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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Berggren, Niclas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Bjørnskov, Christian (Aarhus University) |
| Abstract: | Social and cultural determinants of economic institutions and outcomes have come to the forefront of economic research. We introduce religiosity, measured as the share for which religion is important in daily life, to explain institutional quality in the form of property rights and the rule of law. Previous studies have only measured the impact of membership shares of different religions, with mixed results. We find, in a cross-country regression analysis comprising up to 112 countries, that religiosity is negatively related to our institutional outcome variables. This only holds in democracies (not autocracies), which suggests that religiosity affects the way institutions work through the political process. Individual religions are not related to our measure of institutional quality. |
| Keywords: | Religion; Religiosity; Rule of law; Property rights; Institutions |
| JEL: | K11 K42 Z12 |
| Date: | 2012–03–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0905&r=law |
| By: | Suncica Vujic (University of Bath, Bath, UK); Jacques Commandeur (VU University Amsterdam); Siem Jan Koopman (VU University Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We adopt a structural time series analysis to investigate the impact of parole abolition and sentence reform in Virginia on reported crime rates. The Commonwealth of Virginia abolished parole and reformed sentencing for all felony offences committed on or after January 1, 1995. To examine the impact of Virginia's change in legislation on reported crime rates from 1995 onwards, we perform an intervention time series analysis based on structural time series models. We empirically find that the change in legislation has significantly reduced the burglary rates and to a lesser extent the murder rates in Virginia. For other violent crimes such as rape and aggravated assault the evidence of a significant reduction in crime rates is less evident or is not found. This empirical study for Virginia also provides an illustration of how an effective intervention time series analysis can be carried out in crime studies. |
| Keywords: | Intervention time series analysis; Crime rates; Structural time series models; Unobserved components time series models |
| JEL: | C22 C32 I28 K14 |
| Date: | 2012–01–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120007&r=law |
| By: | Ajay Bhaskarabhatla (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Enrico Pennings (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
| Abstract: | We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a monopolist facing uncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensive disclosures and patents by IBM during 1955-1989. Our results indicate that stronger antitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions are disclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative but less successful mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust; Defensive Disclosure; Patent; IBM |
| JEL: | K21 L40 M10 O32 O34 |
| Date: | 2012–02–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20120010&r=law |
| By: | Koyama, Mark |
| Abstract: | Can the market provide law enforcement? This paper addresses this question by examining an historical case-study: the system of private prosecutions that prevailed in England prior to the introduction of the police. Using a model of the market for crime, I examine why this system came under strain during the Industrial Revolution, and how private associations were able to emerge to internalize the externalities that caused the private system to generate too little deterrence. The model and historical evidence suggest that these private order institutions were partially successful in meliorating the problem of crime in a period when Public Choice considerations precluded the introduction of a professional police force. |
| Keywords: | Economics of Crime; Private Prosecutions; Club Goods; Deterrence; Free- Riding |
| JEL: | N13 K00 K42 K14 N43 |
| Date: | 2012–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40500&r=law |
| By: | Ryan L. Lampe; Petra Moser |
| Abstract: | Patent pools, which allow competing firms to combine their patents, have emerged as a prominent mechanism to resolve litigation when multiple firms own patents for the same technology. This paper takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools on innovation within 20 industries. Difference-in-differences regressions imply a 16 percent decline in patenting in response to the creation of a pool. This decline is driven by technology fields in which a pool combined patents for substitute technologies by competing firms, suggesting that unregulated pools may discourage innovation by weakening competition to improve substitutes. |
| JEL: | K0 L4 N22 O3 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18316&r=law |
| By: | Abhay Aneja; John J. Donohue III; Alexandria Zhang |
| Abstract: | For over a decade, there has been a spirited academic debate over the impact on crime of laws that grant citizens the presumptive right to carry concealed handguns in public – so-called right-to-carry (RTC) laws. In 2005, the National Research Council (NRC) offered a critical evaluation of the “More Guns, Less Crime” hypothesis using county-level crime data for the period 1977-2000. 17 of the 18 NRC panel members essentially concluded that the existing research was inadequate to conclude that RTC laws increased or decreased crime. One member of the panel, though, concluded that the NRC's panel data regressions supported the conclusion that RTC laws decreased murder. We evaluate the NRC evidence, and improve and expand on the report’s county data analysis by analyzing an additional six years of county data as well as state panel data for the period 1977-2006. We also present evidence using both a more plausible version of the Lott and Mustard specification, as well as our own preferred specification (which, unlike the Lott and Mustard model used in the NRC report, does control for rates of incarceration and police). While we have considerable sympathy with the NRC’s majority view about the difficulty of drawing conclusions from simple panel data models, we disagree with the NRC report’s judgment that cluster adjustments to correct for serial correlation are not needed. Our randomization tests show that without such adjustments the Type 1 error soars to 44 – 75 percent. In addition, the conclusion of the dissenting panel member that RTC laws reduce murder has no statistical support. Our paper highlights some important questions to consider when using panel data methods to resolve questions of law and policy effectiveness. Although we agree with the NRC’s cautious conclusion regarding the effects of RTC laws, we buttress this conclusion by showing how sensitive the estimated impact of RTC laws is to different data periods, the use of state versus county data, particular specifications, and the decision to control for state trends. Overall, the most consistent, albeit not uniform, finding to emerge from both the state and county panel data models conducted over the entire 1977-2006 period with and without state trends and using three different specifications is that aggravated assault rises when RTC laws are adopted. For every other crime category, there is little or no indication of any consistent RTC impact on crime. It will be worth exploring whether other methodological approaches and/or additional years of data will confirm the results of this panel-data analysis. |
| JEL: | K0 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18294&r=law |