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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Lindquist, Matthew J. (Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University); Santavirta, Torsten (Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | - |
| Keywords: | - |
| Date: | 2012–05–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sofiwp:2012_008&r=law |
| By: | Grossman, Gene M. (Princeton University); Horn, Henrik (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Mavroidis, Petros C. (Columbia Law School and University of Neuchatel) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of the study is to propose interpretations of the National Treatment (NT) provision included in Art. III GATT, unbound by case-law interpretations of this provision. To make such proposals, we need to understand the role of the provision in the agreement. To this end, we first examine in Chapter 2 the negotiating record relevant to the rationale for the enactment of this provision, as well as the manner in which case law has understood it. In the same Chapter, we also discuss the role of NT in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from the perspective of economic theory. Having established the purpose of NT, we discuss in Chapter 3 the manner in which this provision has been implemented in case law: that is, here we focus on the understanding of the key terms implementing the purpose of NT by GATT and World Trade Organization (WTO) adjudicating bodies. At the end of this Chapter we provide a critical assessment of the case law. In light of our dissatisfaction with the case-law interpretations of some key terms, we present in Chapter 4 our preferred interpretation of NT. |
| Keywords: | National treatment; Trade agreement; WTO; GATT; Most favoured nation |
| JEL: | F13 |
| Date: | 2012–05–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0917&r=law |
| By: | Dewenter, Ralf; Heimeshoff, Ulrich |
| Abstract: | Increasing price levels, high price volatility and the suspicion of collusive behavior are important topics of public debates on competition in retail gasoline markets in many countries. Several governments and competition authorities introduced fuel price regulations in form of restrictions on the frequencies of fuel price changes per day. We present empirical evidence of the effects of fuel price regulation in Austria and Western Australia using difference-in-differences methods to estimate treatment effects of the implementation of such pricing rules. Our estimates provide evidence that fuel price levels in Austria decreased after implementation of regulation. However, we cannot find robust significant effects of regulation on fuel price levels in Western Australia. -- |
| JEL: | K2 K23 L5 L51 L71 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:51&r=law |
| By: | Tim Besley; Thiemo Fetzer; Hannes Mueller |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the effect of piracy attacks on shipping costs using a unique data set on shipping contracts in the dry bulk market. We look at shipping routes whose shortest path exposes them to piracy attacks and find that the increase in attacks in 2008 lead to around a ten percent increase in shipping costs. We use this estimate to get a sense of the welfare loss imposed by piracy. Our intermediate estimate suggests that the creation of $120 million of revenue for pirates in the Somalia area led to a welfare loss of over $1.5 billion. |
| Keywords: | piracy, welfare loss, maritime transport, Somalia, private security, law and order, property rights |
| JEL: | K42 O18 F1 D74 |
| Date: | 2012–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:626&r=law |
| By: | Agisilaou, Panayiotis |
| Abstract: | We develop a model wherein collusive firms' decisions to keep or to destroy the hard evidence is endogenous. Unlike previous literature, we assume that the administration of the cartel crucially depends on the existence of the hard evidence. Within this framework, we explore the impact of a leniency program on whether firms' incentives are to destroy or to keep the hard evidence. Moreover, we examine firms' incentives to report or not to report the hard evidence to the antitrust authority. We show that firms may willfully keep the hard evidence, even if a leniency program is not available, in order to enhance the stability of the cartel. Additionally, we prove that firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency program is available. Finally, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive profits-fine ratio increases. |
| Keywords: | self-reporting; leniency program; hard evidence; collusion |
| JEL: | K40 K21 L4 L1 |
| Date: | 2012–03–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39109&r=law |
| By: | Agisilaou, Panayiotis |
| Abstract: | We develop a model wherein collusive firms' decisions to keep or to destroy the hard evidence is endogenous. Unlike previous literature, we assume that the administration of the cartel crucially depends on the existence of the hard evidence. Within this framework, we explore the impact of a leniency program on whether firms' incentives are to destroy or to keep the hard evidence. Moreover, we examine firms' incentives to report or not to report the hard evidence to the antitrust authority. We show that firms may willfully keep the hard evidence, even if a leniency program is not available, in order to enhance the stability of the cartel. Additionally, we prove that firms are more inclined to keep the hard evidence when a leniency program is available. Finally, we demonstrate that firms are more likely to destroy the hard evidence when the collusive profits-fine ratio increases. |
| Keywords: | antitrust; cartels; enforcement policy; hard evidence; leniency programs |
| JEL: | K21 L4 K4 |
| Date: | 2011–05–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:30963&r=law |
| By: | Deakin, Simon; Sarkar, Prabirjit; Singh, Ajit |
| Abstract: | Legal origins theory suggests that law reform,strengthening shareholder and creditor rights, should enhance financial development. We use recently created datasets measuring legal change over time in a sample of 25 developing, developed and transition countries to test this claim. We find that increases in shareholder protection contribute to stock market growth in the common law world and in developing countries, but not in the civil law world. We also find evidence of reverse causation, with financial development triggering legal changes in the developing world. We consider a number of reasons for the selective impact of law reform, focusing on the endogeneity of the legal system to its economic context, and on resulting complementarities between legal and financial institutions. JEL Codes: G33, G34, K22, O16. |
| Keywords: | legal origins; company law; shareholder rights; creditor rights; financial development |
| JEL: | K22 G34 O16 G33 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:39047&r=law |