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on Informal and Underground Economics |
| By: | Philippe Adair (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12) |
| Abstract: | The Non-Observed Economy (NOE) vs. the shadow economy remains a controversial issue. Illegal, underground and informal activities encapsulated within the NOE/shadow economy display large discrepancies throughout the European Union. First, a tractable taxonomy of the aforementioned market activities is designed according to both definition and scope, whereupon a wide spectrum of estimation methods applies. Second, direct measurements provided by tax audits, household informal expenditure and labour market surveys provide piecemeal information regarding such unobserved activities; a cross-section survey issued from a unique questionnaire applied to all European countries in 2007 and again in 2013 deserves special attention. Third, indirect macroeconomic measurements are drawn from discrepancies on the market for goods and services on the money market and on the labour market, whereas the DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple indicators-multiple causes) method carves the trends of the shadow economy (hereafter SE). Fourth, the estimates of the EU shadow economy drawn from the DYMIMIC model are compared with the assessment of the NOE according to national accounts adjustments; the relevance of major determinants of the NOE/shadow economy-tax burden as well as the characteristics of the informal workforce, is discussed. |
| Keywords: | Shadow Economy ,Estimates,European Union,Measurement Methods,National Accounts |
| Date: | 2017–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01683929&r=iue |
| By: | Anastasiya Luzgina (Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center) |
| Abstract: | Construction sector is on of the most closed and corrupted sector in many countries. Belarus is no exception. For understanding the real situation with corruption and tax evasion in construction sector in Belarus the survey of 50 construction companies was done. According to achieved results, a large share of respondents agreed that some companies of the sector have hidden income, pay salaries " in envelopes " and spend some money for resolving problems with state institutions. At the same time construction enterprises that participated in tenders on municipal procurement underline many problems in this specific sphere. All these problems can be divided by administrative, economic and problems associated with the existence of corruption and the shadow economy. The most popular answers include corruption, unfair competition and imperfect legislation. On the base of international experience and the results of the survey we develop the list of recommendations for decreasing the level of corruption and tax evasion in construction sector that will support to create favorable environment for business development of the country. |
| Keywords: | corruption,tax evasion,construction,shadow economy,municipal procurements |
| Date: | 2017–12–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01705894&r=iue |
| By: | Mitra, Sudeshna; Gupta, Kausik |
| Abstract: | The paper attempts to analyze the impact of trade liberalization policy, in terms of FDI, on the level of informal competitive wage rate as well as on the size of the informal sectors of a developing economy with dualistic economic structure in a general equilibrium framework. The wage rate earned by the informal workers has been considered here as a proxy for their living standard. In this paper it is found that FDI raises the level of wage rate of the informal workers and consequently raises their standard of living. It is also found in this paper that FDI expands both formal and informal manufacturing sectors in the urban areas whereas it contracts the rural agricultural informal sector. In this structure an attempt has also been made to analyze the effects on the welfare level of the economy for a drive towards liberalization through FDI by assuming Sen (1974) type social welfare function which considers inequality in income distribution. |
| Keywords: | Informal sector, informal wage, liberalization, foreign capital, inequality, welfare. |
| JEL: | F10 F11 F16 I30 J31 O17 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:85230&r=iue |
| By: | BANERJI, Asit; GOTO, Jun; ISHIZAKI, Hironori; KUROSAKI, Takashi; LAL, Kaushalesh; PAUL, Shampa; SAWADA Yasuyuki; TSUDA, Shunsuke |
| Abstract: | To deepen our understanding of the urban informal sector and small enterprises in developing countries, we surveyed micro and small entrepreneurs in northeastern areas of Delhi, India. The baseline survey was conducted in November–December 2014, covering 506 sample entrepreneurs in both manufacturing and service sectors. Between June and August 2017, the endline survey was conducted to collect panel information on firm performance. As the demonetization policy in November 2016, in which high value banknotes were demonetized overnight, affected small and micro enterprises, specific questions on its impact were added in the endline survey. Between the two surveys, artefactual field experiments were also applied to the subsample to collect information on social, risk, and time preferences. In this paper, we present details of the resurveys implemented under this project and describe the key variables collected. Among 226 entrepreneurs who participated in the artefactual field experiments, many showed their tendency for present bias and high discount rates. On average, the participant entrepreneurs behaved in an altruistic manner, took substantial risk, and reduced their risk-taking when they were assigned the role of the leader. Out of 287 entrepreneurs who participated in the endline survey, 50% were unregistered with the government, implying that they were highly informal. During the period between baseline and endline surveys, innovations to expand the business were not very active, either. The majority of sample entrepreneurs were affected at least temporarily by the demonetization in 2016. |
| JEL: | O17 O14 L26 |
| Date: | 2018–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hiasdp:hias-e-65&r=iue |
| By: | Carné, Martín.; Trevignani, Virginia.; Muruaga, Fernando. |
| Keywords: | labour inspection, informal employment, Argentina |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:ilowps:994980393202676&r=iue |
| By: | Dom, Roel |
| Abstract: | A major component of tax administration reform in sub-Saharan Africa over the last thirty years has been the creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities (SARAs). These operate at arm’s length from the ministry of finance, which is different to conventional tax administrations. They have an independent legal status, and usually integrate both customs and tax functions. While most SARAs have a similar institutional framework, they may have different de jure competences, organisational set-up and responsibilities, and differences in their de facto autonomy from the ministry of finance. This ring-fencing of tax collection from political interference is supposed to improve tax compliance and collection compared to conventional tax administrations. By handing control over to an independent authority, governments can signal a credible commitment to a fairer and less discretionary collection process that should boost compliance. In addition, increases in human resources, budget, organisational and financial autonomy might create the managerial space and flexibility needed to overcome rigid civil service structures, allowing the administration to operate more effectively. However, to the extent to which different SARAs share the same institutional blueprint, there is a risk that the reform remains blind to local political and societal sensitivities, which could undermine its effectiveness. Existing research largely concludes that there is a positive correlation between the establishment of SARAs and increases in revenue collection. However, our recent research shows that there is no robust evidence to substantiate this. |
| Keywords: | Governance, |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idq:ictduk:13612&r=iue |
| By: | Bertranou, Fabio.; Jiménez, Mónica.; Jiménez, Maribel. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:ilowps:994980393302676&r=iue |
| By: | Carné, Martín.; Trevignani, Virginia.; Muruaga, Fernando. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ilo:ilowps:994980393102676&r=iue |