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on Marketing |
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Issue of 2007‒01‒13
seven papers chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao University of the Beira Interior |
| By: | Jean, JASKOLD-GABSZEWICZ (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Department of Economics); Didier, LAUSSEL; Nathalie, SONNAC |
| Abstract: | We study access pricing by platforms providing internet services or pay-TV to users while they allow advertisers to have access to these users against payment via ads or banners. Users are assumed to be ad-haters. It is shown that equilibrium access prices in the usersÕ market are increasing in the dimension of the advertising market : the larger the number of advertisers, the higher the access prices for both platforms. |
| Date: | 2006–09–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006044&r=mkt |
| By: | Andrea Di Liddo; Luigi De Cesare |
| Abstract: | Let us consider two new perfect substitute durable products which are produced and sold in a market by two competing firms. Looking at a potential buyer, we build a stochastic rule by which she purchases the good from one of the two firms (so that she becomes an adopter). The model is considered discrete in time and space. The probability of transition from the non adopter state to the adopter one depends on an imitation mechanism (word-ofmouth) as well as on the pricing and advertising policies of the producers/sellers. It is assumed that only actual information about the market determine the evolution in the subsequent time step so that a Markov process arises. Both firms maximize their expected discounted profits by choosing optimal marketing strategies. Suitable equilibria are characterized and, because of the lack of convexity in the model, the simulated annealing algorithm is proposed to compute them. |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ufg:qdsems:07-2006&r=mkt |
| By: | Bontems, P.; Meunier, V. |
| Abstract: | We analyze a two-sender quality-signaling game in a duopoly model where goods are horizontally and vertically differentiated. While locations are chosen under quality undertainty, firms choose prices and advertising expenditures being privately informed about their thpes. We show that pure price separation is impossible, and that dissipative advertising is necessary to ensure existence of separating equilibria. Equilibrium refinements discard all pooling equilibria and select a unique separating equilibrium. When vertical differentiation is not too high, horizontal differentiation is at a maximum, the high-quality firm advertises, and both firms adopt prices that are distorted upwards (compared to the symmetric-informati on benchmark). When vertical differentiation is high, firms choose identical locations and espost, only the high-quality firm obtains positive profits and signals its type through advertising only. Incomplete information and the subsequant signaling activity are chowh to increase the set of parameters values for which maximum horizontal differentiation occurs. ...French Abstract : Les auteurs étudient dans cet article, un modèle de concurrence au sein d'un duopole dans un contexte de différenciation horizontale. Les produits vendus par les firmes peuvent aussi potentiellement différer selon leur qualité. Les firmes choisissent tout d'abord leurs localisations de manière séquentielle puis simultanément leurs prix. A l'étape de localisation, la qualité du suiveur est connaissance commune tandis que la qualité du leader est incertaine mais révélée de manière privée avant l'étape de compétition par les prix. Ils montrent que la perspective de devoir signaler une qualité haute par le prix induit le leader à accroître au maximum la différenciation horizontale du produit. Ce résultat contraste fortement avec l'équilibre en information complète, qui peut impliquer une différenciation minimale ou intermédiaire selon les paramètres du modèle. Ainsi, le principe de différentiation maximale est restauré en présence d'information incomplète. |
| Keywords: | ADVERTISING; LOCATION CHOICE; QUALITY; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; MULTI-SENDER SIGNALING GAME ; DIFFERENCIATION DES PRODUITS; PRIX; QUALITE DES PRODUITS; CONCURRENCE ECONOMIQUE; OLIGOPOLE |
| JEL: | D43 L15 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rea:inrawp:200603&r=mkt |
| By: | Minjae Song (School of Economics Georgia Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | The paper has two objectives. The first is to construct a dynamic model of research joint ventures (RJVs) in which firms competing in the product market cooperate in investing to improve generic manufacturing technology. The second objective is to analyze cooperative research led by SEMATECH in the semiconductor industry using the dynamic model. The estimation consists of two stages. In the first stage, consumer demand is estimated using product level data, and state variables are constructed to reflect a technological advance and an evolution of firms' competitiveness in the product market. In the second stage, research expenditure level and firms' value functions are computed for every combination of the state variables as solutions to the dynamic model. I also compute firms' research expenditures for competitive research by making firms unilaterally invest in research. The results show that in RJVs firms' research expenditures go down to one fifth of what they would spend in competitive research. Lower research expenditure results in higher net profits in RJVs, although variable profits are similar in all regimes. RJVs are also more likely to generate higher consumer surplus than competitive research. This is because, while consumers benefit from more frequent introductions of higher quality products in competitive research, they occasionally pay higher prices than they do in RJVs for the same quality products. The net effect is that consumers are hurt more by higher price in competitive research than by less frequent introductions of new products in RJVs. Firms also make different research decisions for the same changes in the product market conditions, depending on whether they cooperate or compete in research |
| Keywords: | Research Joint Venture, Dynamic Model of Oligopoly Market, Product Innovation |
| JEL: | C73 D92 L63 |
| Date: | 2006–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed006:468&r=mkt |
| By: | Dubois, P.; Nauges, C. |
| Abstract: | We propose a structural empirical approach à la Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) to disentangle the effect of experts' grades from the effect of unobserved quality on the pricing of experience goods. Using a panel data set of 108 châteaux selling wine on the Bordeaux "en primeur" market, we provide some empirical validation for the theoretical result that the price set by wine producers is used as a signal for wine quality. We confirm that experts' grades affect producers' choice of "en primeur" price above the effect of unobserved wine quality. Our empirical results also show that failing to control for endogeneity caused by the omission of unobserved quality leads to over-estimate the influence of experts" grades on the "primeur" price. ...French Abstract : Lorsqu'un bien d'expérience est délivré sur le marché, l'opinion des experts est supposée donner de l'information sur la qualité du bien aux futurs consommateurs. Cependant, savoir si l'opinion des experts affecte la formation des prix par elle-même reste une question empirique difficile à répondre. En effet, la vraie qualité inobservée du bien rend l'opinion des experts nécessairement endogène dans une équation de prix hédonique pour des biens d'expérience. En utilisant un panel de données sur les vins de Bordeaux, les auteurs proposent une approche structurelle permettant de séparer la valeur de l'information sur la qualité donnée par les experts de l'effet de la vraie qualité. |
| Keywords: | EXPERIENCE GOOD; EXPERTS' GRADES; QUALITY; WINE; IDENTIFICATION; STRUCTURAL ECONOMETRICS ; ECONOMETRIE; EXPERT; QUALITE DES PRODUITS; VIN DE BORDEAUX; PANEL ; BIEN D'EXPERIENCE |
| JEL: | D82 L15 Q11 C51 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rea:inrawp:200607&r=mkt |
| By: | Pedro Cosme Vieira (Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto); Aurora A.C. Teixeira (CEMPRE, Faculdade de Economia do Porto, Universidade do Porto) |
| Abstract: | Although there is considerable consensus that Finance, Management, and Marketing are ‘science’, some debate remains with regard to whether these three areas comprise autonomous, organized and settled scientific research fields. In this paper we aim to explore this issue by analyzing the occurrence of citations in the top-ranked journals in the areas of Finance, Management, and Marketing. We put forward a modified version of the ‘network cluster’ as proposed by Klamer and Van Dalen (2002) and conclude that Finance is a ‘Relatively autonomous, organized and settled field of research’ whereas Management and (to a larger extent) Marketing are relatively non-autonomous and hybrid fields of research’. Complementary analysis based on sub-discipline rankings using the recursive methodology of Liebowitz and Palmer (1984) confirms the above conclusions. |
| Keywords: | Citations; Science; Autonomy |
| JEL: | C89 A12 |
| Date: | 2006–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:233&r=mkt |
| By: | Bonnet, C.; Dubois, P.; Simioni, M. |
| Abstract: | We present a methodology allowing to introduce manufacturers and retailers vertical contracting in their pricing strategies on a differentiated product market. We consider in particular two types of non linear pricing relationships, one where resale price maintenance is used with two part tariffs contracts and one where no resale price maintenance is allowed in two part tariffs contracts. Our contribution allows to recover price-cost margins from estimates of demand parameters both under linear pricing models and two part tariffs. The methodology allows then to test between different hypothesis on the contracting and pricing relationships between manufacturers and retailers in the supermarket industry using exogenous variables supposed to shift the marginal costs of production and distritution. We apply empirically this method to study the market for retailing bottled water in France. Our empirical evidence shows that manufacturers and retailers use non linear pricing contracts and in particular two part tariffs contracts with resale price maintenance. At last, thanks to the estimation of our structural model, we present some simulations of counterfactual policy experiments like the change of ownership of some products between manufacturers. ...French Abstract : Dans cet article, les auteurs présentent une méthodologie permettant de modéliser des contrats dans les stratégies de fixation des prix des distributeurs et des producteurs sur un marché oû les produits sont différenciés. Notamment, ils considèrent deux types de contrats à tarifs binômes pour modéliser les relations verticales : avec ou sans prix de revente imposés par les producteurs. Ce papier permet de déterminer les marges prix coût à partir de paramètres estimés de la demande à la fois pour des modèles de double marginalisation et pour des modèles à tarifs binômes. Différentes hypothèses sur les relations entre producteurs et distributeurs sont alors testées en utilisant des variables exogènes supposées faire varier les coûts marginaux de production et de distribution. Les auteurs appliquent empiriquement cette méthode au marché de l'eau plate nature embouteillée en France. Les résultats empiriques montrent que les producteurs et les distributeurs utilisent des contrats à tarifs binômes avec prix de revente imposés. De plus, grâce aux estimations du modèle structurel, les auteurs simulent des changements de propriété des produits entre producteurs et distributeurs. |
| Keywords: | VERTICAL CONTRACTS; TWO PART TARIFFS; MANUFACTURERS; RETAILERS; DOUBLE MARGINALIZATION; COLLUSION; COMPETITION; WATER; DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS; NON NESTED TESTS ; CONTRAT; PRODUCTEUR; DISTRIBUTION; COUT MARGINAL; CONCURRENCE ECONOMIQUE; DIFFERENCIATION DES PRODUITS; PRIX; EAU MINERALE; MODELE |
| JEL: | L13 L81 C12 C33 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rea:inrawp:200604&r=mkt |