New Economics Papers
on Law and Economics
Issue of 2013‒06‒04
twelve papers chosen by
Jeong-Joon Lee, Towson University
  1. Do Lawyer-Legislators Protect Their Business? Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms By Ulrich Matter; Alois Stutzer
  2. Racial Segregation Patterns in Selective Universities By Peter Arcidiacono; Esteban Aucejo; Andrew Hussey; Kenneth Spenner
  3. Legal emulation between regulatory competition and comparative law By Larouche, P.
  4. Of TRIPS and Traps: The Interpretative Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU over Patent Law By Dimopoulos, A.; Vantsiouri, P.
  5. Foreign Investment Insurance and EU Law By Dimopoulos, A.
  6. Institutions, competition and regulation: Intellectual property and innovation By Tucker, C.E.
  7. The impact of EU competition law on national healthcare systems By Sauter, W.
  8. Innovation is in the (clean) air: The inclusion of aviation in the EU emissions trading scheme as a driver of innovation in air transport By Lykotrafiti, A.A.
  9. Are joint patents collusive? Evidence from the US and Europe By Fosfuri, A.; Helmers, C.; Roux, C.
  10. Market dominance and quality of search results in the search engine market By Lianos, I.; Motchenkova, E.
  11. Institutional investors, political connections and incidence of corporate fraud By Wu, W.; Johan, S.A.; Rui, O.M.
  12. Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy By Acconcia, Antonio; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore; Rey, Patrick
  1. By: Ulrich Matter; Alois Stutzer (University of Basel)
    Abstract: <p style="margin-bottom:12.0pt; text-autospace:none"><span style="font-family:"Arial","sans-serif"">Attorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal and state level between 1995 and 2012. It holds when controlling for legislators’ ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer-legislators, at least in part, pursue their business interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators’ identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.</span>
    Keywords: Lawyers, legislatures, rent-seeking, tort law, tort reform, voting behavior
    JEL: D72 K13
    Date: 2013
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2013/09&r=law
  2. By: Peter Arcidiacono; Esteban Aucejo; Andrew Hussey; Kenneth Spenner
    Abstract: This paper examines sorting into interracial friendships at selective universities. We show significant friendship segregation, particularly for blacks. Indeed, black friendships are no more diverse in college than in high school despite the colleges blacks attend having substantially smaller black populations. We show that part of the reason for the segregation patterns is large differences in academic background coupled with students being more likely to form friendships with those of similar academic backgrounds. Within a school, stronger academic backgrounds make interracial friendships with blacks less likely and friendships with Asians more likely. These results suggest that affirmative action admission policies at selective universities which drive a wedge between the academic characteristics of different racial groups may result in increased within school segregation.
    Keywords: Minorities, college, friendship, race
    JEL: K10 J15 I20
    Date: 2013–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1219&r=law
  3. By: Larouche, P. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012017&r=law
  4. By: Dimopoulos, A.; Vantsiouri, P. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012025&r=law
  5. By: Dimopoulos, A. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012028&r=law
  6. By: Tucker, C.E. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012030&r=law
  7. By: Sauter, W. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012032&r=law
  8. By: Lykotrafiti, A.A. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012033&r=law
  9. By: Fosfuri, A.; Helmers, C.; Roux, C. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012035&r=law
  10. By: Lianos, I.; Motchenkova, E. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012036&r=law
  11. By: Wu, W.; Johan, S.A.; Rui, O.M. (Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economics Center)
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2012042&r=law
  12. By: Acconcia, Antonio; Immordino, Giovanni; Piccolo, Salvatore; Rey, Patrick
    Abstract: We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.
    Keywords: Accomplice-witness, Criminal Organizations, Leniency, Whistleblowing.
    Date: 2013–03–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:27210&r=law
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