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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Luca Colombo (ESC [Rennes] - ESC Rennes School of Business); Paola Labrecciosa; Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We take a novel approach based on differential games to the study of criminal networks. We extend the static crime network game (Ballester et al., 2006, 2010) to a dynamic setting where criminal activities negatively impact the accumulation of total wealth in the economy. We derive a Markov Feedback Equilibrium and show that, unlike in the static crime network game, the vector of equilibrium crime rates is not necessarily proportional to the vector of Bonacich centralities. Next, we conduct a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the network size, the network density, and the marginal expected punishment, finding results in contrast with those arising in the static crime network game. We also shed light on a novel issue in the network theory literature, i.e., the existence of a voracity effect. Finally, we study the problem of identifying the optimal target in the population of criminals when the planner's objective is to minimize aggregate crime at each point in time. Our analysis shows that the key player in the dynamic and the static setting may differ, and that the key player in the dynamic setting may change over time. |
| Keywords: | Differential games, Markov equilibrium, Criminal networks, Bonacich centrality, Key player |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-04850675 |
| By: | Kroeger, Sarah (U.S. Department of the Treasury); La Mattina, Giulia (University of South Florida) |
| Abstract: | Criminal activity nuisance ordinances penalize tenants for calling emergency services in relation to certain illegal events, including domestic violence. There is a widespread concern that these policies will exert a chilling effect on the reporting of domestic violence and potentially increase the incidence and severity of domestic assaults. We exploit the sequential implementation of criminal activity nuisance ordinances by municipalities in Ohio, and estimate the direct impact of these ordinances on intimate partner homicides using a reduced form framework. We rule out an increase in intimate partner homicides following the enactment of a nuisance ordinance; in fact we estimate a negative impact. The effect is driven by a reduction in partner homicides in cities with a higher proportion of renter-occupied homes prior to the implementation of the ordinances. We do not find any evidence that the effect can be attributed to selective migration out of cities that enacted nuisance ordinances or a change in police officer reporting practices. |
| Keywords: | domestic violence, housing policy, intimate partner homicide, nuisance ordinance |
| JEL: | J12 J18 K42 R28 |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17565 |
| By: | Pia M. Orrenius; Chloe N. Smith; Madeline Zavodny |
| Abstract: | Hiring someone who is not authorized to work in the United States is illegal, and employers who knowingly hire unauthorized immigrant workers may face civil and criminal penalties. The federal government uses a variety of actions, including worksite raids and paperwork audits, to enforce the prohibition on hiring unauthorized workers. Compliance costs and the possibility of becoming the target of an immigration enforcement action may affect U.S. businesses’ decisions about whom to hire as well as how many workers to employ and how much to pay them, but little previous research has studied such potential impacts. We find that increases in worksite enforcement actions in an industry raise employment but reduce the average wage. Enforcement also boosts both hires and separations, so worker turnover rises. Actions that target employers—audits, investigations, fines and criminal charges—have larger effects than raids, which target workers. The results are consistent with businesses shifting to on-the-books or legal workers when immigration enforcement activity increases. However, tougher enforcement does not lead to an increase in business sign-ups in E-Verify or IMAGE, which are two federal government programs that can help businesses determine whether workers are authorized. This suggests that, even in the face of tougher enforcement, employers find it costly to use programs that check workers’ employment eligibility. |
| Keywords: | unauthorized immigration; Immigration enforcement; raids; audits; E-Verify |
| JEL: | J15 J61 J63 K37 |
| Date: | 2024–11–19 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:feddwp:99175 |
| By: | Roberto Galbiati (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emeric Henry (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Nicolas Jacquemet (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Formal enforcement punishing defectors can sustain cooperation by changing incentives. In this paper we introduce a second effect of enforcement: it can also affect the capacity to learn about the group's cooperativeness. Indeed, in contexts with strong enforcement, it is difficult to tell apart those who cooperate because of the threat of fines from those who are intrinsically cooperative types. Enforcement can then potentially have a negative dynamic impact on cooperation when it prevents learning. We provide theoretical and experimental evidence in support of this mechanism. Using a lab experiment with independent interactions and random rematching, we observe that, in early interactions, having faced an environment with fines in the past decreases current cooperation. We further show that this results from the interaction between enforcement and learning: the effect of having met cooperative partners has a stronger effect on current cooperation when this happened in an environment with no enforcement. |
| Keywords: | Enforcement, social values, cooperation, learning, spillovers, repeated games, experiments |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-04800439 |
| By: | Ms. Monique Newiak; Ms. Ratna Sahay; Navya Srivastava |
| Abstract: | Domestic violence is a global phenomenon. We study the interplay of determinants of a woman’s risk of facing intimate partner violence (IPV) for the case of India—using information from up to 235 thousand female survey respondents and exploiting state-level variation in institutions, law enforcement and attitudes. Unless in paid and formal employment, a woman’s economic activity is associated with a higher risk of IPV. However, household and other characteristics, such as higher agency within the household, higher education of the husband, lower social acceptance of IPV, and normalization of reporting incidences of violence counter this association. At the state level, the presence of more female leaders, better reporting infrastructure for victims of IPV, and higher charge-sheeting rates are associated with a lower risk of IPV. |
| Keywords: | Female employment; labor force participation; intimate partner violence; legal rights; institutions |
| Date: | 2024–11–22 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/239 |
| By: | Galán, Juan Sebastián (Universidad de los Andes) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the persistent effects of Crown versus settler colonialism. Exploiting a spatial regression discontinuity design in Mexico, I document that regions where the relative power of the colonial state over settler elites was higher exhibit higher historical and contemporary economic prosperity. In contrast to the view that Crown judges disproportionately weakened property rights, court records analyzed with natural language processing algorithms suggest they constrained settlers from expropriating indigenous lands. In the long-run, a feedback loop appears to have consolidated an emerging rural middle class, whose relative enfranchisement tied it less to patronage politics, encouraging public good provision and labor mobility out of agriculture. |
| Keywords: | Colonialism; courts; property rights; economic development; Mexico. |
| JEL: | D73 K40 N46 O12 P14 |
| Date: | 2024–12–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000089:021268 |
| By: | Bagues, Manuel (University of Warwick); Villa, Carmen (University of Warwick and Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | Over the past decades, many European countries have raised the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) from 16 to 18 years. This study provides novel evidence of the impact of this policy on educational outcomes by exploiting the staggered timing of MLDA changes across Spanish regions. Raising the MLDA decreased alcohol consumption among adolescents aged 14–17 by 8 to 18% and improved their exam performance by 4% of a standard deviation. This effect appears driven by alcohol’s direct impact on cognitive ability, as we find no significant changes in potential mediators like use of other substances or time spent on leisure activities, including socialising, sports, gaming, or internet use. We also observe a decrease in tranquilliser and sleeping pill use, suggesting improved mental health. Our findings indicate that reducing teenage alcohol consumption represents a significant opportunity to improve educational outcomes in Europe, where youth drinking rates remain notably high. |
| Keywords: | alcohol ; adolescence ; minimum legal drinking age ; PISA JEL Codes: I18 ; I12 ; I21 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1529 |
| By: | Alan D. Miller |
| Abstract: | I propose a model of aggregation of intervals relevant to the study of legal standards of tolerance. Seven axioms: responsiveness, anonymity, continuity, strategyproofness, and three variants of neutrality are then used to prove several important results about a new class of aggregation methods called endpoint rules. The class of endpoint rules includes extreme tolerance (allowing anything permitted by anyone) and a form of majoritarianism (the median rule). |
| Date: | 2024–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2501.00578 |
| By: | Matthew J. Lindquist (Stockholm University); Eleonora Patacchini (Cornell University); Michael Vlassopoulos (University of Southampton); Yves Zenou (Monash University) |
| Date: | 2024–12–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:24/56 |