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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Julien Albertini; Arthur Poirier; Thepthida Sopraseuth (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | We shed light on the driving forces behind unemployment uctuations and short-run changes in the informality rate on the Argentine labor market. Using Argentine survey data, we measure worker ows between formal employment, informal employment, unemployment and non-participation. We propose a methodology to correct for the discontinuity of Argentine survey data and that is able to compute consistent time series of quarterly ins and outs of informal work. Using variance decompositions and counterfactual exercises, we show that the ins and outs of informal employment are key drivers of labor market uctuations. In particular, out ows from unemployment to informal employment account for 37% of uctuations in the unemployment rate. In addition, our analysis suggests that informality is: (i) a exible sector that is used in recessionary periods as a bu er against income losses and (ii) a stepping stone towards formal employment. The observed large changes in the informality rate are well explained by the change in job mobility between the formal and informal sectors as well as variations in hirings from unemployment and non-participation in the informal sector. |
| Keywords: | worker ows, informality, unemployment, business cycle, emerging market. |
| JEL: | E24 E26 J6 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2019-13&r=all |
| By: | Charles Bellemare; Marvin Deversi; Florian Englmaier |
| Abstract: | Filing income tax returns or insurance claims often requires that individuals comply with complex rules to meet their obligations. We present evidence from a laboratory tax experiment suggesting that the effects of complexity on compliance are intrinsically linked to distributive fairness. We find that compliance remains largely unaffected by complexity when income taxes are distributed to a morally justified charity. Conversely, complexity significantly amplifies non-compliance when income taxes appear wasted as they are distributed to a morally dubious charity. Our data further suggest that this non-compliance pattern is facilitated through the ambiguity that evolves from mostly unstrategic filing mistakes. |
| Keywords: | complexity, compliance, distributive fairness, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D91 H26 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7899&r=all |
| By: | Simplice A. Asongu (Yaoundé/Cameroon); Nicholas M. Odhiambo (Pretoria, South Africa) |
| Abstract: | This study investigates linkages between the mobile phone, information sharing offices (ISO) and financial sector development in 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. ISO are private credit bureaus and public credit registries. The empirical evidence is based on contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. Two main hypotheses are tested: mobile phones complement ISO to enhance the formal financial sector (Hypothesis 1) and mobile phones complement ISO to reduce the informal financial sector (Hypothesis 2). The hypotheses are largely confirmed. This research adds to the existing body of literature by engaging hitherto unexplored dimensions of financial sector development and investigating the role of mobile phones in information sharing for financial sector development. |
| Keywords: | Information sharing; Banking sector development; Africa |
| JEL: | G20 G29 L96 O40 O55 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aby:wpaper:19/016&r=all |
| By: | Kevin Lang; Kaiwen Leong; Huailu Li; Haibo Xu |
| Abstract: | We study roughly 11,000 loans from unlicensed moneylenders to over 1,000 borrowers in Singapore and provide basic information about this understudied market. Borrowers frequently expect to repay late. While lenders do rely on additional punishments to enforce loans, the primary cost of not repaying on time is compounding of a very high interest rate. We develop a very simple model of the relational contract between loan sharks and borrowers and use it to predict the effect of a crackdown on illegal moneylending. Consistent with our model, the crackdown raised the interest rate and lowered the size of loans. |
| JEL: | I28 I3 K42 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26400&r=all |