nep-knm New Economics Papers
on Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy
Issue of 2006‒09‒03
twelve papers chosen by
Martin Spraggon Hernandez
Universite du Quebec en Outaouais
  1. Price Competition over Boundedly Rational Agents By B. Luppi
  2. Firms' Network Formation Through the Transmission of Heterogeneous Knowledge By R. Andergassen; F. Nardini; M. Ricottilli
  3. Optimal Search Auctions with Correlated Bidder Types By Cremer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles
  4. Reflections on "The Simple Economics of Basic Research": Looking Back and Looking Forwards By Richard Nelson
  5. Competition, Innovation and Growth with Limited Commitment By Ramon Marimon; Vincenzo Quadrini
  6. Agricultural Production Clubs: Viability and Welfare Implications By Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.
  7. Valuing R & D Investments With A Jump-Diffusion Process By L. Sereno
  8. The skill content of technological change. Some conjectures on the role of education and job-training in reducing the timing of new technology adoption. By R. Antonietti
  9. Recommended Play and Correlated Equilibria: An Experimental Study By Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib
  10. Degenerate Feedback and Time Consistency in Dynamic Games By R. Cellini; L. Lambertini; G. Leitmann
  11. Endogenous Attention Costs and Intertemporal Decision-Making By D. Dragone
  12. A Rationale for Searching (Imprecise) Health Information By F. Barigozzi; R. Levaggi
  1. By: B. Luppi
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:565&r=knm
  2. By: R. Andergassen; F. Nardini; M. Ricottilli
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:543&r=knm
  3. By: Cremer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles
    Abstract: We study optimal auctions when contacting prospective bidders is costly and the bidders’ values are correlated. Although full surplus extraction is in general impossible, we can construct a search mechanism that fully extracts the surplus with an arbitrarily high probability.
    Keywords: optimal auction, correlated values, search costs, search mechanism,
    Date: 2006–08–24
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12663&r=knm
  4. By: Richard Nelson
    Abstract: Many of the points argued in this old paper have withstood the tests of time. The economic contribution of basic research is to enable or facilitate downstream invention. The range of inventions that may be facilitated by basic research is unpredictable, but often large. For these reasons, it is desirable that the results of basic research be in the public domain rather than being patented. One major point has turned out not to be fully true. In some cases the results of basic research can be and have been patented. The heart of this essay is an exploration of the problems that have been caused in recent years by the patenting of basic research results, and a consideration of the policy options and appropriate responses.
    Keywords: Basic research, Science, Public Domain, Patenting, Bayh-Dole
    Date: 2006–08–31
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2006/20&r=knm
  5. By: Ramon Marimon; Vincenzo Quadrini
    Abstract: We study how barriers to competition---such as restrictions to business start-up and strict enforcement of covenants or IPR---affect the investment in knowledge capital when contracts are not enforceable. These barriers lower the competition for human capital and reduce the incentive to accumulate knowledge. We show in a dynamic general equilibrium model that this mechanism has the potential to account for significant cross-country income inequality.
    JEL: L14 L16 O4
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12474&r=knm
  6. By: Langinier, Corinne; Babcock, Bruce A.
    Abstract: Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as a club. We first investigate under what circumstances a club of a given size is desirable for producers, and for society. We then analyze the optimal size of the club when there exists a direct barrier to entry, and when there is no barrier. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified producers have divergent incentives. Furthermore, if barriers to entry are allowed, an optimal size of club exists, which allows some revelation of information. In the absence of barrier to entry, it is less likely that a club will emerge.
    Keywords: Asymmetric information, certification, clubs, quality.
    Date: 2006–08–28
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12670&r=knm
  7. By: L. Sereno
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:569&r=knm
  8. By: R. Antonietti
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:556&r=knm
  9. By: Cason, Timothy N.; Sharma, Tridib
    Abstract: This study reports a laboratory experiment wherein subjects play a hawk-dove game. We try to implement a correlated equilibrium with payoffs outside the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs by privately recommending play. We find that subjects are reluctant to follow certain recommendations. We are able to implement this correlated equilibrium, however, when subjects play against robots that always follow recommendations, including in a control treatment in which human subjects receive the robot "earnings." This indicates that the lack of mutual knowledge of conjectures, rather than social preferences, explains subjects' failure to play the suggested correlated equilibrium when facing other human players.
    Keywords: Game Theory ; Experiments ; Coordination ; Common Knowledge
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2006–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1191&r=knm
  10. By: R. Cellini; L. Lambertini; G. Leitmann
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:535&r=knm
  11. By: D. Dragone
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:570&r=knm
  12. By: F. Barigozzi; R. Levaggi
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:559&r=knm
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