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on Law and Economics |
| By: | Andre van Stel; David Storey; Roy Thurik |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of business regulations on various measures of entrepreneurship. Using data for a sample of countries participating in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor between 2002 and 2005, we estimate a two-equation model explaining the nascent and the actual entrepreneurship rate, while taking into account the interrelationship between the two variables. Various determinants of entrepreneurship reflecting the demand and supply side of entrepreneurship as well as business regulation measures are incorporated in the model. Data on various categories of business regulations are taken from the World Bank Doing Business data base. Our estimation results suggest that, while entry regulations only have a small and indirect impact on the actual entrepreneurship rate, the impact of labour market regulations is more important. We also find that the determinants of opportunity and necessity entrepreneur-ship are fundamentally different. |
| Keywords: | nascent entrepreneurship, young businesses, business regulations, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, World Bank Doing Business |
| JEL: | K20 L51 M13 O57 |
| Date: | 2006–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:egpdis:2006-04&r=law |
| By: | Louis Kaplow |
| Abstract: | This Handbook entry presents a conceptual, normative overview of the subject of taxation. It emphasizes the relationships among the main functions of taxation -- notably, raising revenue, redistributing income, and correcting externalities -- and the mapping between these functions and various forms of taxation. Different types of taxation as well as expenditures on transfers and public goods are each integrated into a common optimal tax framework with the income tax and commodity taxes at the core. Additional topics addressed include a range of dynamic issues, the unit of taxation, tax administration and enforcement, and tax equity. |
| JEL: | H20 H21 D61 I38 K34 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12061&r=law |
| By: | Patricia Born; W. Kip Viscusi; Tom Baker |
| Abstract: | Whereas the literature evaluating the effect of tort reforms has focused on reported incurred losses, this paper examines the long run effects using a comprehensive sample by state of individual firms writing medical malpractice insurance from 1984-2003. The long run effects of reforms are greater than insurers' expected effects, as five year developed losses and ten year developed losses are below the initially reported incurred losses for those years following reform measures. The quantile regressions show the greatest effects of joint and several liability limits, noneconomic damages caps, and punitive damages reforms for the firms that are at the high end of the loss distribution. These quantile regression results show stronger, more concentrated effects of the reforms than do the OLS and fixed effects estimates for the entire sample. |
| JEL: | K13 G22 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12086&r=law |
| By: | Matthias Kräkel (University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, tel: +49 228 733914, fax: +49 228 739210. m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de); Dirk Sliwka (University of Cologne, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, D-50931 Köln, Germany, tel: +49 221 470-5888, fax: +49 221 470-5078. dirk.sliwka@uni-koeln.de) |
| Abstract: | We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the principal's profits from entering the market are sufficiently large relative to the agent's outside option. If the principal can impose a fine on the agent for leaving the firm, she will never prefer a non-compete agreement. |
| Keywords: | fine, incentives, incomplete contracts, non-compete agreements |
| JEL: | D21 J3 K1 M5 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:99&r=law |