|
on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy |
Issue of 2020‒05‒25
two papers chosen by Laura Ştefănescu Centrul European de Studii Manageriale în Administrarea Afacerilor |
By: | Zhangkai Huang; Gordon M. Phillips; Jialun Yang; Yi Zhang |
Abstract: | The Cultural Revolution deprived Chinese students of the opportunity to receive higher education for 10 years when colleges and universities were closed from 1966-1976. We examine the human capital cost of this loss of education on subsequent innovation by firms, and ask if it impacted firms more than 30 years later. We examine the innovation of firms with CEOs who turned 18 during the Cultural Revolution, which sharply reduced their chances of attending college. Using multiple approaches to control for selection and endogeneity, including an instrument based on whether the CEO turned 18 during the Cultural Revolution and a regression discontinuity approach, we show that Chinese firms led by CEOs without a college degree spend less on R&D, generate fewer patents, and receive fewer citations to these patents. |
JEL: | G3 I23 J24 O31 O32 |
Date: | 2020–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27107&r=all |
By: | Maurizio Iacopetta (Sciences Po-OFCE and SKEMA Business School); Raoul Minetti (Michigan State University); Pierluigi Murro (LUISS University) |
Abstract: | New firms are often based on ideas that the founders developed while working for incumbent firms. We study the macroeconomic effects of spinoffs through a growth model of product variety expansion, driven by firm entry, and product innovation. Spinoffs stem from conflicts of interest between incumbent firms' shareholders and employees. The analysis suggests that incumbents invest more in product innovation when knowledge protection is stronger. An inverted-U shape relationship emerges, however, between the intensity of spinoff activities and the strength of the rule of law. A calibration experiment indicates that, with a good rule of law, loosening knowledge protection by 53 reduces product innovation by one fifth in the short run and one seventh in the long run, but boosts the spinoff rate by one tenth and one sixth in the short and long run, respectively. Nevertheless, per capita income growth drops and welfare deteriorates. The trade-offs are broadly consistent with evidence from Italian firms. |
Keywords: | Corporate Governance, Endogenous Growth, Spinoffs. |
JEL: | E44 O40 G30 |
Date: | 2020–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fce:doctra:2013&r=all |