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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Antinyan, Armenak; Asatryan, Zareh |
| Abstract: | Governments increasingly use nudges to improve tax collection. We synthesize the growing literature that evaluates nudging experiments using meta-analytical methods. We find that simple reminders increase the probability of compliance by 2.7 percentage points relative to the baseline where about a quarter of taxpayers are compliant. Nudges that commonly refer to elements of tax morale increase compliance by another 1.4 percentage points. Deterrence nudges, which inform taxpayers about enforcement parameters, increase compliance the most, amounting to an additional 3.2 percentage points increase on top of reminders. Our additional findings highlight the conditions where nudges are more effective, such as their potential when targeting sub-population of late-payers, and also suggest that even this sample of randomized trials may be susceptible to selective reporting of results. Overall, our findings imply that taxpayers are biased by various informational and behavioral constraints, and that nudges can be of some help in overcoming these frictions. |
| Keywords: | Tax compliance, Tax evasion, Randomized control trials, Nudging, Reminders, Tax morale, Deterrence, Meta-analysis, Publication selection bias |
| JEL: | C93 D91 H26 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:300677 |
| By: | Klejdysz, Justyna (LMU Munich and ifo Institute); Zawisza, Tom (OECD and Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Abstract: | How does the differential tax treatment of employees versus self-employed affect the decision to switch to self-employment? Using administrative data on the universe of taxpayers, we study the impact of a large tax cut for business owners in Poland on high-income individuals’ decisions to transition from employment to self-employment. In 2004, the marginal tax rate for business owners in the top income bracket decreased from 40% to a flat rate of 19%, while employees remained subject to a progressive tax schedule with a top rate of 40%. We find a 17% increase in the probability of high-income employees switching to self-employment five years after the reform. The increase in entries to self-employment was driven by increased transitions to long-term solo self-employment (self-employment without dependent workers), especially in high-skilled service industries. In 2009, another reform reduced the tax differential. The entries from employment to self-employment temporarily decreased, but those who had previously switched to self-employment did not return to employment. These findings suggest that large tax differentials increased the attractiveness of self-employment as an alternative to employment but also increased the share of entrants to self-employment who do not hire workers. |
| Keywords: | employment; self-employment; optimal taxation; income tax; highincome earners |
| JEL: | D31 H20 J62 L26 |
| Date: | 2024–08–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:mfplwp:0043 |