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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Yan Li (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the impacts of reforms – privatization, new entry and independent regulatory authority – on mobile network penetration and expansion using a new and hitherto unused panel dataset for 30 national mobile markets (i.e. 29 OECD countries and China) over the time period 1991-2006 under a 3-equation econometric framework. The estimation results confirm that introducing new entry is, in general, positively correlated with mobile network penetration and expansion; and in particular, the third entry brings many more benefits than the second one. The results also highlight the crucial role of an independent regulator in privatized mobile markets. Especially, the dynamic estimation results suggest that without an independent regulator, privatization is, on average, negatively correlated with mobile network expansion, even in certain competitive market environments. |
| Keywords: | New entry, privatization, independent regulator, mobile network, econometric analysis |
| JEL: | L10 L51 L96 K23 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-35&r=law |
| By: | C. Fritz Foley; Robin Greenwood |
| Abstract: | Recent research documents that ownership concentration is higher in countries with weak investor protection. However, drawing on panel data on corporate ownership in 34 countries between 1995 and 2006, we show this pattern does not hold for newly public firms, which tend to have concentrated ownership regardless of the level of investor protection. We show that firms in countries with strong investor protection are more likely to experience decreases in ownership concentration after listing, that these decreases appear in response to growth opportunities, and that they are associated with new share issuance. We consider the implications of these findings for financing choices and patterns in firm growth and analyze alternative explanations for the diffusion of ownership that could distort our interpretations. We conclude that ownership concentration falls as firms age following their IPO in countries with strong investor protection because firms in these countries raise capital and grow, diluting blockholders in the process. |
| JEL: | G3 K22 |
| Date: | 2008–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14557&r=law |