country was a province of British India. Throughout this period, which lasted from 1886 to 1937, questions of money and finance in Burma were mostly the preserve of the Raj in Calcutta and New Delhi. And, yet, it is a little-known fact that plans to establish a central bank for Burma were promoted throughout the colonial years by a succession of imperial officials. These plans, which reached their apogee in the 'monetary reform' advocacy that followed the Great Depression, were never realised in the colonial era. They were, however, indicative of a political economy discourse in colonial Burma that was more vigorous, and theoretically sophisticated, than is commonly supposed.
    Keywords: Monetary institutions, British Empire, Burma, Indian monetary reform
    JEL: N25 E42 E58
    Date: 2005–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mac:wpaper:0511&r=mon
  18. By: Ana Paula Ribeiro (Universidade do Porto); Alvaro Aguiar (Universidade do Porto)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:25&r=mon
  19. By: Doyle, Matthew; Falk, Barry L.
    Abstract: Recent theoretical work shows that volatility in inflation and/or unemployment can generate time consistency problems when the central banker's loss function is asymmetric. Empirical work to date has been inconclusive. We show that previous evidence offered in support of the proposition that the volatility of unemployment helps explain inflation outcomes suffers from a spurious regression problem. Once this problem is controlled for, the evidence suggests that the volatility of unemployment does not help explain inflation outcomes. Inflation volatility can help explain inflation outcomes, but for this relationship to be due to asymmetries in central bank preferences it would require that central bankers dislike low inflation more than they dislike high inflation.
    JEL: E5
    Date: 2006–02–20
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12501&r=mon
  20. By: L. Randall Wray
    Abstract: From this paper's Preface, by Dr. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President: In Public Policy Brief No. 79, L. Randall Wray wrote about the Federal Reserve’s recent interest rate hikes that "the most charitable interpretation of the Fed’s policy change is that it appears to be premature."Wray marshaled a convincing array of data on payrolls, employment-to-population ratios, and other labor market indicators to show "that the current recovery has not yet attained the degree of labor market tightness that was common in previous recoveries," and therefore that the threat of inflation was minimal. Hence, the Fed, in raising rates, was unnecessarily jeopardizing the economy’s weak recovery. In this new brief, we learn about the flaws in the Fed’s thinking that have led to its frequent policy mistakes.Wray traces several strands of current central bank thinking back to their roots in the Fed’s internal discussions in the mid-1990s. Transcripts of these discussions have recently been released, a development that has yielded some disturbing and telling insights about the way in which monetary policy is formed. The situation of 1994 closely parallels that of current times. Unemployment was clearly above its lowest sustainable level, and inflation was low. Still, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and its chairman, Alan Greenspan, believed that interest rates had to be raised to keep prices in check. As it turned out, inflation stayed low, even as unemployment sank to levels previously believed to be inflationary. The Fed’s interest rate hikes proved to be unnecessary at best and counterproductive at worst. Not only is the current economic environment reminiscent of 1994, but so are contemporary justifications for recessionary policies.Wray lists six tenets of policy making common to both periods: transparency, gradualism, activism, low inflation as the only official goal, surreptitious targeting of distributional variables, and the neutral rate as the policy instrument to achieve these goals. The Fed would not be eager to espouse some of these principles publicly, but they were all discussed in committee meetings, as the recently released transcripts make clear—and there is no reason to think the Fed has changed its philosophy. Wray shows that this philosophy is convoluted. Fed officials claim that they are attempting to reach a neutral interest rate that neither provokes inflation nor causes recession. But they also say that they will not know the level of the neutral rate until they reach it. Little can be gained by pursuing such a chimerical goal. Moreover, even when the interest rate was far below its supposedly neutral level, the economy seemed to be free of inflation. Finally, the Fed seems to have painted itself into a corner by promising in advance a gradual series of interest rate increases. It is small wonder that the press finds the Fed’s public statements to be somewhat confusing and cryptic. The Fed transcripts shed light on the events of 1994 and those of the present day. I think that it is time for a new approach to monetary policy; this brief shows why.
    Date: 2004–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb80&r=mon
  21. By: Ulrich Fritsche (German Institute of Economic Research); Vladimir Kuzin (Goethe-University Frankfurt)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:70&r=mon
  22. By: Athanasios Papadopoulos (University of Crete); Giuseppe Diana (University Robert Schuman); Moise Sidiropoulos (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:58&r=mon
  23. By: Ester Faia (Department of Economics); Alessia Campolmi (Department of Economics)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:80&r=mon
  24. By: Marika Karanassou (Queen Mary - University of London and IZA); Dennis J Snower (Institute of World Economics IZA and CEPR)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:50&r=mon
  25. By: Maarten Dossche (National Bank of Belgium); Gerdie Everaert (Ghent University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:85&r=mon
  26. By: Jean-Claude Nachega
    Keywords: Inflation , Congo, Democratic Republic of the , Fiscal policy , Economic stabilization ,
    Date: 2005–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/221&r=mon
  27. By: Alan Blinder
    Abstract: Among the most notable, but least discussed, hallmarks of what I have called the "quiet revolution" in central banking practice (Blinder, 2004a) has been the movement toward making monetary policy decisions by committee. Until about a decade ago, most central banks had a single governor, who might or might not have been independent of the rest of the government. But since then, the United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and Brazil, to name just a few, have opted to establish monetary policy committees (MPCs). In addition, the committee-based ECB replaced 12 central banks, most of which had previously been run by individual governors. Thus the existence of a pronounced worldwide trend is clear. In this paper, I discuss two questions. The first question is why. Why have so many central banks switched from individual to group decisionmaking? The second question is how. How should central banks make decisions and how should they communicate with the public, the government, and the markets?
    Keywords: central banks; committees; voting; communication.
    JEL: E58 D71 D78
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:092&r=mon
  28. By: Phillip Lawler (University of Wales, Swansea); Jonathan James (University of Wales, Swansea)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:27&r=mon
  29. By: James M. Boughton
    Keywords: Fund , International monetary system , White, Harry Dexter , Exchange rate regimes , Capital controls , Capital flows ,
    Date: 2006–01–19
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/6&r=mon
  30. By: Chiara Dalle Nogare; Matilde Vassalli
    Abstract: Following Havrilesky’s seminal work (1995) and its extension by Maier, Sturm and de Haan (2002) we construct a monthly index of external influences on Bank of Italy’s conduct for the period 1984-1998. This paper aims at describing the index of overall pressure on Italian monetary policy and the five sub-indexes of which it is composed, namely the index of political pressure, the index of pressure coming from the economic sectors, the index of pressure coming from trade unions, the index of pressure coming from the financial sector and the index of pressure coming from other sources.
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0407&r=mon
  31. By: Michael Arghyrou (Cardiff Business School); Virginie Boinet (Brunel Business School); Christopher Martin (Brunel Business School)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:35&r=mon
  32. By: Charalambos G. Tsangarides; Pierre Ewenczyk; Michal Hulej
    Keywords: Bilateral trade , Africa , Monetary unions , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–02–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/31&r=mon
  33. By: Maria Demertzis (De Nederlandsche Bank and University of Amsterdam); Nicola Viegi (University of KwaZulu-Natal)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:52&r=mon
  34. By: L. Randall Wray
    Abstract: From this paper's Preface, by Dr. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President: For a time, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) seemed to have learned from the mistakes of the past. Instead of taking good economic performance as a sign of incipient inflation, Chairman Alan Greenspan kept interest rates relatively low in the late 1990s, even as unemployment plummeted.Many commentators worried that the FOMC's unusually easy stance would usher in a period of runaway inflation, but inflation stayed in the 2 to 3 percent range. Now, with scant evidence of an inflationary threat, Greenspan and his committee seem intent on raising interest rates. Greenspan argues that the current anemic expansion is "self-sustaining" and no longer needs the support of low interest rates. In this new brief, Levy Institute Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray evaluates the Fed's concern about a coming inflation and its decision to begin raising interest rates. He begins with an examination of key market developments that might signal inflation.Most economists worry about inflation when labor markets begin to tighten and employees gain the bargaining power necessary to demand pay raises.Wray marshals an array of evidence demonstrating that workers can only wish for such conditions. The economy has created no net new jobs since the beginning of the current presidential term. To match the 64.4 percent proportion of adults who held jobs during the Clinton era, the economy would have to generate four million new positions. It is clear that the job market will not be a source of inflation any more than it was during the Clinton boom.
    Date: 2004–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lev:levppb:ppb79&r=mon
  35. By: Luke Willard; Tarhan Feyzioglu
    Keywords: Inflation , China , United States , Japan , Deflation , Trade , Economic models ,
    Date: 2006–02–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/36&r=mon
  36. By: Bruce D. Smith; Mohsin S. Khan; A. Senhadji Semlali
    Abstract: Prepayment required for individual copies. An annual subscription is $375.00 a year. It includes 12 monthly shipments and priority mail delivery. The Stock No. for the subscription is WPEA.
    Keywords: Inflation , Markets , Economic models ,
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:01/44&r=mon
  37. By: Celine Rochon
    Abstract: In an economy with a fixed exchange rate regime that suffers a random adverse shock, we study the strategies of imperfectly and sequentially informed speculators that may trigger an endogenous devaluation before it occurs exogenously. The game played by the speculators has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium which is a strongly rational expectation equilibrium in the set of all strategies with delay. Uncertainty about the extent to which the Central Bank is ready to defend the peg extends the ex ante mean delay between the exogenous shock and the devaluation. We determine endogenously the rate of devaluation. Forthcoming in the Journal of International Economics
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sbs:wpsefe:2006fe03&r=mon
  38. By: Roberto Guimaraes (International Monetary Fund); Cem Karacadag (International Monetary Fund)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:68&r=mon
  39. By: Anne Sibert
    Abstract: There is a small, but growing, economics literature on the importance and effects of having monetary policy made by a committee, rather than by an individual. Complimenting this is an older and larger body of literature on groups in the other social sciences, particular in social psychology. This paper provides a review of some of this work, focusing on two important features of committees: the effect of their size on performance and whether or not they are more moderate than the members who make them up. Individual members of a committee acquire idiosyncratic information which the committee uses to make a decision. A result of the famous Condorcet Jury Theorem is that larger committees have more resources, in the form of more information, and are thus better than smaller ones. This result depends on individuals being willing to work as hard at gathering information when they are members of a committee as they would be willing to work if they were acting alone. The economics literature suggests that this may not hold; that individual members may have an incentive to shirk. This phenomenon of a member withholding effort is called social loading in the social pyschology literature. Studies stretching over 125 years document its existence and suggest that it becomes more important as committee size increases and that it disappears when individual members contributions can be identified and evaluated. The Condorcet Jury Theorem also depends on the committee being able to aggregate members information and on members being willing to truthfully reveal their information. An excessively formal meeting structure may cause the former to fail to hold; committee members with different objectives may cause the latter not to be true. As a result of shirking and coordination problems, smaller committees may be better than larger ones and the optimal size for a committee is an empirical issue. Committees pool members information and views, thus it seems that monetary policy made by a committee should be more moderate than monetary policy made by a single individual. However, several hundred studies demonstrate that belonging to a committee polarizes its members and, hence, committees may be more extreme than individuals. A particularly harmful form of group polarization occurs when committee members striving for consensus causes them to stop paying suffcient attention to alternative courses of action. In this case the committee may make terrible decisions that none of its members would have made on their own. The results of the literature on committee size and committee polarization suggest that the ideal monetary policy committee may not have many more than five members. It should have a well defined objective and it should publish the votes of its members. It should be structured so that members do not act as part of a group, perhaps by having short terms in office and members from outside the central bank. External scrutiny of the decision-making process should be encouraged.
    Keywords: committees; monetary policy.
    JEL: E58 C92 D71
    Date: 2006–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:091&r=mon
  40. By: Klaus Schaeck (University of Southampton); Simon Wolfe
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:44&r=mon
  41. By: Jonathan David Ostry; Jeromin Zettelmeyer
    Keywords: Fund , Crisis prevention , Exchange rate policy surveillance ,
    Date: 2005–11–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/206&r=mon
  42. By: Young-Sook Lee (University of Wales Swansea); Tae-Hwan Kim (University of Nottingham); Paul Newbold (Yonsei University)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:19&r=mon
  43. By: Rodolphe Blavy
    Keywords: Banking , Bank credit , Bank supervision ,
    Date: 2005–12–13
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:05/222&r=mon
  44. By: Matthias Doepke (UCLA); Martin Schneider (NYU and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
    Date: 2006–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:uclawp:846&r=mon
  45. By: Fabrizio Zampolli (Bank of England); Andrew Blake (Bank of England)
    Date: 2005–09–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mmf:mmfc05:2&r=mon
This nep-mon issue is ©2006 by Bernd Hayo. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 13:16.