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on Marketing |
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Issue of 2014‒02‒21
three papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao Universidade da Beira Interior and Universidade de Lisboa |
| By: | Bontems, Philippe; Mahenc, Philippe |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the issue of price signaling in a model of vertical relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer who share the same information about quality, unlike consumers who do not observe it a priori. We show that delegating the price setting task to a retailer and controlling it through a vertical contract (two-part tari¤) helps drastically reduce the number of price signaling equilibria available to the retailer. The outcome of a unique price charged to consumers obtains without invoking the consumer sophistication usually required by selection criterions. The vertical contract turns to be the most e¢ cient way for the vertical chain to tie its hands on a unique ?nal price. This price may disclose or not information to consumers depending on their initial optimism about quality. We prove that there also exists circumstances where consumers prefer ex ante not to learn the true quality through price. |
| Keywords: | quality signalling, vertical relationship, information disclosure. |
| JEL: | D82 L12 L15 |
| Date: | 2014–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:27906&r=mkt |
| By: | Marc Bourreau (Telecom ParisTech and CREST-LEI); Frago Kourandi (Athens University of Economics and Business); Tommaso Valletti (University of Rome Tor Vergata and Imperial College London) |
| Abstract: | We propose a two-sided model with two competing Internet platforms, and a continuum of Content Providers (CPs). We study the effect of a net neutrality regulation on capacity investments in the market for Internet access, and on innovation in the market for content. Under the alternative discriminatory regime, platforms charge a priority fee to those CPs which are willing to deliver their content on a fast lane. We find that under discrimination investments in broadband capacity and content innovation are both higher than under net neutrality. Total welfare increases, though the discriminatory regime is not always beneficial to the platforms as it can intensify competition for subscribers. As platforms have a unilateral incentive to switch to the discriminatory regime, a prisoner's dilemma can arise. We also consider the possibility of sabotage, and show that it can only emerge, with adverse welfare effects, under discrimination. |
| Keywords: | Net neutrality; Two-sided markets; Platform competition; Investment; Innovation. |
| JEL: | L13 L51 L52 L96 |
| Date: | 2014–02–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:307&r=mkt |
| By: | Mohamed Akli Achabou; Sihem Dekhili; Linda Prince |
| Abstract: | The main objective of this research is to study the determinants of the environmental commitment in France. 25 companies responded to a survey. The results show that the regulation constitutes a relevant vector of the environmental commitment of companies but it comes in a second order after the customer satisfaction. The search for legitimacy with the customers seems to be fundamental for the enterprises’ survival. |
| Keywords: | Environmental commitment, Financial performance, Customer satisfaction, Corporate social responsibility (CSR). |
| Date: | 2014–01–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-075&r=mkt |