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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Harbaugh, William T. (University of Oregon); Mocan, Naci (Louisiana State University); Visser, Michael S. (Sonoma State University) |
| Abstract: | We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger. |
| Keywords: | crime, punishment, incentives, deterrence, juvenile, arrest, risk, larceny |
| JEL: | K4 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5813&r=law |
| By: | Knieps, Günther |
| Abstract: | Regulatory reforms in European network industries are strongly influenced by legal decisions. The cases considered in this paper not only initiated the liberali-zation process of the markets for network services but also provided an impor-tant signaling function for the remaining regulatory problems: localization of network-specific market power, abolishment of grandfathering rights, ex ante regulation of network-specific market power instead of negotiated unregulated network access, incentive regulation instead of cost-based regulation. The process towards sector-symmetric market power regulation based on economi-cally founded principles gains increasing relevance. Nevertheless, there are fur-ther reform potentials to be exhausted in the future. -- |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:aluivr:129r&r=law |
| By: | Chongwoo Choe; Ratbek Dzhumashev; Asadul Islam; Zakir H. Khan |
| Abstract: | We examine the causes and consequences of corruption in the provision of education service in Bangladesh. Our empirical analysis is based on the 2007 household survey data collected by Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), which measure actual corruption. Our main findings are (i) both the incidence of corruption and the amount of bribe increase in the level of red tape, (ii) poorer households, households with less educated household head, and households with girls studying in school are more likely to be victims of corruption, (iii) households with higher social status are more likely to rely on informal network to bypass the red tape or pay less amount of bribe and, as a result, (iv) corruption in the education sector is likely to be regressive. |
| Keywords: | education, corruption, bribery, Bangladesh |
| JEL: | K4 O1 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2011-08&r=law |
| By: | Cozzi, Guido; Galli, Silvia |
| Abstract: | The incentives to conduct basic or applied research play a central role for economic growth, and this question has not been explored in much detail so far. How does increasing early innovation appropriability affect basic research, applied research, education, and wage inequality? In the US, what does the common law system imply on the macroeconomic responses to institutional change? This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of patent protection by incorporating a two-stage cumulative innovation structure into a quality-ladder growth model with skill acquisition. We consider three issues (a) the over-protection vs. the under-protection of intellectual property rights; (b) the evolution of jurisprudence shaping the bargaining power of the upstream innovators; and (c) the implications of strengthening patent protection on wage inequality and growth. We show analytically and numerically how the jurisprudential changes in intellectual property rights witnessed in the US after 1980 can be related to the well-known changes in wage inequality and in education attainments. Basic research patents may have grown disproportionately due increasing jurisdictional protection, eventually compromising applied innovation, education, and growth. By simulations, we show that the dynamic general equilibrium interations may mislead the econometric assessment of the temporary vs persistent effects IPR policy. |
| Keywords: | Basic and Applied R&D; Two-Stage Sequential Innovation; Skill Premium; Inequality and Education; Common Law. |
| JEL: | K40 O34 O31 |
| Date: | 2011–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:31902&r=law |