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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Waterson, Michael (University of Warwick); Xie, Jian (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the London bus market, a large market with regular procurement of bus services, for possible collusion using a wide variety of techniques, making use of the data at our disposal. There is little evidence of collusion in bidding for contracts apparent from our data, despite some features of the market that might lead to collusive behaviour. |
| Keywords: | Cartel behaviour ; Procurement ; Detecting Cartels ; Bus market |
| JEL: | D44 L41 L92 D22 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1196&r=all |
| By: | Budzinski, Oliver; Lindstädt-Dreusicke, Nadine |
| Abstract: | The markets for audiovisual content are subject to dynamic change. Where once "traditional" (free-to-air, cable, satellite) television was dominating, i.e. linear audiovisual media services, markets display nowadays strong growth of different types of video-on-demand (VoD), i.e. nonlinear audiovisual media services, including both Paid-for VoD like Amazon Prime and Netflix and Advertised-financed VoD like YouTube. Competition policy decisions in such dynamic markets are always particularly challenging. The German competition authority was presented such a challenge when, at the beginning of the 2010s, German television providers sought to enter online VoD markets with the help of cooperative platforms. We review the antitrust concerns that were raised back then in an ex post analysis. In doing so, we first discuss the dynamic development of the German VoD markets during the last decade. In the second part of this paper, we derive four aspects, in which the previous antitrust analysis cannot be upheld from today's perspective. First, relevant implications of modern platform economics were neglected. Second, some inconsistencies in the assessment of the two projects appear to be inappropriate. Third, the emerging competitive pressure of international VoD providers was strongly underestimated. Fourth, the question of market power in online advertising markets looks very different at the end of the decade. |
| Keywords: | video-on-demand,media economics,two-sided markets,competition,platform economics,commercial television,public service broadcasters,antitrust policy,YouTube,Amazon,Netflix |
| JEL: | L40 L82 K21 L13 D40 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:125&r=all |
| By: | Simplice A. Asongu (Yaoundé/Cameroon); Jacinta C. Nwachukwu (Preston,United Kingdom); Stella-Maris I. Orim (Coventry University, UK); Chris Pyke (Preston, United Kingdom) |
| Abstract: | Purpose-The study complements the scant macroeconomic literature on the development outcomes of social media by examining the relationship between Facebook penetration and violent crime levels in a cross-section of 148 countries for the year 2012. Design/methodology/approach-The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Tobit and Quantile regressions. In order to respond to policy concerns on the limited evidence on the consequences of social media in developing countries, the dataset is disaggregated into regions and income levels. The decomposition by income levels included: low income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income. The corresponding regions include: Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Findings-From OLS and Tobit regressions, there is a negative relationship between Facebook penetration and crime. However, Quantile regressions reveal that the established negative relationship is noticeable exclusively in the 90th crime quantile. Further, when the dataset is decomposed into regions and income levels, the negative relationship is evident in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) while a positive relationship is confirmed for sub-Saharan Africa. Policy implications are discussed. Originality/value- Studies on the development outcomes of social media are sparse because of a lack of reliable macroeconomic data on social media. This study primarily complemented five existing studies that have leveraged on a newly available dataset on Facebook. |
| Keywords: | Crime; Social media; ICT; Global evidence; Social networks |
| JEL: | K42 D83 O30 D74 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:abh:wpaper:19/003&r=all |
| By: | Christophe Bellégo (CREST-ENSAE); Joeffrey Drouard (University of Rennes 1 and CREM) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the effects of policies fighting drug gangs. We exploit the pacification program of slums in Rio de Janeiro, whose progressive rollout across several districts allows the identification of its causal effects on several crime indicators measured from o cial crime data. By combining a proxy variable and by adding simple structure to the empirical model, we correct the endogeneity bias resulting from the unobserved crime reporting change associated with the policy. We find that the program decreases murder rate by 7 percent, but increases assault rate by 51 percent, resulting in a rise in the total number of crimes. Our results are explained both by marginal and absolute crime deterrence effects, and the fact that drug gangs secure the territories under their control. |
| Keywords: | Crime, Criminal Governance, Reporting Rate, Pacification Policy, Drug Gangs, Brazil |
| JEL: | D74 K42 |
| Date: | 2019–05–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crs:wpaper:2019-08&r=all |
| By: | Simplice A. Asongu (Yaoundé/Cameroon); Joseph Nnanna (The Development Bank of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the determinants of and persistence in access to weapons using a global sample of 163 countries for the period 2010 to 2015. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). Hysteresis in access to weapons is consistently more apparent in countries with below-median levels in access to weapons, compared to their counterparts with above-median levels in access to weapons. The hysteresis hypothesis within this context is the propensity of past values of access to weapons to influence future values of access to weapons. Factors that consistently drive access to weapons are: perceptions of crime; criminality; conflict intensity; political instability; military expenditure, violent demonstrations and terrorism. The effects of these drivers are contingent on initial levels of access to weapons. Policy recommendations for managing access to weapons are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Access to weapons; Global evidence; Persistence; Arms; Security |
| JEL: | H56 L64 K42 P50 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:abh:wpaper:19/008&r=all |
| By: | Lena Edlund; Cecilia Machado |
| Abstract: | US homicide rates fell sharply in the early 1990s, a decade that also saw the mainstreaming of cell phones – a concurrence that may be more than a coincidence, we propose. Cell phones may have undercut turf-based street dealing, thus undermining drug-dealing profits of street gangs, entities known to engage in violent crime. Studying county-level data for the years 1970-2009 we find that the expansion of cellular phone service (as proxied by antenna-structure density) lowered homicide rates in the 1990s. Furthermore, effects were concentrated in urban counties; among Black or Hispanic males; and more gang/drug-associated homicides. |
| JEL: | I0 I18 R0 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25883&r=all |
| By: | Levy, Daniel; Young, Andrew |
| Abstract: | We study the cost of breaching an implicit contract in a goods market, building on a recent study that documented the presence of such a contract in the Coca-Cola market, in the US, during 1886‒1959. The implicit contract promised a serving of Coca-Cola of a constant quality (the “real thing”), and of a constant quantity (6.5oz in a bottle or from the fountain), at a constant nominal price of 5¢. We offer two types of evidence. First, we document a case that occurred in 1930, where the Coca-Cola Company chose to incur a permanently higher marginal cost of production, instead of a one-time increase in the fixed cost, to prevent a quality adjustment of Coca-Cola, which would be considered a breach of the implicit contract. Second, we explore the consequences of the Company’s 1985 decision to replace the original Coke with the “New Coke.” Using the model of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Hirschman 1970), we argue that the unprecedented public outcry that followed the New Coke’s introduction, was a response to the Company’s breaching of the implicit contract. We document the direct and quantifiable costs of this implicit contract breach, and demonstrate that the indirect, although unquantifiable, costs in terms of lost customer goodwill were substantial. |
| Keywords: | Implicit Contract, Cost of Breaching a Contract, Cost of Breaking a Contract, Invisible Handshake, Customer Market, Long-Term Relationship, Price Rigidity, Sticky Prices, Nickel Coke, Coca-Cola, Secret Formula |
| JEL: | A14 E12 E31 K10 L14 L16 L66 M30 M31 N80 |
| Date: | 2019–05–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:94148&r=all |